The role of third party intervention in Africa's civil conflicts: The case of South Africa's peace mission in Burundi (1999-2004) by Kiiza, Charles J.
                                                                      1
THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’s  CIVIL 
CONFLICTS: THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S PEACE MISSION IN 
BURUNDI (1999-2004). 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Justification for the Research 
 
1.1.1 Background    
  
The end of the cold war has introduced a significant change in conception and 
practice of humanitarian intervention. The end of superpower confrontation has 
substantially removed the “systemic constraints” on intervention in sovereign states.  
The cold war had made non-intervention an international norm, but its demise has 
granted broad recognition to the protection of individual rights. This has created an 
enabling environment for initiating interventions. Humanitarian interventions are not 
only aimed at preventing the suffering perpetrated by repressive governments, but are 
also meant to alleviate the situations produced by internal conflicts that lead to gross 
violation of human rights1. 
 
The end of the cold war “did not bring peace, but war and conflict” in the territories of 
millions of people. The UN has been increasingly called upon to respond by 
alleviating the suffering inflicted on the civilian populations, and to assist conflicting 
parties reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict2. In Africa, the post-cold war has 
been widely marked by an increase in the “number, scope and intensity” of civil 
conflicts that have spread, or possess the potential to spread into neighboring 
countries3. The intractable civil conflict in Burundi epitomizes Rugumamu’s 
                                                 
1 Saban Kardas, 2001, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: The Evolution of the Idea and Practice’,       
   Journal of International Affairs, vol.vi, no.2, pp.4-5.   
2 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘The United Nations and the New Global Challenges’, Social Education,    
   vol.58, no.7, 1994, pp.403-406 
3 Severine, M. Rugumamu, State Sovereignty and Intervention in Africa: Nurturing New   
  Governance Norms, Conflict Management Center, OAU, Maputo, 2001,pp.5-6 
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argument; the civil conflict which has been on-going since the country’s 
independence in 1962, escalated into a fully-fledged conflict in the aftermath of the 
end of the cold war- 1993, killing and displacing hundreds of thousands of 
Burundians and threatening regional stability.  
 
Almost all conflicts in Africa since the end of the cold war are civil in nature. From 
the experience of the United Nations and other international actors, these conflicts 
have proven much difficult to address than inter-state conflicts4. Hence, this research 
investigates the role played by these external actors (Interveners) in addressing 
contemporary African civil conflicts by specifically looking at South Africa’s leading 
and challenging role in helping to address Burundi’s intractable civil conflict. 
 
Events that occurred in Somalia and Rwanda during the early 1990s, and the recent 
crises in West Africa and the Great Lakes Region, call forth to “urgent and continuing 
need for developing effective methods for rapid and effective intervention in African 
conflicts”5. In a positive move towards that, the African Union (AU) has launched a 
new Peace and Security Council (PSC). Motivated by failure of the international 
community to prevent the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the AU pledges to intervene in 
African conflicts6. It is in view of that, that South Africa hopes to “play a leading role 
in a variety of international, regional and sub-regional forums, and that the country 
will become an active participant in attempts to resolve various regional and 
international conflicts”7. 
 
The Burundi conflict which turned into a bloody civil conflict in 1993 when the first 
democratically elected president, Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated is believed to 
be “fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions and stems 
                                                 
4 Marrack Goulding, , ‘The United Nations and Conflicts in Africa Since the Cold War’, Africa   
  Affairs, vol.1999, no.98, 1999, p.155 
5 Vanessa Kent & Mark Malan, 'Decisions, Decisions South Africa’s Foray into Regional Peace   
   Operations’, Occasional Paper 72, http://www.iss.co.za, April 2003, p.1 
6 Agence France Presse, ‘African Ministers Agree on Robust Peacekeeping Force’,  
   http://www.globalpolicy.org, 1 July 2002, p.1 
7 Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘White Paper on South African Participation in  
   International Peace Mission’, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 1998, pp.1-2  
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from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power”8. Ever 
since the country got its independence “acts of genocide, war crimes and other crimes 
against humanity have been perpetrated against Tutsi and Hutu ethnic communities”9. 
Arguably, such acts are not committed against Burundians but the entire humanity, 
since they constitute a breach of the universal human rights and the 1948 Geneva 
Convention on Genocide, hence, demand urgent attention from the international 
community in form of intervention for human protection. 
 
Despite the fact that the international community has had to re-define and expand 
international norms of sovereignty and non-intervention in order to address the plight 
of the civilian populations, which has been aggravated by the intensifying post-cold 
war civil conflicts, yet without re-defining traditional peacekeeping, which is 
conditioned by a ceasefire agreement between warring parties; consent by the 
conflicting parties; impartiality of the peacekeeping force; and non-employment of 
force (except for self-defense), any intervention in an intra-conflict will constitute a 
violation of these internationally recognized principles of peacekeeping. Moreover, to 
a party that has not consented to the deployment of a peacekeeping force, such 
intervention would be seen to undermine peace by acting as a problem rather than a 
solution. 
 
The Burundi civil conflict illustrates the foregoing argument: 
 The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was not signed 
by the two major conflicting parties, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy 
(FDD) and the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), though the former later 
acceded to the Agreement. This has hindered the peace implementation 
program in areas infiltrated by FNL. 
 The AU did not seek consent from FNL and FDD in constituting the African 
mission in Burundi. This increasingly undermined the ceasefire and put the 
peace process in jeopardy10.  
                                                 
8 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, http://www.usip.org,  
   4 Feb. 2002, p.4 
9  loc.cit 
10Vaness Kent & Mark Malan, op.cit, p.5; Jan Van Eck, ‘The ‘Dar Talks’: No Chance of Progress   
   Without Inclusivity’, www.up.ac.za, 28 Aug.2002, p.2; ‘Burundi Peace Talks Close with Little  
    Progress’, http://www.cnn.com, 30 Nov.2000, p.1 
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Accordingly, this fell short of a peacekeeping mission since according to traditional 
peacekeeping a ceasefire agreement signed by warring parties is only meant to create 
a secure environment for the interposition of the peacekeeping force between the 
hostile parties (in other words, keeping the peace) while enabling negotiations aimed 
at resolving the conflict to take place. Therefore, it can be argued that, in that context 
there was no peace to keep in Burundi. Thus, this demands an investigation into SA’s 
diplomatic machinery in overcoming this challenge. 
 
1.1.2 Justification 
 
Despite increased prospects of peace after the end of the cold war, intra-state conflicts 
on the African continent have increased in number, scope and intensity11. Hence, it is 
important to investigate the challenging role by interveners in Africa’s contemporary 
civil conflicts by looking at possibilities offered by the new world order and 
constraints encountered in addressing the conflicts. 
 
In order for any enduring resolution of a conflict to occur there is, as a prerequisite, 
need to diagnose the root causes of a conflict. The root causes of the Burundi conflict 
have been mainly attributed to ethnic and regional discrimination, political and 
economic exclusion. In responding to this, the key mediator of the Burundi conflict, 
Nelson Mandela with the help of the Regional Initiative for peace in Burundi and 
representatives from UN and OAU designed a formula in which the issues of power 
sharing and reconciliation were to be addressed.  This culminated in the Arusha Peace 
and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi. Despite the fact that all the other major 
warring parties have embraced the Agreement as a tool to address the root causes of 
the Burundi civil conflict, efforts to bring the FNL aboard the Peace deal have been 
futile; the rebel group has occasionally continued to launch attacks on both military 
and civilian targets. The complexity of this situation (the refusal of FNL to join the 
peace process) perhaps introduces a new dimension to the root causes of civil 
conflicts. This research investigates this case and elucidates the underlying factors 
surrounding it, with a view to bring to light a new perspective of looking at and 
dealing with intractable civil conflicts.   
                                                 
11 Saban Kardas, op.cit, p.6; Severine, M. Rugumamu, op.cit, pp.5-6 
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The 1994 Rwandan genocide in which up to a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus 
were massacred unfolded regional ethnic extremism/solidarity in the Great Lakes 
Region. A number of countries in the Region such as Uganda, DRC, Tanzania, have 
at least one or two of the ethnic groups similar to those found in Rwanda i.e., Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa), with Burundi having a similar ethnic composition as Rwanda12. 
Ethnic extremism has culminated in ethnic confrontation in the DRC in which 
indigenous Congolese Tutsis and the former Rwandan forces and militiamen (of Hutu 
ethnicity) who fled the country after committing genocide, have often clashed. It is 
also believed that the August 13, 2004 massacre of Congolese Tutsis at Gatumba 
refugee camp in Burundi was carried out by both Rwandan Hutu militias based in 
Congo and the FNL rebels13. As a matter of fact, this raised tension between Rwanda 
and Burundi on one side and DRC on the other, as the former threatened military 
intervention in the Congo while the latter amassed soldiers on its borders. Thus, the 
research investigates ethnic extremism/solidarity as a dimension of the Burundi civil 
conflict and its implications on regional peace and security as part of a justification to 
undertake research in this area. 
 
1.2 Research Aim and Objectives, and Research Questions 
 
1.2.1 Aim 
 
This research aims at investigating the role played by external actors (interveners) in 
contemporary African civil conflicts by specifically looking at South Africa’s leading 
and challenging role in helping to resolve Burundi’s intractable civil conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 ‘Africa: Is Peace Possible?’, 2001, Great Decisions TV, Producer Begleiter, R. 
    Nathan, L. Editorial, http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za , 2001, pp.1-2 
13 Aloys Niyoyita, ‘Burundi, Rwanda may Send Troops into Congo’,  
    http://www.tallahassee.com, 18 Aug. 2004, pp.1-2; Kristina A. Bentley & Roger Southall, An   
    African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi, HSRC Press, Cape Town, 2005, pp.199-  
   200; Michael Schmidt, ‘Rwanda, Burundi Might Track Killers’, ThisDay, 16 August 2004. 
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1.2.2 Specific objectives: 
 
o Investigating SA’s motivation in addressing Burundi’s intractable civil 
conflict by inquiring into its national interests and foreign policy on Africa; 
o Inquiring into SA’s diplomacy in reconciling and managing approach-related 
differences that were apparent in the key parties (Regional Initiative for peace 
in Burundi) helping to resolve the Burundi civil conflict; 
o Investigating SA’s management approach of the Burundi peace process by 
involving the AU and later the UN; 
o Examining SA’s successes and limitations in pursuing a diplomatic solution to 
the Burundi civil conflict, and how this is crucial in informing Africa’s 
international relations; and 
o Providing a plausible explanation of the complexity surrounding the Burundi 
civil conflict, which is based on the theory of protracted social change. 
 
1.2.3 Research Questions 
 
o How does SA, as a leading player, manage the Burundi peace process in 
partnership with key external parties like the Regional Initiative for Burundi, 
AU and the UN;  
o To what extent has SA’s involvement in Burundi peace process been 
successful, and what are the limitations of SA’s diplomatic/political and 
military involvement in resolving the Burundi civil conflict; 
o What lessons of relevance to Africa’s international relations can be drawn 
from South Africa’s intervention (peace mission efforts) in Burundi’s 
intractable civil conflict; and 
o  How does ethnic extremism/solidarity as a feature of the Burundi civil 
conflict potentially undermine regional/international peace and security? 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
The research employed a qualitative research approach. This is because of its 
characteristic quality that “focuses on the analysis of information so as to generate 
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qualitative explanation of social phenomena”14. Therefore, the approach was applied 
to analyze collected data and offer explanations around issues related to third party 
intervention and the Burundi civil conflict. 
 
Field Research 
 
1.3.1 Data collection 
 
In an effort to collect primary data, and “uncover new clues, open up new 
dimensions” of the research problem and to “secure vivid, accurate, inclusive 
accounts” informed by personal experience15, in-depth interviews that are semi-
structured were administered. In this regard, an interview guide consisting of a 
number of themes was relied upon to gather information. This included open-ended 
questions, which gave informants the freedom to express their opinions. However, the 
researcher guided informants to focus on the subject whenever they tended to stray16. 
 
The semi-structured interviews were opted for because they enable the interviewer to 
constantly: “appraise the meaning of emerging data for his problem and uses the 
resulting insights to phrase questions that will further develop the implications of 
these data”17. In an attempt to capture all the relevant information given by the 
informants, audiotapes were used. 
 
The list of informants included: 
o Key Burundian government officials (from the ministries of External Affairs, 
Security and Good Governance); 
o SA Burundi Mission Operational Commanders; 
o Field experts specializing on conflict in the Great Lakes Region; and 
o Key Burundian Local Officials (e.g., Mayor, Councilors), the Elite (e.g., 
University lecturers), Religious and Opinion leaders; 
o United Nations Officials and Commanders in Burundi; and 
                                                 
14 Justus, I. Mwanje, Issues in Social Science Research, OSSREA, Addis Ababa, 2001, p.2   
15 Robert Walker, Applied Qualitative Research, Gower Publishing Company,   
    Vermond, USA, 1985, p.4 
16 Justus I. Mwanje, Qualitative Research Process, OSSREA, Addis Ababa, 2001, p.25 
17 Robert Walker, op.cit, p.5 
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o AU Officials in Burundi. 
The reason for having deliberately selected this category of informants was its in-
depth knowledge and experience around issues pertinent to the research problem. 
 
Other data sources included original reports, and policy decisions and papers, on 
resolutions of stakeholders involved in the Burundi peace process. These constituted 
primary data collecting tools, while secondary data collecting tools included scholarly 
literature and internet research. 
 
According to Denzin and Lincoln, qualitative research is “multimodal in focus” as it 
uses various methods to collect data. The use of a number of methods is an attempt to 
acquire an in-depth understanding of the object of the research18. Hence, in order to 
make more reliable comparisons, contrasts and generalization about the findings of 
the research, and to have a broader perspective of the research problem, the study 
employed in-depth interviews, and policy and scholarly literature analyses.  
 
1.3.2 Data analysis 
 
In an effort to facilitate data analysis, categories were formulated in advance and 
thereafter the collected data was sorted by “putting the appropriate sections of data 
into the particular categories they illustrate”19. However, in order to ensure thorough 
data analysis, constant “intertwining of data collection and data analysis” was done20. 
According to David, this is simply collecting data while simultaneously analyzing it21. 
 
The transcribed data from audiotapes were analyzed separately, however, this was 
done in the context of “concepts and categories developed in the analysis of earlier 
interviews”22.   
  
                                                 
18 Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research, SAGE Publications,    
     Inc., London, 1994, p.4 
19 Robert Walker, op.cit, p.58 
20 Smith Robert B. & Manning Peter K, Qualitative Methods: Handbook of Social Science Methods,  
    Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1982, p.68.    
21 Silverman David, Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook, Sage, Publications, London,   
    2000, pp.121-122.    
22 Robert Walker, op.cit, p.5 
                                                                      9
1.4 Scope and limitation of the study 
 
For the interest of the research, intervention as highlighted in the title is not restricted 
to military operation or to peace enforcement, but also includes non-military 
preventative measures. The research focuses only on external- third party intervention 
in civil conflicts.  
 
Efforts to interview SA senior officials who participated in the Burundi peace process 
were fruitless and because SA is the key subject of the research, primary and crucial 
information was not obtained, however, information from original sources such as 
reports was relied upon to respond to questions related to SA’s efforts to address the 
Burundi civil conflict. 
  
The study presents a brief discussion on the peace and security framework set up by 
the AU to respond to armed instability on the continent. In spite of the numerous 
measures that are employed in dealing with the African civil conflicts, this study 
focuses on peace missions or operations that involve peacemaking (diplomatic 
negotiation/mediation), peacekeeping and peace enforcement designed to stop 
confrontation by the warring parties and, therefore, enable the resolution of the 
conflict(s).   
 
The research broadly focuses on SA’s peace mission efforts in resolving the Burundi 
civil conflict that began from 1999 when former President Nelson Mandela was 
appointed the chief Mediator of the Burundi peace process to 2004 when the UN took 
over control from the AU. The research also looks at the Burundi conflict starting 
from 1993, the year when the civil conflict escalated into a bloody conflict after the 
assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye. 
However, for purposes of understanding the nature and dynamics of the Burundi civil 
conflict, the study extends back to include pre-colonial, colonial and post-
independence eras. 
 
In an attempt to clearly locate the specific contributions made by the above mentioned 
parties in responding to the African civil conflicts and, thereby, construct a framework 
within which the parties operate, the research initially looks at intervention in the 
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contemporary world, and the changing nature of civil conflicts in Africa in terms of 
their dimensions, scope and intensity. 
  
          
1.5 Theoretical framework: Perspectives on Conflict Resolution 
 
This section sets out a conceptual framework upon which SA’s ‘conflict resolution 
approach’, employed in reconciling the Burundi warring parties toward embracing a 
pacific settlement of the conflict, is assessed. The literature is also useful in analyzing 
both the nature of the African civil conflicts and Burundi’s intractable civil conflict. 
 
At the level of analyzing the attempts made to resolve the Burundi intractable civil 
conflict, the theory of conflict resolution is drawn upon. This is crucial in analyzing 
SA’s diplomatic/political and military approach towards resolving the Burundi civil 
conflict. Conflict resolution refers to the process of helping to bring about a solution, 
where the actors find it unattractive to continue conflicting and realize the importance 
of benefit-distribution across the society. This may require a third party, whose role 
might be a mediator attempting to resolve the conflict23.  
 
Conflict resolution focuses on the root causes of conflict and attempts to address them 
meaningfully. In that regard, attempts are made to cut off links between the causes of 
conflict and the actions of warring parties to resort to it. However, such a pragmatic 
approach neglects the functions of political violence in national and international 
relations. The functions of conflicts include capturing or preserving of power, 
ensuring of internal cohesion and external expansion. Conflict resolution as a 
“problem-solving theory” encourages the development of techniques by which the 
problems can be addressed. Various bargaining strategies to achieve concrete results 
are acceptable objects of analysis. As bargaining behavior often involves coercion and 
threats, leading to escalation of the situation rather than contribute to its resolution, 
there are attempts to develop various appropriate solutions to violent conflicts. These 
emphasize, for example, promotion of common interests, the resort to third parties 
                                                 
23 Raimo Väyrynen, 1991, New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict      
    Transformation, SAGE Publications Ltd, London, 1991, pp.59-60.   
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and consideration of an “honorable retreat”24. Given the intractable nature of the 
Burundi civil conflict especially the hostility that was apparent in the warring parties, 
which forced the two key rebel groups, the FDD and FNL not to participate in the 
Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi, it is interesting to interrogate 
the techniques and nature of the bargaining behavior employed by SA in contributing 
towards resolving the conflict. 
 
The problem-solving approach often focuses on the existing power relations and 
institutions and fails to consider their basic nature. This kind of conflict management 
often relies on empirical research, which seeks for invariance between root causes of 
violence and the conflict phases. On the other hand, the focus on the functions of 
violence leads to questions on the nature of the social order in which it happens. In 
this case, the study of violence assumes a broader economic, social and political 
perspective. The emphasis on social orders and their relationship to internal and 
external violence, explains the existence of alternatives of which some are more 
preferred than others. Thus, unlike in problem-solving theory and conflict 
management, consideration of the functions of violence attaches a normative element 
into attempts to resolve conflicts. In this regard, conflict resolution is “better equipped 
to avoid the pitfalls of political engineering and the neglect of the structural context of 
violence”25. Indeed any attempts to resolve the Burundi intractable conflict must 
consider the social order in which the conflict occurs. This is especially true, in as far 
as, it is significantly observed that the Burundi conflict is characterized by ethnic 
hatred, a distorted racial ideology, and a distortion in the social order by colonialism. 
 
Conflict resolution is facilitated by a “ripe moment, defined in terms of escalation that 
can best be understood in the context of policy alternatives … the mediator needs both 
to find a formula that meets the parties’ demands and also manipulate the conflict- 
verbally or materially- in order to mediate effectively”26. Any external party 
attempting to address conflict by helping belligerent parties to refocus their energies 
into more useful activities must not only consider its own interests, but the “dynamics 
                                                 
24 Raimo Väyrynen, 1991, New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and  
    Conflict Transformation, SAGE Publications Ltd, London, 1991, p.300 
25 loc.cit 
26 I. William Zartman, ‘Conflict Resolution in Africa’, in I. William Zartman (ed.), Ripe for   
    Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, p.255 
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of the parties”27. Conflict resolution is effectively done in “concert”. In case of a 
number of conciliators available to the warring parties and if a number of their friends 
are able to “coordinate their good offices and pressure”, there are greater chances of 
success. Before engaging with the principal parties on a proposed agreement, it is 
prudent to start with their allies28.  Since the search for a solution to the Burundi civil 
conflict was done in “concert”, then how was the coordination of “good offices and 
pressure” carried out, and more importantly, how did SA manage this process in an 
attempt to promote a more acceptable outcome to the warring parties? This research 
pursues these questions with a goal to establish third parties’ role in addressing 
contemporary African civil conflicts- with specific attention to Burundi’s civil 
conflict. 
 
According to Zartman, conflict can be “prevented” in some instances and “managed” 
in others, but “resolved only if the term is taken to mean the satisfaction of apparent 
demands rather than the total eradication of underlying sentiments, memories, and 
interests”29. Coser argues that conflict emerges from “an incompatibility” of goals or 
actions30. Thus, conflict reduction implies both the reduction in incompatibilities, in 
as much as it is possible, as well as reconciling the pursuits of such incompatibilities 
to peaceful or political means. Hence, for effective conflict management to occur, the 
ends and means should be seen as “inextricably linked” together. Since politics is the 
process of managing demands, poorly managed demands are likely to result in 
violence, therefore, conflict management short of dealing with root causes of 
violence, is likely to be less fruitful.31 Indeed, in order for any effective effort to 
address conflict it must focus on its root causes, but I differ with Zartman, where he 
says that conflict can be resolved by appealing to apparent demands rather than the 
“total eradication of underlying sentiments, memories, and interests”. This is 
reminiscent to addressing the symptoms rather than the cause of an ‘epidemic’. For 
instance, any solution to the Burundi intractable conflict short of addressing the 
                                                 
27 loc.cit 
28Ibid., p.276 
29 I. William Zartman, ‘Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management, and Resolution’, in Francis M.   
    Deng & I. William Zartman (eds.), Conflict Resolution in Africa, The Brookings Institution,   
    Washinton, D.C., 1991, P.299 
30 Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, Free Press, 1956, p.8  
31 I. William Zartman, op.cit, p.300 
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deeply entrenched and distorted sentiments and memories of the Burundian society 
(Hutus against Tutsis and vice versa), will only produce short lived peace. 
 
If the parties can neither conquer nor avoid each other as a means of ending conflict, 
procedural conflict conclusion is suitable in addressing the conflict. According to this 
approach, parties have to live together; in general terms, conflict may not be 
permanently resolved given the continual contact of the parties, but particular 
conflicts in form of social systems may be resolved with time as they are replaced by 
other conflicts and systems. Procedural conflict conclusion is of three forms. The first 
is reconciliation, in which parties commit themselves to renounce the negative value 
systems of the images of each other. Parties now share common interests and prefer 
the same state of affairs or position thereby resolving the conflict. The second is 
compromise in which parties have differing value systems and “optimum positions”. 
Each party however, is willing to settle for less than his ideal expectations rather than 
continue the conflict. In compromise, reaching a settlement is a result of mutual 
bargaining between the parties themselves. The third form of conflict conclusion or 
settlement is the award, in which parties commit themselves to abide by the verdict of 
a mediator as a means to reach a settlement to the conflict. The compromise and the 
award are largely the same since they both represent less than the ideal expectations 
of the parties, however, they are different in how they arrive at the settlement32. 
 
The first form, reconciliation is problematic: it is difficult to achieve reconciliation, let 
alone, resolve a conflict while maintaining the same state of affairs. For example, the 
Burundi conflict cannot be said to be resolved without addressing the current state of 
affairs- imbalances that have existed over three decades of Tutsi control of the 
political, economic and military life in Burundi. 
 
Given that mediation was SA’s key diplomatic instrument in addressing the Burundi 
civil conflict, then it is safe to utilize the literature on mediation (as a component of 
the theory of conflict resolution) to frame the study. Mediation is “a form of third 
party intervention in a conflict”33. It is different from other third party intervention in 
                                                 
32 Kenneth E. Boulding, ‘Conflict Resolution and Control’, in Kenneth E. Boulding (ed.), Conflict and  
    Defense: A General Theory, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1963, pp.309-315  
33 Zartman I. William and Touval Saadia, ‘International Mediation in the post-Cold War Era’, in   
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conflicts as it does not rely directly on the use of force and its focus is not to take 
sides in a conflict. Its purpose is to reach a fair settlement to the conflict, which is 
agreeable to both parties34.  
 
Mediation is used by states as a foreign policy instrument. States’ intervention as 
mediators is seen as a legitimate cause because of its goal of conflict reduction. 
However, the desire to promote peace is seen to serve other motives within the realm 
of power politics. In order to understand these motives the application of a rational-
actor model in terms of cost-benefit considerations can be helpful. Mediators are seen 
as actors “in the plot of relations surrounding a conflict”, and in that regard, they are 
considered to have an interest in its outcome, otherwise, they would not find it 
attractive to mediate35. It is in light of this, that SA’s motivation in joining other key 
conciliators (that had been involved in the Burundi peace process), will be 
interrogated within the broader perspective of its national interests and foreign policy 
on Africa. 
 
Mediators use three modes to appeal to interests of all conflicting parties in an attempt 
to reach a mutually acceptable outcome of the conflict. These include communication, 
formulation, and manipulation respectively. Since mediation facilitates parties to do 
what they cannot do on their own, each of the three modes applies to a different level 
of stalemate in the course of direct negotiations. For instance, when conflict has made 
it impossible for warring parties to make direct contacts, thereby inhibiting them from 
talking to each other and from making concessions without being seen as weak or 
having lost face, the mediator serves as communicator. The second mode of mediation 
requires the mediator to be a party to the substance of the negotiations. A conflict may 
not only break down communication between the parties, but may totally prevent 
them from reaching a negotiated settlement to the conflict, in that case, the parties 
need a mediator as formulator. Formulas provide the key to an acceptable outcome of 
a conflict; they facilitate common understanding of the problem and its remedy or a 
shared belief system of justice to determine an outcome. Therefore, the mediator as a 
                                                                                                                                            
    Managing Global Chaos, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, pp.445-461. 
34 loc.cit  
35 Zartman I. William and Touval Saadia, ‘International Mediation in the post-Cold War Era’, in   
    Chester A. Crocker et al (eds.), Managing Global Chaos:Sources of and Responses to International   
    Conflict,  United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, p.2 
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formulator often needs to persuade the parties, as well as, to suggest remedies to their 
differences. Since persuasion involves power, it therefore requires greater 
commitment than merely communication36. If it is true that formulas facilitate 
common understanding of the problem and a shared belief system of justice to 
determine an outcome, then what prevented a number of Burundian parties notably 
the two key rebel groups (FDD and FNL) from being signatories of the Arusha peace 
and reconciliation agreement for Burundi? And what mediation strategies/diplomatic 
skills did SA use to overcome this challenge and thereby route Burundi on the road to 
peace? 
 
The third mode requires the mediator to act as a manipulator. In this case, the 
mediator assumes full responsibility by becoming, in some instances, part of the 
solution or the problem. As a manipulator, the mediator uses its influence to help 
parties reach an agreement by threatening and cajoling them. When the stalemate to 
agreement is constrained by the size of the outcome, the mediator must convince the 
parties of its vision of the solution; it must thereby take measures in an effort to make 
the solution acceptable, enhancing its value by adding benefits to its outcome and 
presenting it in a manner aimed at overcoming imbalances that might have forced one 
of the parties not to subscribe to it. The mediator may have to go as far as improving 
the “absolute attractiveness of the resolution by increasing the unattractiveness of 
continued conflict”, either of which actions contravenes the principle of neutrality37. It 
is salient to investigate how SA used its influence to manipulate the Burundian 
warring parties towards a negotiated settlement to the conflict, and how in this pursuit 
SA mitigated the perceived lack of neutrality in order to drive the peace process 
forward. 
 
A mediator possesses five sources of leverage38:  
 
First, persuasion, the ability to portray an alternative future as more 
favorable than the continuing conflict; second, extraction, the ability 
to produce an attractive position from each party; third, termination, 
the ability to withdraw from the mediation; fourth, deprivation, the 
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ability to withhold resources from one side or to shift them to the 
other; and fifth, gratification, the ability to add resources to the 
outcome39. 
 
In every case the parties determine the effectiveness of the mediator’s leverage, which 
in effect, subjects leverage under much difficulty in mediation40. To what extent did 
SA draw upon the leverage at its exposure to cajole Burundian warring parties and 
hence moving the peace process forward?     
 
 In most cases, third party intervention functions through mediation or arbitration. In 
mediation, the third party possesses control over the process and not the outcome. The 
mediator helps belligerents in conflict resolution but does not possess the power to 
impose a settlement. In arbitration, third parties have control over both the process 
and outcome. Parties present their positions or final offer to a third party, who 
possesses the power to impose a solution41. To what extent did SA act as a mediator 
or play both roles of mediation and arbitration? An analysis, which will be made 
under chapter five that will look at SA’s diplomatic/political attempts in helping 
Burundian belligerent parties to address the Burundi civil conflict, will aid us in 
responding to this.   
 
Negotiation is “a method of settling conflict rather than resolving it. The focus of 
negotiation is not attitude change per se, but an agreement to change behavior in ways 
that make settlement possible”42. Some of the most important work takes place during 
the prenegotiation phase of resolving a conflict. It is during this phase that key parties 
to the conflict are identified and invited to participate, that critical issues are raised 
and prioritized to constitute an agenda, and that a formula which is to form the basis 
of the general agreement is designed43. In light of this, how did SA approach the 
deeply polarized Burundian parties and thus enable them to come to the negotiating 
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table from which they agreed to adopt the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement 
for Burundi and the ceasefires?  
     
Effective negotiation also requires follow-up and implementation. To reach an 
agreement through negotiation is insufficient in itself. Parties perceived to have the 
potential to spoil the agreement unless their views are attended to by incorporating 
them, must be given attention, if at all, a negotiated agreement is to succeed. It is also 
crucial to put into consideration the number and importance of parties to a 
negotiation: “the greater number of parties to a negotiation, the more difficult it will 
be to reach any agreement at all. But only if the relevant parties and interests are 
included in the negotiations is the agreement reached likely to stick”44. On what basis 
then, did the facilitators of the Burundi peace process go about excluding the rebel 
movements, who obviously were key stakeholders in the peace process, and whose 
interests were crucial in determining the success of the peace process? Responding to 
this, reveals the complexity in dealing with seemingly irreconcilable demands and 
conflicting interests of the Burundian warring parties.   
  
Parties possess “the greatest degree of control when they are directly involved in 
decision-making, rather than handing responsibility wholly to an adjudicator”45. This 
applies in cases where they negotiate without assistance or are helped by a neutral 
third party in the form of a facilitator, a mediator or an arbitrator in non-binding 
arbitration. In each of these cases, the responsibility to make the final decision lies 
with the conflicting parties. The essential differences between these processes are as 
follows:46  
o Facilitation- where the third party assists the disputing parties 
by suggesting the procedures to be followed in negotiation; 
o Mediation- where the third party takes a more active role in 
brokering the negotiations; and  
o Non-binding arbitration- where the third party suggests a 
solution for their consideration. 
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However, in practical terms the difference between these roles is not clear-cut, 
notably, between facilitation and mediation. The terms may be used interchangeably 
by third parties depending on individual preferences or styles. “A facilitator is always 
looking for consensus … But consensus should not be the goal of a facilitated process 
… The goal of facilitation should be to improve communication and increase 
understanding, not to reach agreement”47. Generally, mediators search for agreement 
and in the process may be “more interventionist”. Both mediators and facilitators aim 
at observing neutrality, partly by not revealing their opinions or suggesting 
solutions48. Analyzing SA’s diplomatic/political efforts in attempting to address the 
Burundi civil conflict, will single out its diplomatic approach that helped Burundian 
parties to reconcile their positions and thus embrace pacific means to address the civil 
conflict.    
 
According to needs theories, in order to eliminate conflicts in society, there is need to 
place much emphasis on satisfying basic human needs. The theories argue that 
achieving a harmonious society is conditioned by needs-satisfaction49. Burton argues 
that the behavioral interests in human needs are not bent on making the individual 
happier, though this may turn out to be true in the end. It is an attempt to search for 
necessary conditions on which social organizations can live in harmony. Problem-
solving at any social level extending to interactions between states- can be fruitful 
only, when individual needs are taken as the basis of “analysis and planning”. More 
boldly, Burton posits that the emphasis on human needs as the basis of analysis and 
problem-solving is aimed at creating a stable and progressive society: meeting 
individual human needs facilitates an individual to function as an efficient unit within 
a social system, without which no social organization can exist harmoniously50. Thus 
the link between needs satisfaction and social harmony suggests three things, first, 
that if basic human needs are met, then conflicts are inevitably rooted out. Conflicts 
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emerge due to systematic frustration and prevention of certain individual needs. 
Second, once analysis and planning are based on needs, it will be much easier to 
identify and deal with conflict. Thirdly, though, a variant of the second interpretation, 
it is argued that every conflict carries within itself an aspect of need satisfaction. 
Conflict breaks out as a failure to recognize certain needs of a particular group or 
though recognized, have been frustrated or unsatisfactorily fulfilled. Once the needs at 
hand are identified and legitimately recognized to require fulfillment, the course for 
conflict resolution is mapped out51. Applying the perspective to the Burundi situation, 
will enable us to appreciate the extent to which needs-satisfaction relates to the 
intractable conflict in Burundi, which over the years has defied all hope in a stable 
country where both Hutus and Tutsis would leave in harmony.  
 
On the question of the nature of African civil conflicts, the research is informed by the 
theory of protracted social change (PSC). The theory refers to the “prolonged and 
often violent struggles by communal groups for such basic needs as security, 
recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic 
participation”52. The basic assumption of the theory is that societies or political 
groups sharing a geographic entity engage in confrontation. The attractiveness of the 
PSC lies in its broader perspective in defining the causes of contemporary conflicts in 
Africa. The theory contends that Africa’s conflicts cannot be attributed exclusively to 
ethnicity or external forces as this limits the understanding of the complexity of the 
conflicts. The theory therefore suggests the use of a combination of factors in order to 
understand Africa’s intractable conflicts53. 
 
The study is also framed by scholarly and policy literature on intervention. The 
literature provides a framework from which questions of how, when and in what 
capacity intervention in a sovereign state can be legitimately carried out. Intervention 
is conceptualized to refer to “action taken against a state or its leaders, without its or 
their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective”. 
However, it extends to include other alternatives to military action notably, all forms 
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of preventive measures, and coercive intervention measures like sanctions and 
criminal prosecutions54. 
 
The rationale for intervention for human protection lies in the need to protect civilians 
facing major catastrophes when the state in question is either unable or unwilling to 
bring the situation to an end, or is itself involved in perpetuating the situation. It is 
also based on the need to contain an internal situation that constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security. Further, intervention draws support from a broad 
spectrum of international legal instruments and principles such as fundamental natural 
law principles; the human rights provisions of the UN charter; the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Additional Protocols on international humanitarian 
law, and many others55. It is, therefore, appropriate to employ the literature as a basis 
for an operational framework to inform the daunting task of third party interveners in 
dealing with the complex nature of contemporary African conflicts.  
 
1.6 Organization of Chapters 
   
Chapter One: Background to the study 
 
This is the introductory chapter that presents the aim of the research and specific 
objectives, and research questions. The chapter also discusses the justification for the 
research. The theoretical framework guiding the inquiry and methodology of the 
research are also presented in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Two: Intervention in the Contemporary World  
 
In this chapter I attempt to analyze the conceptualization and practice of intervention 
in the post-cold war world and how this has been shaped and influenced by the end of 
superpower rivalry. Also the chapter analytically looks at the concept of intervention 
and its implications on international norms of sovereignty and non-intervention; state 
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security versus human security in the post-cold war era; and the re-conceptualization 
of peacekeeping in the post-cold war period. 
 
Chapter Three: The Changing nature of African civil conflicts  
 
This chapter makes a critical analysis of contemporary African civil conflicts by 
inquiring into factors that inform their dimensions, scope and intensity, and 
interrogates how this relates to the new world order. The chapter also attempts to 
critically explore different perspectives on the root causes of Africa’s civil conflicts in 
the new international dispensation. 
 
Chapter Four: The Burundi civil conflict   
 
In this chapter I critically discuss the nature and characteristics of the Burundi conflict 
and its implications on international /regional peace and security. The discussion 
includes the historical evolution of the conflict; its root causes and effects on the 
neighboring countries. This chapter also attempts to critically analyze the effects of 
ethnic extremism/solidarity, as a feature of the Burundi conflict, on regional peace 
and stability. Also the chapter makes a critical examination of the Burundi peace 
process (that culminated in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for 
Burundi) and its implications on the long-lasting stability of Burundi.  
 
Chapter Five: South Africa’s Peace Mission and the civil conflict in Burundi  
 
This chapter examines the diplomatic negotiation and mediation, and peacekeeping 
efforts of South Africa in helping to resolve the Burundi civil conflict. South Africa’s 
motivation in intervening in the Burundi conflict is investigated within the context of 
its foreign policy on Africa and its national interests. The chapter also makes an 
assessment of SA’s successes, and limitations encountered in its efforts to peacefully 
resolve the intractable conflict in Burundi. 
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Chapter Six: Regional Organizations/Initiatives and Africa’s Civil Conflicts: 
South Africa’s Search for a Diplomatic Solution to the Burundi Civil Conflict 
 
This chapter presents a brief discussion on the peace and security framework set up by 
the AU to respond to armed instability on the continent. Thereafter, the chapter 
investigates South Africa’s engagement with the UN, AU and Regional Initiatives, 
aimed at resolving Burundi’s intractable civil conflict.  
 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
This is the concluding chapter, in which salient findings of the study are presented in 
a concise form, the theoretical framework revisited, recommendations, and areas of 
possible further investigation suggested.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
INTERVENTION IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 
 
The chapter attempts to analyze the conceptualization and practice of intervention in 
the post-Cold War world and how this has been shaped and influenced by the end of 
superpower rivalry. Also the chapter analytically looks at the concept of intervention 
and its implications on international norms of sovereignty and non-intervention; state 
security versus human security in the post-Cold War era; and the re-conceptualization 
of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period. 
 
2.1 Intervention and the end of Superpower Rivalry 
 
The end of superpower rivalry has created potential for consensus in the Security 
Council and has facilitated international intervention in global conflicts. This is 
reflected in the dramatic increase in the number and scope of military intervention56. 
Superpower “disagreements no longer paralyse the UN” on intervention in regional 
and civil conflicts57. 
 
The end of the cold war has provided an opportunity for an increased number of 
United Nations interventions into ongoing conflicts58. This, however, is dependent on 
whether or not the interests of the only superpower or any other member of the UN 
Security Council are preserved or promoted on intervention. For instance, a Security 
Council member will veto any decision to intervene in a given conflict in which its 
interest will be compromised. The decision to intervene is also influenced by the 
anticipated benefits to obtain on intervention in a given country. The failure to 
intervene in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide could support the preceding argument. 
This could similarly apply in case of Burundi, where hundreds of thousands of people 
have died in the face of the international community.    
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The new opportunity and capacity for collective action that emerged with the end of 
the Cold War has provided “a critically important dimension” to the current debate on 
intervention for human protection. The UN Security Council has for the first time 
since its establishment been provided with possibilities of achieving its envisioned 
role in the UN Charter. Although not without some drawbacks, this capacity of the 
Security Council was found to be real, when in the 1990s it authorized almost 40 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations59. The international Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty recognizes that,  
the issues and the preoccupations of the 21st century present new and often 
fundamentally different types of challenges from those that faced the world in 
1945, when the United Nations was founded. As new realities and challenges 
have emerged, so too have new expectations for action and new standards of 
conduct in national and international affairs60.  
 
However, the “mandates and capacity” of international institutions have not 
corresponded with the emerging and pressing international needs. Most importantly, 
“the issue of international intervention for human protection purposes is a clear and 
compelling example of concerted action urgently being needed” to redefine 
international norms and reform institutions in order to march with international needs 
and aspirations61. Indeed, in order to launch successful humanitarian intervention, 
there is need to redefine international norms, for example, UN traditional 
peacekeeping norms which condition intervention until certain criteria (such as 
ceasefire, and consent by warring parties) have been met. This was the case in 
Burundi, where the UN refused to intervene before a comprehensive ceasefire was 
signed. Though, I do agree with the foregoing proposition of enabling effective 
international response to the daunting challenges facing the world, yet without a move 
to reconcile individual national interests with universal aspirations, there cannot be a 
concerted will that is very often required to launch successful interventions. 
 
According to Annan, states’ conception of their national interests poses one of the key 
obstacles to effective intervention for human protection. Annan argues that since the 
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world has changed in profound ways with the end of the Cold War, “a new broader 
definition of national interests is needed in the new century, which would induce 
states to find greater unity in the pursuit of common goals and values”62. How do we 
then explain a situation where national interests of states (especially in Africa) are at 
stake as a result of an on-going conflict in a neighbouring state, and yet such countries 
have remained passive? This raises the issue of financial/economic constraints as 
another key hindrance to launch effective intervention for human protection.   
 
The superpower rivalry during the cold war had made a multilateral humanitarian 
intervention almost impossible to launch, but in the post-Cold War era, 
multilateralism emerged as one of the key considerations for humanitarian 
intervention or in order for any humanitarian intervention to earn legitimacy, it has to 
be multilateral in nature63.  
 
The end of the Cold War has enabled a fundamental shift in the concept of 
humanitarian intervention as well as its practice. This shift is informed by a number of 
factors. One of the key factors is the “changing nature of the international system”; 
the demise of superpower rivalry has to a considerable extent gotten rid of the 
“systemic constraints” on intervention in internal affairs of independent states64. As 
the Cold War had made non-intervention an absolute term, with its demise norms 
providing for the protection of individual rights have widely gained approval. This 
created a conducive “political atmosphere” for launching interventions65. Given the 
appalling humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe that was climaxed by President 
Mugabe’s urban restructuring program, which left hundreds of thousands of civilians 
without shelter and the means of survival, and in Darfur, Sudan where hundreds of 
thousands have been massacred by a militia group supported by the Sudan 
government, what then prohibits humanitarian intervention in such cases? This means 
that, in practical terms, the principle of non-intervention is as absolute as ever. 
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A significant number of post-Cold War interventions were, in most cases, regional or 
international in nature and were sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council resolutions. 
Even in non-U.N. interventions, interveners in some way or another associated their 
action to the U.N. Aside from increased U.N participation; multilateralism was 
another development that was a result of the demise of the Cold War66. Conditions 
dictated by the Cold War had made a multilateral intervention difficult to achieve, 
however, in the post-Cold War era, multilateralism emerged as one of the key 
considerations for any humanitarian intervention or, according to Finnemore, 
“humanitarian intervention now must be multilateral to be legitimate”67. 
 
While the Secretary General acknowledges the importance of intervention in 
preventing gross and systematic violations of human rights, he argues that 
intervention must earn international consensus and should be seen to be legitimate and 
based on internationally accepted norms. On the one hand, Annan recalls the 
Rwandan genocide as a catastrophe that befell the world due to inaction of the 
international community, and on the other, he points out the dire consequences of the 
Kosovo conflict in which action less of international recognition and legitimacy were 
regrettable. This has subjected humanitarian intervention to a state of dilemma: “is it 
legitimate for a regional organization to use force without a UN mandate? On the 
other hand, is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, 
with grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked?”68. Though these are 
valid questions in search of justification for a coherent intervention policy, yet 
without responding to how the operation should be carried out whether or not it is 
sanctioned by the UN, is itself untenable to the resulting consequences of a conflict. 
Responding to this not only can provide a framework within which an intervention 
should be conducted, but also spells out specific activities of an intervening force, a 
goal that this research pursues by looking at the role played by external actors in their 
attempts to address Burundi’s intractable conflict. 
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Although the view of the UN Security Council on massive violations of human rights 
in a civil conflict constitute a threat to peace and security and, thereby, justify 
intervention, humanitarian actors are faced with serious concern regarding the 
legitimacy, level of damage, and mode of operations of the interventions69. 
Responding to these concerns requires a contextual, legal, and operational framework 
within which interventions should take place. In other words, a framework defining 
the role of interveners in a conflict situation. If then gross violations of human rights 
constitute a threat to international peace and security and therefore justify 
intervention, what prevents the international community from launching interventions 
in order to stop civilian deaths and suffering? Or what motivates actors in having to 
intervene in precariously dangerous situations? Looking at SA’s motive to intervene 
in Burundi, a country that is distant from SA and seemingly without strategic interests 
to benefit from, and also inquiring into policy guidelines of intervention by the AU 
and the UN within the context of the civil conflict in Burundi, will reveal 
justifications upon which intervention is based.     
 
The world is in a new dispensation of “collective and multilateral management of 
international conflicts”70. Since 1988 the U.N. has dealt with almost “twice as many 
conflict management activities than in all previous years combined”71. In addition to a 
number of peacekeeping missions, these activities include good offices support by the 
Secretary-General in Afghanistan, the Western Sahara, and in other conflict stricken 
countries, imposition of sanctions and military intervention72. 
 
The zero-sum nature of the Cold War implied that intervention in civil conflicts 
during that era provided an increased expected payoff than a similar policy in the 
post-Cold War period. In the post-Cold War era, where ideological and bloc politics 
are unimportant matter, strategic interests are weighed down in the decision over 
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intervention73. Moreover, this has changed considerably since the 1993 American 
unsuccessful intervention in Somalia which left a number of Americans dead. To the 
extent that intervention now seems largely to be influenced by cost-benefit 
considerations of states. This could explain why the world looked on while hundreds 
of thousands were being killed after the assassination of the first democratically 
elected Hutu President in Burundi in 1993, and the subsequent 1994 Rwandan 
genocide that resulted in the massacre of over a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates.  
 
Scott argues that the decision to intervene was based on ‘doctrinal policies and 
bureaucratic infighting” by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War74. 
According to Blechman, intervention in interstate conflicts is motivated by morality. 
The international community is compelled to react in humanitarian crises involving 
famines and refugee flows75. Refugee flows are likely to impose costs on national 
interests and thus interventions in civil conflicts with massive refugee flows are 
supported by international convention. For example, when national security is 
threatened by internal conflict in neighbouring countries, intervention is considered to 
be an option by a bordering country. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a 
classical example of national security threat76. Also intervention in civil conflicts is 
justified (by the Geneva Convention on Genocide) when there is evidence of mass 
killings, which could be translated into genocide, but why wasn’t intervention 
forthcoming in Burundi in the face of killings at that extent and massive refugee flows 
and internally displaced people? This raises the question of self-interest as a key 
consideration that motivates states’ desires to intervene in a given conflict.  
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2.2. Intervention and International norms of Sovereignty and non- Intervention 
 
Kardas observes that, during the Cold War intervention was regarded as illegal since 
it breached norms of sovereignty and self-determination.77 The shift in focus of 
Article 2(4) to 2(7) of the UN Charter has subjected the provision to 
“reinterpretation”, whereby a government committing serious atrocities against its 
own people or a state collapsing into anarchy cannot invoke international law in 
defence of military intervention into its internal affairs78. Will, therefore, a state 
unable to ensure the protection of sections of its population invoke international law 
in defence of military intervention? This calls forth to a detailed provision that 
accommodates all situations which subject the lives of civilians under serious threat. 
Consider, for example, the aftermath of the assassination of the first democratically 
elected Hutu President of Burundi, where hundreds of thousands died and with 
hundreds of thousands fleeing into neighbouring countries especially Tanzania, and 
thousands internally displaced, and where some parts of the country were a no-go 
areas: should intervention in such a state of affairs be hampered?      
 
The Security Council increasingly regarded gross violations of human rights that were 
a result of civil conflicts as a breach of international peace and security and therefore 
warranting intervention. These interventions were often,  
 carried out in ways that raised more concerns than they addressed. Critics 
saw the right to intervene as the instrument of inconsistent, cruelly selective 
intervention policies, hijacked by the national interests and ethnocentrism of 
the more powerful states, in blatant contradiction to the principles of equality 
and sovereignty, and in dubious relation to the principle of self-
determination79. 
This could be corrected by coherent and credible policy guidelines that allow for 
when and how intervention should be carried out in a given conflict situation. The 
policy should also provide for the specific purpose intervention is intended to address, 
which purpose should be geared towards addressing the root cause of the conflict. 
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Traditionally, humanitarian intervention refers to peaceful enforcement aimed at 
halting gross human rights abuses. Thus, if the U.N. sanctions humanitarian 
intervention, the purpose should be to address a human rights catastrophe and not 
other political objectives or interests80. However, in the African context, debate over 
humanitarian intervention has broadened beyond humanitarian goals to include the 
“possibility of intervention to address a range of important political and other 
objectives, including whether intervention should also be considered where effective 
state authority has completely collapsed, where spill over effects threaten regional 
stability, or where democratization or democratic processes are threatened”81. Indeed, 
by simply addressing or halting the consequences of the conflict without aligning your 
efforts by dealing with the root of the conflict, it is synonymous to dealing with the 
symptoms of an illness rather than its diagnostically tested cause.  
 
Africans have on many occasions been key proponents of intervention. However, the 
move toward intervention especially military intervention in the name of humanitarian 
and other purposes has not been generally accepted. The nature of past interventions 
has caused much concern leading to increased interest in the intervention debate 
especially for Africa. While effective action may be launched to save large numbers 
of populations or perhaps promote basic human rights, interventions that are poorly 
planned may prove more destructive than helpful, and may undermine the human 
norm of non-intervention and thus heighten the “likelihood and potential for conflicts 
between and among states”82. It should, however, be appreciated that humanitarian 
intervention purposed to prevent gross human rights violations, e.g., killings and rape 
in a war situation, will take a military form. As will be revealed by the current 
research, Burundi’s civil conflict demonstrates the need to adopt an intervention 
policy, which is suitable to the current international environment that we live in.      
 
Humanitarian intervention is consistent with customary international law under 
certain circumstances and should be launched only when diplomatic and other 
peaceful means have failed, and the U.N. Security Council fails to launch an effective 
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operation, for example, as a result of a veto by a permanent member of the U.N.83. 
Intervention aimed at defending human rights is recognized under customary 
international law if the criteria that follow are met: 1) a potential threat of genocide or 
other inhuman acts that violate international law; 2) an exhaustion of diplomatic and 
other peaceful means for defending rights that are at stake; 3) the absence of effective 
action by the U.N. or a concerned international agency; 4) a considerable use of force 
in relation to the threatened rights; 5) the controlled consequences on “authority 
structures” sufficient to defend the rights at stake; 6) the controlled involvement in a 
state’s internal affairs necessary to ensure the defence of the rights at stake; 7) a 
prompt withdrawal in line with the objectives of the operation; and 8) prompt and 
comprehensive reporting to the security council and compliance with regional 
directives set up by the security council84. However, according to Charvet, 
humanitarian intervention as the most forceful means of defending human rights at an 
international level was inconsistent with non-intervention and state sovereignty85. In 
as far as, humanitarian intervention is based on legitimate prerequisites for 
intervention and pursued within its intended purposes, it should not be seen to 
undermine norms of non-intervention and sovereignty.     
 
According to Samkange intervening in order to promote humanitarian objectives has 
often been justified in overriding state sovereignty. In Africa, the debate goes beyond 
humanitarian goals to include intervention when a failed state threatens regional 
stability.86 What about a situation where state authority is unable to control part of a 
country’s territory due to rebel activities, which often violate human rights and cause 
massive population displacements? Though, Burundi does not qualify as a failed state, 
the ongoing conflict makes the country fall within this category and, therefore, 
demands an inquiry into the role of intervention by third parties in addressing the 
conflict.  
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“In Africa, each conflict has unique causes and will require unique solutions. A case- 
specific approach will have to be taken in addressing internal war”87. This implies that 
a decision to intervene militarily in Africa’s civil conflicts should reflect such reality. 
Yet, such a military intervention should be informed by a general framework of 
criteria that are in conformity with international law and regionally acceptable 
processes and norms88. But given the devastating nature of most of Africa’s civil 
conflicts, the goal of military intervention should first and foremost focus on 
protecting the suffering civilian populations rather than focusing on the uniqueness of 
the causes and solutions of a particular conflict. However, in practical terms, what are 
the constraints that such an intervention is likely to encounter in the contemporary 
context, where international norms of sovereignty and non-intervention have been re-
defined? This is investigated under chapter five, which looks at SA’s intervention in 
Burundi’s civil conflict. 
 
In a world of anarchy with overwhelming inequality of power and resources, for many 
states sovereignty is considered to be their only guarantor of security. “For many 
states and people, it is a recognition of their equal worth and dignity, a protection of 
their unique identities and their national freedom, and an affirmation of their right to 
shape and determine their own destiny”89. Recognizing that the principle that all 
states, regardless of their capabilities, are equally sovereign under international law 
was underscored as a “cornerstone” of the U.N. charter under article 2(1)90. 
 
However, the conditions under which the exercise of sovereignty is done and the 
practice of intervention takes place, have dramatically changed since 1945. Evolving 
international law has limited the actions of states, not only, in terms of human rights 
but in ways they treat their people. Moreover, currently a number of actors are playing 
international roles that were in the past exclusively preserved for states. Not even the 
key proponents of the defence of state sovereignty claim the unlimited power of a 
state to do what it pleases to its own people. Sovereignty, therefore, is conceived of 
having “a dual responsibility: externally– to respect the sovereignty of other states, 
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and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the 
state”91. This, therefore, suggests that a state failing to observe the criteria above loses 
its sovereign rights by which intervention purposed to defend human rights is 
justified. 
 
“Millions of people remain at the mercy of civil wars, insurgencies, state repression 
and state collapse”92. In the recent past, significant failures and successes have been 
registered, especially in the area of international intervention. There are ongoing fears 
regarding the acknowledgement of a “right to intervene”. In order for intervention for 
human protection purposes, including the option for military intervention, to gain 
legitimacy, it is necessary that the international community design “consistent, 
credible and enforceable standards to guide state and intergovernmental practice”93. 
Experience in Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo, and interventions and non-
interventions in many other countries, clearly reveals the need to comprehensively 
reassess the tools, devices, and conception of international relations in the new world 
order, in order to address the challenges of the 21st century94. However, in order that 
this assessment registers meaningful results, it should be carried out in conjunction 
with the search for concerted will that is often the locomotive, which influences 
intervention policies. For instance, although the civil conflict in Burundi has killed 
hundreds of thousands since the country’s independence in 1962, the international 
community’s will to intervene was only implemented in 2004.   
 
According to Evans et al, any new approach to intervention for human protection 
purposes needs to meet at least four basic objectives:95. 
1) To establish clearer rules, procedures and criteria for determining whether, when 
and how to intervene; 2) to establish the legitimacy of military intervention when 
necessary and after all other approaches have failed; 3) to ensure that military 
intervention, when it occurs, is carried out only for the purposes proposed, is 
effective, and is undertaken with proper concern to minimize the human costs and 
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institutional damage that will result; and 4) to help eliminate, where possible, the 
causes of conflict while enhancing the prospects for durable and sustainable peace. 
However military intervention should be allowed some flexibility because in some 
cases it might be necessary to pursue/fight spoilers (parties) who have refused to join 
a peace process, in order to guarantee peace to the civilians whom the peacekeeping 
mission is purposed to protect. For instance, it is not unreasonable for the United 
Nations Operation in Burundi (UNOB) to enforce peace in the FNL’s areas of 
operations since they have consistently refused to join the peace process. The current 
crisis in Eastern Congo where the UN forces are engaging in a confrontation with 
rebels, demonstrates the exercise of military intervention aimed to promote peace.  
 
Respect for state sovereignty, that is, territorial integrity and political independence is 
fundamental to the stability, security, and progress of the international system96. This 
is enshrined in article 2(7) of the U.N. charter: states are obliged not to intervene in 
affairs considered to be within the domestic jurisdiction of an independent state97. 
Intervention for human protection purposes, including military intervention in severe 
situations, is justified when civilians are faced with catastrophe, and the state in 
question is not in position or is unconcerned with ending civilian suffering, or is itself 
the instigator. Such an internal situation interpreted to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security in order to justify enforcement action is provided 
under chapter VII of the U.N. charter. This emerging notion for military intervention 
for purposes of human protection also draws support from various legal instruments. 
These include fundamental natural law principles; provisions of human rights under 
the U.N. charter; the Universal declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide 
Convention; the Geneva Conventions and additional protocols on international 
humanitarian law; the Statute of the international Criminal Court; and many other 
international human rights and human protection agreements and covenants. The level 
of legitimacy attached to intervention usually requires responses to such questions 
like the purpose, means, exhaustion of other alternatives of resolving the conflicts, 
level of response in relation to provocative situation and the authorizing agency98. 
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Intervention for human protection purposes has been conceptualized not to focus on 
the “right to intervene” but on the “responsibility to protect”: 1) The responsibility to 
protect focuses on the interests or needs of the vulnerable populations, rather than the 
intending interveners, in other words, the need to protect civilian populations from 
gross murder, women from systematic rape and children from starvation; 2) the 
responsibility to protect recognizes the state to possess the chief responsibility to 
protect its population. This responsibility is assumed by the international community 
when the state concerned is unwilling or unable to exercise it; 3) the responsibility to 
protect, not only, implies the “responsibility to react”, but the “responsibility to 
prevent and responsibility to rebuild”99. However, in the case of Burundi, the 
responsibility to protect was not exercised in practical terms; while the UN 
peacekeepers, who are led by SA have chapter VII mandate to use force in an effort to 
protect civilians under imminent threat, they have not done so by deploying in areas 
where civilians are at high risk of rebels’ attacks.    
 
The concept of sovereignty is based on the principle of non-intervention, which is an 
obligation binding other states from unsolicited involvement in the internal affairs of a 
state. Under article 2(4), the U.N. charter provides that, “all members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state”100. However, in case a state is unable 
to exercise fundamental obligations of its independence, which include ensuring 
security and fundamental human rights of all its population, that state compromises its 
right of non-intervention101. Has then the international community fully exercised the 
right of intervention in Burundi given that the state has to a great extent failed to live 
up to its obligations? The current research explores the extent at which this has been 
effected.   
 
State sovereignty has been the central legal and ideological principle and “myth” 
guiding the world system since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia102. In the world today 
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the exercise of state sovereignty has substantially been eroded103. A number of factors 
ranging from voluntary to involuntary explain this trend: voluntary erosion of state 
sovereignty has occurred when international intervention has been launched to 
counter the repressive actions of a state on its citizens, for example Iraq, while 
involuntary state’s sovereignty has been eroded when a state loses its ability to 
manage its national budget and foreign exchange rates, or its ability to control 
transnational environmental effects. Humanitarian catastrophes like massive refugee 
flows resulting from civil conflicts are likely to challenge the state’s right of 
sovereignty, when they impose a threat to neighbouring states104. This was the case in 
Burundi, although, the government of President Buyoya had rejected the decision to 
intervene by external troops, he had to succumb to international pressure based on the 
argument that, not only, had Burundi’s civil conflict posed a threat to the civilian 
population but to the region.   
 
Respect for state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in a state’s internal 
affairs have over the years been central to international law105. However, “state 
sovereignty has never been absolute”; it has often been subjected to constraints in 
other international relations norms or “formalized in international law”106. The 
traditional concept of sovereignty is challenged when a sovereign state is unable to 
ensure basic necessities like political stability and an even distribution of resources107. 
As long as this does not amount to a humanitarian catastrophe such as gross violation 
of human rights, the international community has no legal right to intervene in such a 
state to restore order as such issues are within a state’s internal affairs.  
 
Sovereignty has been reconceptualized as state responsibility to protect its “vulnerable 
populations”. The international community assumes such responsibility only when the 
state in question has failed to exercise it. The focus is placed on the rights of 
populations in need rather than on the rights of the interveners. Therefore, since the 
state exercises the key responsibility to protect, so sovereignty remains a fundamental 
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principle. Only when a state is not able or intently fails to exercise the responsibility 
to protect, does an international obligation to rescue civilians facing harm triumph 
over the rights of the sovereign state, and does the principle of non-intervention 
passed on to an international responsibility to protect108. However, events in Darfur 
clearly suggest that the government of Sudan has intently failed to exercise the 
responsibility to protect; hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed by 
Janjaweed militias, who are supported by the government in Khartoum. Why hasn’t 
then the international community assumed such responsibility without necessarily 
having to seek consent from Khartoum? Could this suggest that the newly defined 
international norms designed to protect innocent civilians facing catastrophe are no 
less than mere rhetoric- lacking in force to implement the decision of the international 
community? 
 
2.3. State Security versus Human Security in the Contemporary era 
 
Security is facing new challenges in the contemporary world. In the past, security 
threats were seen to be a result of external factors. The key concerns of state security 
were to ensure the protection of a state’s boundaries, people and institutions from 
external attacks. Understanding of state security and various threats has broadened in 
the last decades. In addition to protection of borders, people, and institutions, 
recognition of threats posed by environmental pollution, international terrorism, 
massive population displacements and endemic diseases like HIV/AIDS, has come to 
the fore. This redefinition of security is a reflection of the changing nature of 
international and national environments. Intra-conflicts have overtaken interstate 
conflicts as the major threat to international peace and security109. 
 
The U.N. charter in its preamble “reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person”. As part of the U.N. purpose, article 1(2 and 
3) of the U.N. charter acknowledge the principle of equal rights, and promotion of 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination. As a 
protective measure of these purposes, article 56, of the U.N. charter states that, all 
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member states pledge to undertake joint and individual action in cooperation with the 
U.N. for their achievement110. According to the preamble of the Universal declaration 
of Human Rights, “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world”. Under its article 1, “all human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights”, and article 3 states that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
the security of person”111. 
 
According to Annan, the new conception of a state’s sovereignty is “widely 
understood to be an instrument in the service of the state’s peoples”. The aim of the 
U.N. charter is “to protect individual human rights, not to protect those who abuse 
them”112. The pursuit of fundamental human rights by considerable numbers of people 
around the world “often contradict the foundational norms of the nation-state system”, 
that is, national sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of a country. 
On the one hand, it is argued that every human being, by virtue of being human, has 
certain basic rights in relation to all other humans and that governments exist to 
protect these rights. By implication, all human beings have a claim to natural rights, 
whereas governments and other governing structures simply have “artificial and 
recallable powers”. On the other hand, there is a prevailing view placing much 
emphasis on the state- arguing that as individual human rights are dependent on “a 
stable and durable community”, then independent national states should be recognized 
as “agencies of public order and justice and also the legitimate authorities for 
arbitrating among competing human rights claims”113. However, it is not always the 
case that individual human rights are dependent on a stable and durable community; 
while this could apply in a given section of a state’s population, it may not be the case 
in the other, where individual human rights are compromised by prevailing dire 
circumstances. In this regard, consider the situation in northern Uganda where people 
live in unbearable conditions- in camps because of fear of rebel attacks while the rest 
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of the country is stable. Given that this has been ongoing for over 18 years, the state 
in that instance loses its legitimate authority to ensure public order and justice and the 
authority to arbitrate among competing human rights claims. Burundi had a similar 
experience; people were herded in camps, whereby they had to endure severe 
conditions, in an attempt to prevent rebel recruitments in the countryside, but the 
international community exerted pressure on the government and thus abandoned the 
practice. 
 
Moore observes that “human security entails eliminating threats to the security of 
individuals, groups, and societies, in addition to that of states”114. According to the 
Commission on human security, human security is complementary to state security in 
four ways115: 
1) Its concern is the individual and the community rather than the state; 2) menaces 
to people’s security include threats and conditions that have not always been 
classified as threats to state security; 3) the range of actors is expected beyond the 
state alone; 4) and achieving human security includes not just protecting people but 
also empowering people to fend for themselves. 
 
Human security “broadens the focus from the security of borders to the lives of people 
and communities inside and across those borders”116. It is meant to ensure the security 
of people and not simply ensuring territorial boundaries against external aggression. 
And unlike traditional approaches that exclusively entrust the state with state security, 
the process of human security includes a bigger constituency of “actors and 
institutions- especially people themselves”117. 
 
One of the key defining features of the post-Cold War era is the reconceptualization 
of “national security away from its traditional narrow realist paradigm preoccupation 
with state security to human security in all its multifaceted dimensions”118. 
Seemingly, there has been a shift away from “statist approaches” to security to a “new 
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security paradigm”. This is crucial as it interrogates who holds power, how it is 
exercised, and in whose interests it serves. The primary beneficiaries of the new 
security paradigm are the people- parties, and organs of the civil society. Moreover, 
the emerging security paradigm also includes non-military threats to national security 
like poverty, disease, environmental issues, and democratic governance. The primacy 
of human security over state security informs the daunting task of multinational 
interventions aimed at resolving severe conflicts and thereby protecting the suffering 
civilian populations without seeking consent of warring parties119. In practical terms, 
however, state security still holds supremacy over human security and, therefore, this 
constrains international interventions purposed to protect civilians under serious 
threat. For instance, Sudanese government refusal to allow the deployment of UN 
troops citing a threat to state security posed by the UN troops– in the event that they 
intervene in the fighting between rebels and government-backed Janjaweed militias, 
leaves civilians in Darfur in catastrophic humanitarian conditions and therefore 
compromises human security. Moreover the ban on night movements by the 
government of Burundi that was placed on UN peacekeepers prevented them from 
monitoring and verifying civilian killings, which were often carried out during night 
hours.  
 
The commission on intervention and state sovereignty defines human security as “the 
security of people- their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect 
for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights 
and fundamental freedoms”120. The increasing acknowledgement by the international 
community that security concepts must centre on both people and states has marked 
an important shift in international thinking during the recent past. The Commission 
also recognizes that sovereignty and intervention not only they significantly affect 
rights of states but more so individual human beings. Thus the emphasis in the 
security debate has shifted to focus more on human security, in terms of accessibility 
to basic needs like food, employment and sound environmental factors, rather than on 
state security- ensuring the security of its borders and governmental structures 
through armaments. The fundamental components of human security, which are the 
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“security of people against threats to life, health, livelihood, personal safety and 
human dignity”, can be threatened by outside forces in as much as internal forces. The 
right to intervene conceptualized as the responsibility to protect focuses on providing 
protection or assistance to civilians faced with severe humanitarian conditions121.  
 
State security is based on state sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs of a 
state and non-aggression. However, how does state security ensure human security 
within that state?122. In terms of relations between states, state security implies state 
protection and preservation through military means123. While, human security means 
“a situation in which the life, the body and the socio-economic-political well-being” 
of an individual are protected through the “use of physical force”. The evidence of 
“death, disease, starvation, slavery, imprisonment, homelessness, abject poverty, 
political oppression and cultural deprivation”, on a gross scale and on a prolonged 
basis, involves human insecurity. Therefore, by implication, human rights constitute 
the basis of human security124. 
 
As state security involves ensuring the protection of the people (human security), 
territorial integrity, the system of government, and the political independence of a 
state, conflicts between the four roles is bound to emerge. State security may not 
always promote human security. For example promotion of human rights cannot be 
guaranteed by tyranny. Human security is dependent on state security. For instance, a 
weak state or a state which is unable to control all its territory cannot ensure the well-
being of its people. In some instances, human security “may necessitate sacrifice of 
state security”. For example, a state may “surrender to an aggressor” or may lose part 
of its territory for the sake of ensuring the protection and well-being of its people125. 
However, state security in some respects is dependent on human security in the sense 
that severe conditions afflicting human security, e.g., political repression and 
exclusion, and abject poverty, could lead to insurrection against state establishments 
and, therefore, cause state insecurity. Most rebellions against states in Africa and 
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elsewhere, including the one in Burundi are launched as a result of this and many 
other severe conditions against human security.      
Acknowledging that “the physical security of a state is not synonymous with the 
security of its peoples”, it is suggested that Africa must employ new methods of 
addressing conflicts involving “topography and demography”. A responses to this is 
bound to be located in the broader framework of socio-economic development and not 
in pursuit of state security as realism dictates. In recent times, Africa has redefined its 
security concerns by focusing on broader geo-political considerations. In this regard, 
the 1992 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit of African heads of state and 
government in Dakar, Senegal, acknowledged in its communiqué that “there is a link 
between security, stability, development and cooperation in Africa”126. This is true 
considering that the civil conflict in Burundi paralysed development initiatives in the 
country and trade between Burundi and neighbouring countries. Also because of ties 
between Burundian rebels and the Mai Mai and Rwandan militias and former 
Rwandan government soldiers in the DRC, the conflict destabilised regional stability.    
 
Further, this thinking is clearly articulated in the Kampala document, which is a joint 
effort by the secretariats of the OAU, the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, and 
the African Leadership Forum. The document states that: 
The concept of security goes beyond military consideration. It embraces all 
aspects of the society including economic, political and social dimensions of 
individual, family, community, local and national life. The security of a 
nation must be construed in terms of the security of individual citizen to live 
in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the 
affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human 
rights127. 
From the above perspective any situation that seriously undermines human security 
by implication, it means a failure in state security and, therefore, in terms of the 
responsibility to protect calls forth to international intervention with an aim to 
alleviate the suffering of the people. On the other hand, the perspective enhances 
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primacy of the state security over human security by which the latter is directly 
dependent on the former; in other words, human security can only be attainable when 
there is assurance of state security. However, as has been argued above the two are 
interdependent as there cannot be sustained state security in the face of human 
insecurity even in a purely autocratic state. 
 
2.4 UN Peacekeeping in the Contemporary World 
 
The United Nations was founded in order to “save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war”128. According to Brahimi et al, this is the central function of the U.N., 
and to a large extent, it is the basis upon which it is judged. In order to meet this 
challenge the following must be put under consideration: renewed commitment of 
member states; comprehensive institutional change; and increased financial resources. 
In effect, this would facilitate “critical peacekeeping and peacebulding” obligations 
assigned to the U.N. by the member states129. For instance, institutional change could 
take the form of revisiting norms governing traditional peacekeeping in order to 
reflect the current international dispensation, where norms of non-intervention and 
sovereignty have been reconceptualised. In the case of Burundi, for example, 
traditional peacekeeping blocked the UN from intervening, particularly, because of 
the absence of a ceasefire between the government of Burundi and the rebels.       
 
Peacekeeping emerged as a United Nations quest for encouraging and supporting 
nations to resolve differences through peaceful means. Peacekeeping started in 1948 
with the formation of the state of Israel and the commission of the United Nations 
Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which included unarmed military 
observers to support and promote the armistice between Israel, Lebanon, Syria and 
Egypt130. Peacekeeping or preventive diplomacy, as some prefer to call it, has been 
regarded by the international community as the primary approach in resolving 
international disputes131. Peacekeeping is defined as: 
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the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of 
hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful 
third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using 
multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and 
maintain peace132 
 
In the strict sense, peacekeeping entails a third party playing the role of an “impartial 
referee” in order to address a conflict or dispute between two or more parties133. 
Peacekeeping and enforcement operations are based on the U.N. charter providing for 
the maintenance of peace and security134. Then, what form can peacekeeping or third 
party intervention take in a situation as in Burundi, where one party has not embraced 
the peace process- not a signatory to the ceasefire and continues to threaten the 
security of civilians? Chapter six covers this through a consultative effort with third 
parties involved in the Burundi peace process.  
 
Until the end of the Cold War, United Nations peacekeeping operations largely had 
“traditional ceasefire-monitoring mandates” without peace building tasks. The “entry 
strategy” or the procedure that was to be followed before any deployment of United 
Nations was straightforward: War, ceasefire, invitation to ensure compliance of 
ceasefire and deployment of military observers or forces to implement the same, 
while efforts to search for a political settlement was undergoing. But traditional 
peacekeeping, which deals with the symptoms rather than the root cause of conflict, 
lacks a “built-in exit strategy” and the associated peacemaking was almost unable to 
produce desired results. As a consequence, traditional peacekeepers have remained in 
place for up to 50 years (for example, in the Middle East and India/Pakistan). 
However, since the end of the cold war, United Nations peacekeeping has in most 
cases been integrated with peace building in complex peace operations deployed 
under intra-state conflict situations. Thus, risks and costs for operations under such 
settings are much greater than for traditional peacekeeping135. While peace building is 
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crucial in the aftermath of violent conflict as a measure to build trust in the former 
warring parties and, therefore, helpful to resolve the root causes of conflict, 
essentially, peacekeeping devoid of traditional criteria, e.g., deployment of troops in a 
conflict situation not dictated by a ceasefire in place, could serve to promote the key 
purpose of the UN, which is to save civilians from the plague of war. For instance, 
had South African troops not deployed in Burundi when the UN refused to deploy in 
absence of a ceasefire, the situation could have exploded and possibly leading to 
extensive killings or, ongoing negotiations would have stalled and, thereby, 
prolonging the peace process.     
 
Traditional peacekeeping where the U.N. is entrusted with the task of monitoring and 
promoting an agreed ceasefire is in this era difficult to implement in civil conflicts 
whose ceasefires are largely unobserved by warring parties136. This was the case in 
Burundi, where fighting ensued in almost all parts of the country even after signing of 
the ceasefire by the warring parties. Therefore, unless there is change in approach in 
promoting peace, this will defeat the very purpose of protecting civilians, which the 
peacekeepers are entrusted to do. 
 
The U.N. Security Council “is only as effective in conflict management as the 
permanent members want it to be”. For instance, the U.S. strong leadership was 
crucial in mobilizing a successful campaign against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. In 
Kosovo, Security Council strong differences were a result of NATO’s military 
operation without the Council’s approval. In other cases, contradictory resolutions 
negatively affected the implementation exercise. Unless the permanent members of 
the Security Council agree on a strategy “to improve the staffing, structure, and 
purpose of peacekeeping”, the Council will continue to pass resolutions that are 
ineffective137. Not only, will the disagreement by members of the Security Council 
lead to ineffective resolutions, but delays in passing resolutions to deal with complex 
humanitarian situations could lead to another Rwanda. Perhaps, there is need to revisit 
the right of veto by permanent members of the UN Security Council in order to 
address such impasse. As a matter of fact, although, the UNOB had a chapter VII 
mandate, the mission had insufficient resources to fulfil its mandate.  
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In the past, peacekeeping was easily implemented; an armed force that was lightly 
equipped and which observed the principle of neutrality, occupied a buffer zone- 
separating the two warring state parties. Both confronting parties consented to the 
force, whose task was to monitor a ceasefire that had already been agreed upon. The 
mandate of the force was to “keep peace” while a negotiated settlement to the conflict 
was being pursued (for example, the peace Mission in Cyprus). On the contrary, 
peacekeeping has become an extremely complex activity; peacekeepers have been 
sent to countries where there is no ceasefire agreement, consent of warring parties, 
and the government is unable to control all its administrative territory, or government 
is inexistent138. In such cases, peacekeeping by implication turns into peace 
enforcement; peacekeepers have got to engage with peace spoilers in an effort to 
enforce peace and thus, ensure protection of the civilians. This implied that by 
deploying in Burundi without the consent of the rebels, with the FNL outside the 
peace process, amounted to a declaration of war against the rebel forces. Eastern 
Congo, where the UN forces are directly involved in fighting with the rebels 
epitomises the preceding argument. 
 
Peacekeeping operations have failed to address their designed purposes due to the less 
commitment by capable states in assuming a meaningful role. Their rhetoric in 
strengthening peacekeeping is not marched with necessary resources. One of the key 
problem that is facing peacekeeping is the failure on the part of the U.N. Security 
Council to operate within the context of the new world order. This is premised on the 
possibility in responding to conflicts that the end of superpower rivalry created, which 
in practice, is lacking139. Since the ideological differences that paralysed the UN in 
dealing with conflicts came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union, perhaps, 
the reluctance by the UN Security Council in responding to conflicts in the post-Cold 
War era suggests that there are no strategic interests that motivate members into 
action. Conversely, members could be motivated to respond to conflicts only when 
there are immediate interests to be gained. The Kuwait-Iraqi conflict of 1991 and the 
1994 Rwandan genocide are classical examples to illustrate the argument; while a 
number of countries through the leadership of the US and with overwhelming support 
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from the UN Security Council intervened in the former, none were willing to risk 
their troops in the latter case. 
 
According to Claude, the major problem confronting peacekeeping is the lack of 
political will by key nations in the U.N. Security Council: Claude argues that the 
problem does not lie in the shortage of human and material resources based on the 
fact that there are over 25 million soldiers in the world, and that states “devote $1,000 
billion annually towards their military budgets”. Nations are unwilling “to sacrifice 
their soldiers for a cause that is not relevant to their national interests”140. What then 
constitutes national interests? Since most of the nations are signatories to a number of 
international conventions prohibiting human rights abuses, then any action that 
undermines such rights would by virtue of that constitute a concern within their 
national interests and should, thereby, call forth to intervention. In another sense, this 
could imply that nations are driven by economic benefits and less of humanitarian 
concerns in their desire for peacekeeping. 
 
While traditional peacekeeping was consistent with the U.N. charter’s provision on 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of independent states, new peace operations 
have been justified on humanitarian grounds. Recent U.N. operation with the purpose 
of executing Security Council resolutions without the consent of the warring parties, 
has been referred to as peace enforcement141. Thus, this implies that in the current 
international environment, peace missions/operations are guided by a redefinition in 
international norms of sovereignty and non-intervention.  
 
Although peacekeeping is not impossible in civil conflict, it is nevertheless faced with 
difficulties under such settings. Peacekeeping operates in favour of the challenged 
government when through a ceasefire the government gains “political capital” in the 
eyes of a population exhausted from conditions of instability. Peace implies, in the 
perspective of the rebel groups, the preservation of the status quo. Unless that 
perception is reconciled, warring parties will interpret peacekeeping efforts as 
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operating against their cause142. This was the initial perspective of the FDD rebels 
regarding peacekeepers; they claimed that the external forces were in support of the 
government, however, their hopes were raised when it was clear to them that they 
would win an election that was due to be organised.     
 
The panel on United Nations peace operations upholds principles of peacekeeping, 
which are “consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in self-
defence”, to be the guidelines of peacekeeping143. Based on UNTSO formed in 1948 
to monitor the armistice between Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, and UN-MOGIP 
established in 1949, which exist until to date, Sanderson argues that this is proof that 
“traditional peacekeeping does not solve disputes, but creates an atmosphere that 
prevents the situation from worsening and enables the possibility of progress”144. 
Moreover, traditional peacekeeping could compromise the lives of civilians in cases 
where warring parties have failed to respect the ceasefire or in the case of Burundi 
where one party has refused to join the peace process (the FNL in this case) and 
therefore not a party to the ceasefire.  
 
In the Cold War era, a significant number of the U.N. peacekeeping operations were 
easily implemented and problems relating to the operation were addressed by 
operations officers. But in the post-Cold War world, they are “composite, multi-
faceted and potentially more dangerous”, and member states contributing troops are 
increasingly more demanding145. This development is likely to compromise the 
internationally recognised responsibility of humanitarian intervention and, thereby, 
subject civilian populations facing humanitarian catastrophes to danger. This was 
reflected in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, where as a result of the failure of 
international intervention (peace enforcement), over a million people were brutally 
massacred in a period of three months. 
 
Boutros states that “the bureaucratic and diplomatic structures of the United Nations 
remain not only unsuitable but almost inimical to putting together peacekeeping 
operations that go beyond the norms of classical peacekeeping”. In light of the nature 
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of conflicts confronting the post-Cold War era, Boutros questions the relevance of 
peacekeeping operations which remains informed by norms of traditional 
peacekeeping. He further questions the insistence of using U.N. peacekeeping as a 
conflict preventative tool without undergoing transformation. Bosnia and Rwanda are 
classic cases of the ineffectiveness of peacekeeping. As a corrective measure to the 
ineffectiveness of peacekeeping, there is need for a new strategy of peacekeeping as 
much as, additional resources are146. Promoting humanitarian intervention in the post 
Cold-War era while continue to observe classical peacekeeping norms, challenges the 
notion of intervention for human protection. For instance, it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to seek to launch intervention to rescue civilians caught up in a deadly 
conflict situation while at the same time demanding that a ceasefire be signed and 
observed before a peacekeeping force is deployed, or will it be practical for an 
external force to observe neutrality at the face of civilians under imminent threat 
when you are attempting to protect them? 
 
Challenges facing the new United Nations peace operations, among others, include: 1) 
financial difficulty- dramatic increase in the cost of peacekeeping operations together 
with an unwillingness of a number of nations to pay their assessments in time; 2) the 
absence of early warning mechanisms and pre-crisis intervention; 3) mission 
definition- unclear objectives and adequacy of the means to implement the mission; 4) 
the constitution of the Security Council and its mandate in peace operations- 
unwillingness of the U.N. in restructuring the Security Council in order to better 
represent the geographic dimension of its members and to reflect the shifts in 
economic and political power since the end of world war II; 5) mal administration of 
peacekeeping- lacking in “promptness of response, an adequate command structure, 
the composition and training of peacekeeping forces”, and the choice of adequate 
equipment147. It is early warning mechanisms that will influence the promptness of 
response to peacekeeping operations and, thereby, reduce incidences of potentially 
dangerous conflicts that could otherwise escalate causing much destruction to both 
humanity and property. Because of the severity of post-Cold War conflicts, it is 
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crucially important that peacekeeping operations should be well equipped in order to 
withstand any threat that could undermine mission objectives. 
 
In a joint statement by the permanent members of the UN Security Council on the 
millennium Summit, members recognized the daunting challenges facing the UN and 
the world community and realized the need for quicker responses, which are more 
targeted and better coordinated in order to address the challenges. Recognizing also 
the fundamental shift over the past decade in the nature and number of international 
conflicts demanding the UN involvement, members pledged to make structural 
reforms in the UN system in order to reflect this change. This commitment is placed 
in strengthening UN peacekeeping by endowing it with both operational and financial 
resources and hence be able to meet the challenges it faces148. Indeed one of the major 
challenges facing intervention in the post-Cold War period is lack of resources in 
form of military and financial. However, this must be accompanied by the will and 
resolve of the UN Security Council members to confront complex conflict situations 
which often involve a number of warring parties with irreconcilable interests and 
conflicting demands, and in whose interests, peace is an unrewarding dividend. Thus, 
in such cases, of which Burundi was a party, the Security Council must be willing to 
go beyond observing traditional peacekeeping norms and launch peace enforcement in 
form of humanitarian intervention for civilian protection.  
 
Thus, to recap the arguments above, the demise of superpower rivalry has created 
potential for consensus in the Security Council and has enabled international 
intervention in global conflicts. This is reflected in the dramatic increase in the 
number and scope of military intervention. In the post-Cold War era, where 
ideological and bloc politics are unimportant matter, strategic interests are weighed 
down in the decision over intervention. However, intervention is interest-driven with 
respect to Security Council members especially the US as the sole superpower. This 
has resulted into failure to launch intervention for human protection leading to mass 
killings like the 1994 Rwandan genocide. A shift in focus of Article 2(4) to 2(7) of the 
UN charter has reconceptualised norms of sovereignty and self-determination to 
enable intervention for human protection. When a state is unable to ensure protection 
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and fundamental human rights of all its population, it compromises its right of non-
intervention. Humanitarian intervention is consistent with customary international law 
under certain circumstances and should be launched only when, peaceful means have 
failed, and there is lack of consensus in the U.N. Security Council due to exercise of 
right of veto. The primacy of human security over state security in the post-Cold War 
era informs interventions in severe conflicts aimed to protect civilians experiencing 
catastrophe. Since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has in most cases been 
integrated with peace building in complex peace operations deployed under intra-state 
conflict situations. While traditional peacekeeping was consistent with the U.N. 
charter’s provision on non-intervention in the internal affairs of independent states, 
new peace operations have been justified on humanitarian grounds. However, 
traditional peacekeeping, where an external force is mandated to monitor and promote 
an agreed ceasefire is in the contemporary era difficult to implement in civil conflicts 
whose ceasefires are largely unobserved by warring parties. Does the unfolding 
international dynamics at the dawn of the new international system, which has been 
occasioned by the end of the cold war, inform the escalation of civil conflicts in 
Africa? The following chapter will look at the nature of Africa’s civil conflicts and 
interrogate how it relates to these dynamics. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE CHANGING NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN 
CIVIL CONFLICTS 
 
 
This chapter critically analyses contemporary African civil conflicts by inquiring into 
factors that inform their dimensions, scope and intensity, and interrogates how this 
relates to the new world order. The chapter also attempts to critically explore different 
perspectives on the root causes of Africa’s civil conflicts in the new international 
dispensation. 
 
3.1 Post-Cold War African Civil Conflicts 
 
The nature of post-Cold War intra-conflicts in Africa created massive refugees into 
neighbouring countries, a situation that destabilized sub-regional political and socio-
economic sectors. In some cases, intra-state conflicts have resulted in support for any 
one of the warring parties by neighbouring countries.149 According to Abubakar, 
conflicts on the African continent are characterized by massive destruction and 
alarming magnitude. “Africa holds unenviable record of having more conflicts than 
any other continent in the world”150. Since post-Cold War Africa’s civil conflicts have 
very often acquired a sub-regional dimension, their resolution requires a concerted 
response from regional actors. However, the complexity of these conflicts require 
high level diplomatic skills that goes beyond reconciling warring parties to 
reconciling and mobilizing regional actors toward their resolution. 
  
Moreover, these conflicts have acquired a “multilateral dimension, whereby a number 
of countries have engaged in conflict within another country as was the case in 
Democratic Republic of Congo. In which some have referred to the conflict in Congo 
as Africa’s “First World War”. Since 1970, there has been “no less than thirty wars” 
fought in Africa, most of which are civil conflicts. In 1994, a quarter of 48 countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa, that is 12 countries, were at war while two had just been at 
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war, and fourteen had in the near past or currently experienced devastating political 
violence. In 1996, 12 countries were experiencing armed confrontation, and by 1999, 
the number had risen to 18, with 11 countries facing serious political crises. 
Seemingly, therefore, almost all African countries are susceptible to conflicts and 
wars given that the political economy of majority of these countries remains weak and 
vulnerable to “political conflict and breakdown”151. Particularly, this can be traced in 
the lack of effective and functional institutional mechanisms designed to, equitably 
distribute resources across different stakeholders, and adjudicate differences and 
competing interests among nationals in a more acceptable manner.      
 
Experience reveals that all Africa’s civil conflicts cannot be purely seen as an internal 
affair. A significant number of contemporary wars in Africa possess a mixture of 
internal and external features. As such, most African governments are quick to expect 
spill over effects, such as refugees, proliferation of arms or some form of 
destabilization from a neighbouring country engaged in war.152 This implies that 
addressing Africa’s civil conflicts requires a conflict resolution approach that provides 
for both internal and external interest groups, and which goes beyond a narrow 
perspective of defining conflict. 
 
It is, therefore, clear that given the devastating effects of Africa’s civil conflicts on 
neighbouring states, these conflicts qualify as international conflicts, which demand 
international response in form of intervention to address them (see: Charter of the 
United Nations). Under such a situation the affected country cannot claim the right to 
non-intervention and sovereignty, nonetheless, this demands responses in how such an 
intervention might be conducted, and what specific actions it can involve. These 
concerns are addressed under chapter six by looking at the role of interveners in 
Africa’s civil conflicts- with specific attention to the Burundi civil conflict. 
 
In order to concretely comprehend Africa’s contemporary conflicts and thereby 
construct proper analyses thereof, it is crucial to master the context within which such 
conflicts are occurring. That is, within the context of a post-Cold War world where 
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superpower rivalry is inexistence. While African conflicts during the Cold War might 
have been “exacerbated by superpower rivalry”, the post-Cold War African conflicts 
are likely to be “linked to regional instability, political disunity and weak state 
structures”153. Although it is assumed that many conflicts should have come to an end 
given the lack of support from superpowers, some went on by acquiring new 
dimensions and getting more intense.154 Looking carefully at many of the civil 
conflicts in Africa, weak state structures perhaps stand as the most influential factor 
fuelling the conflicts; there are barely no effective structures in place to address 
emerging competing interests of various groups.   
 
I partially agree with Miall et al in which they state that understanding Africa’s 
contemporary conflicts one needs to know the context in which they are occurring, … 
However, some of Africa’s conflicts including the Burundi civil conflict during the 
Cold War cannot be explained exclusively by invoking superpower rivalry, since 
superpowers only involved in Africa’s conflicts where their interests were threatened 
or in contest.  
 
For Africa, the end of the Cold War created:  
A trend of death and despair, which was marked by an important inflation of 
sports of violence all over the continent: in 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries 
of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of 
all war-related deaths and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees 
and displaced persons. For many Africans, the post-Cold War great 
expectations of peace and security blew up at the very moment the rest of the 
world was celebrating the dislocation of the Berlin wall and the collapse of 
the Iron curtain.155   
Accordingly, almost all post-Cold War African conflicts clearly present the need for 
third party intervention. However, the pertinent question to ask is: What role can third 
party intervention play in contemporary African conflicts? Third party interveners 
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involved in the Burundi peace process with SA playing a key role provide an 
operational framework on which to respond effectively to this issue. 
 
 Africa has been swept by a wave of armed conflicts since the early 1990s. This 
comes as a number of entrenched military and one party regimes collapsed as a result 
of the end of the Cold War, emerging of pro-democracy movements and an explosion 
of ethnic and other social conflicts. From Somalia and Rwanda to Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Ivory Coast, Burundi, Sudan and the DRC, “hundreds of thousands have been 
killed outright and millions more have succumbed to war-related epidemics and 
starvation. All but a fraction of the victims have been civilian”156.   
 
Apart from the significant number of deaths that violent conflicts in Africa have 
claimed, they have caused massive population displacements and migration. Such 
crises occur under circumstances, where states have lost control over large parts of 
their territories and the means of violence are easily accessed by unauthorized 
persons. Under such dire conditions, civilians are very often the principal targets.157 
The office of the United Nations high Commissioner for refugee’s report of 1997, put 
the number of the refugees around the world at 22 million, of whom 13 million were 
made refugees as a result of war, violence and human rights violations. 35 percent or 
7.8 million of the refugees and displaced persons were from sub-Saharan Africa.158 
Responding to such catastrophic situations the international community had to 
override the principle of sovereignty by intervening without consent in an effort to 
rescue the affected people159. 
 
Considering that massive killings and population displacements, and gross violations 
of human rights in Africa’s civil conflicts largely occur under circumstances where 
states have lost control over large parts of their territories, what then should be the 
appropriate response from the international community in such a situation? This 
research attempts to respond to this by inquiring into the role of third party 
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intervention in Africa’s civil conflicts by looking at the contemporary world in which, 
international norms of sovereignty and non-intervention have been re-defined.  
 
3.2 The Complexity of Africa’s Civil Conflict 
 
According to Ngwane, civil conflicts in Africa involve conflicts over governance and 
democratic structures. These conflicts are informed by individual country’s “socio-
political evolution, its leadership and its colonial legacy”160. The ethnic composition 
of many African states is suggestive of a governance system that should accommodate 
the various ethnic groups into the governance structures in order to better represent 
their peculiar interests and thereby prevent conflict. For instance, the Burundi conflict 
was fundamentally attributed to the failure of the governance system to accommodate 
equitably all Burundian ethnic groups by which, the marginalised group developed a 
feeling of alienation and as a remedy mobilised for conflict using an ethnic card-  in 
an attempt to correct the exclusionary policy.    
 
 Many conflicts in Africa are based on grievances of ethnic minorities or majorities. 
Almost all African states are multiethnic in composition, a making of the colonial 
boundary demarcation. However, even states that are homogeneous such as Somalia 
are characterized by sub-ethnic differences that have a potential to breed violent 
conflict. The unfair distribution of resources among groups is considered to be a 
critical motivation for conflict161. This is compounded by the lack of effective 
mechanisms to address grievances among groups, which is the case in many African 
states, and this forces marginalised groups to adopt violent means as a measure to 
address conflict.   
  
According to Copson, a cursory review of the dimensions of Africa’s conflicts and 
their sources suggests that the problem is devastating and is strongly entrenched in the 
African state system and societies; 
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Fundamental social cleavages within African states along ethnic and regional 
lines, sometimes reinforced by religious and income differences, are a major 
underlying cause of conflict that will not soon disappear. Africa’s poverty, 
which deprives African societies of the means of easing social tensions, is 
another. The tendency of many African governments to rule through arbitrary 
and repressive means has provoked violent conflict and armed resistance in 
many instances162.  
Because of abject poverty in many African states and the fact that the state is the 
major employer- source of survival for many, group mobilisation for conflict is easily 
done through promises made by politicians seeking to accede to power. Groups are 
made to believe that all those in, and close to, power are their enemies since they 
deprive them of benefits associated with power. Hence, this elevates poverty as one of 
the chief motivation of conflict in Africa.   
 
Warring parties are confronted with irreconcilable interests and values, which are 
intensified by deeply rooted mistrust and competition over meagre resources. This 
blocks any possible attempts to resolve the conflict. In cases where the conflict is of a 
national significance, the degree of complexity raises significantly; the parties claim 
that their survival is at stake; there is infighting and factions within their ranks; large 
scale violence has already broken out; and fundamentally, conflicts are caused by 
structural factors163. For instance, in case of Burundi, while deeply rooted mistrust 
between warring parties was partly blamed for the lack of progress in the Arusha 
peace negotiations, it is broadly exclusion from participating in the governance 
system that intensified the irreconcilable differences among the parties and was 
accountable for the stalemate in the peace negotiations, which after it had been 
addressed through power sharing, the peace process was moved forward. Therefore, 
as long as groups feel that they are discriminated against in the production processes 
and or the governance system, which in most African countries determines one’s 
economic wellbeing, conflict will always emerge.    
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The demise of the Cold War gave raise to deadly ethnic confrontation that was 
manifested in power struggles in Africa, which were seriously devastating owing to 
their intra-conflict characteristics. Chief among these were protracted conflicts in 
Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan. These 
catastrophes contributed to a shift in approach in dealing with Africa’s conflicts in 
pursuit of human security. Peacekeeping was no longer perceived as a means to end 
hostilities and restore political stability. Among other key concerns, the focus was 
placed on good governance, human dignity, sustainable development and national 
reconciliation164. The end of the Cold War should not be seen exclusively to have 
influenced the eruption of deadly ethnic conflict in Africa. For instance, both Burundi 
and Rwanda experienced bloody ethnic confrontation during the Cold War, which 
were motivated by the need to capture power and therefore address injustices and 
inequities that were suffered by the groups and which are largely attributed to colonial 
legacy.   
  
Conflicts in Africa escalated in the 1990s. Economic mismanagement resulted into 
weaker and highly centralized states. The inability to provide basic levels of policing 
and social services led to the weakening of state authority. As a consequence, internal 
conflicts dramatically increased throughout the 1990s. In extreme cases, 
fragmentation led to the formation and proliferation of smaller groups, which further 
developed into warring factions. The civilian population increasingly became 
embroiled in factional conflicts and were subjected to severe violence and abuse. This 
resulted in large scale displacement as well as social and economic destruction165. 
However, looking at some of the deadliest conflict on the continent, the governance 
system through repressive policies is responsible for many of the conflicts that were 
waged on the continent during the 1990s. Notable among these are the conflict in 
Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia and Somalia. Thus, while economic mismanagement may 
result into weaker state systems leading to eruption of conflict, it is chiefly the 
governance system that does not allow for participatory policies of all regardless of 
their political inclinations and ethnic background that motivates conflict.       
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Ethnic discrimination in Africa has been politically exploited and is rooted in colonial 
legacy. Generally, ethnic discrimination,  
 is more often used as a means to sustain conflict and is rarely a primary 
cause. Yet the increasing marginalisation of the poor has provided fertile 
ground for those promoting ethnic conflict as a means of sustaining their own 
control over power. Ethnic violence is now becoming part of the culture 
of conflict in Africa166. 
This was the case in Burundi, where politicians exploited ethnicity in pursuit of their 
interests; those in power using ethnicity in order to preserve and consolidate power 
while the opposition using ethnicity as a basis for group mobilisation to capture 
power. In Burundi, ethnic discrimination is indeed rooted in colonial legacy; 
colonialists found Burundians living side by side under the same King and by using 
the policy of divide and rule they discriminated against ethnic groups by creating 
social classes- where Hutus were encouraged to engage in agriculture and artisanery  
while Tutsis were given good education and positions of administration. 
    
Further, Nair argues that criminal complicity of both local and international actors in 
the search for gaining access to natural resources such as diamond and coltan also 
adds to the list mentioned above in causing civil wars in Africa. The “origins of much 
of the current conflict in Africa lie in deep-seated issues of identity and security. What 
is often at stake, at least in terms of how the protagonists of ethnic conflict see it, is 
nothing less than their very survival as a group”167. This is validated in the Burundian 
case; the 1959 Rwandan social revolution, which culminated in the Hutu capture of 
power from the Tutsi and led to massive deaths and fleeing of the Tutsi into 
neighbouring countries, prompted the minority Tutsi in Burundi to consolidate and 
monopolise power and the military in defence of their security.     
 
The origins of contemporary civil conflicts can be traced to the Cold War, when 
political elites deliberately abused their offices but nonetheless consolidated their 
positions through repression and financial and military support of the superpowers. In 
order to preserve power, rulers maintained continued access to patronage networks for 
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subject populations. Degeneration of states to shadow states, which is characterized 
by the rise of warlords, occurs when a ruler is unable to guarantee “channels of wealth 
accumulation and distribution”. As noted by Reno, the end of the Cold War led to 
declining external support and engineered internal pressures, which consequently led 
to the outbreak of contemporary civil wars168. What then explains conflicts in a 
number of African countries whose states have not degenerated into failed or shadow 
states like Somalia? It is, therefore, fit to go beyond the client-patron relationship as a 
system that ensures continuity in a given society and look at the overall organisation 
of a society, i.e., factors that lead to its stability or instability in an effort to trace the 
root of civil conflicts. This is based on the fact that even at the height of the Cold 
War, Africa experienced civil conflicts, e.g., the civil war in Angola, Mozambique 
and Uganda with Burundi afflicted by violent clashes between the Hutu and the Tutsi.  
   
Stewart suggests that civil wars are often caused by group consciousness of 
“horizontal inequality”, which leads to organized violence for political purposes, 
particularly securing or maintaining state power169. Group identity is normally 
constructed around region, ethnicity, class or religion. Group mobilization for conflict 
usually arises under “situations of relative deprivation” in comparison with other 
groups. However, in some cases violence may be sponsored by groups driven by the 
need to retain their relative position of privilege170. Ayoob argues that it is the 
“erosion of legitimate authority” and inability to provide good governance that offers 
a more solid explanation for the cause of civil war in developing countries171. Indeed, 
inability to provide good governance offers a profound explanation for the cause of 
civil wars in developing countries, of which Africa is part. For example, conflict in 
Burundi, DRC, and Ivory Coast had much to do with the governance style, which 
promoted inequality by marginalising certain ethnic groups. In some cases, bad 
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governance is reflected in the failure to institutionalise the state system leading to 
political violence and consequently escalation into armed violence.    
   
3.3 Dynamics and Causes of African Internal/Civil Conflicts 
 
It is crucially important to look at the dimensions of internal/civil conflicts before 
embarking on analyzing Africa’s contemporary civil conflicts. Civil conflict emerges 
as the most prevalent form of armed conflict in the contemporary world. Civil 
conflicts undermine regional stability, respect for international law and behavioural 
norms, and can challenge the national interests of powerful nations. Many observers 
believe that the causes of civil conflicts are obvious; they acknowledge that the major 
forces responsible for these violent conflicts are the deep-seated hatred among various 
ethnic and religious groups. However, scholarly literature on internal conflict has 
identified four main clusters of factors explaining the incidence of violence in various 
places: structural factors; political factors; Economic/social factors; and 
cultural/perceptual factors:172 
 
The three major structural factors include: weak states; intra-state security concerns; 
and ethnic geography. 1) Weak states- many of the states were artificially constructed 
by the colonial powers; they lacked political legitimacy and institutions capable of 
exercising meaningful control over their territorial boundaries. Weak state structures 
often attract violent conflict. Power conflicts between politicians and potential leaders 
intensify. 2) Intra-state security concerns- when states are weak, individual groups 
feel threatened and so they are compelled to provide for their security; they are 
concerned about whether other groups are a threat to them. This emerges when 
multiethnic states collapse forcing ethnic groups to quickly mobilize in search for 
their defence. 3) Ethnic geography- states with ethnic minorities are more likely to 
experience conflict than others, and certain forms of ethnic demographics are more 
“problematic” than others. However, ethnic homogeneity is not a guarantee to internal 
harmony. For example, regardless of Somalia’s homogeneity, it has been afflicted by 
clan warfare and power struggles among local warlords. 
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Four key political factors explaining internal conflict are: discriminatory political 
institutions; exclusionary national ideologies; inter-group politics; and elite politics. 
Discriminatory political institutions- it is argued that the occurrence of conflict in a 
country depends largely on the “type and fairness” of its political system. For instance 
closed authoritarian systems are likely to create resentment over time, especially in 
cases where there is discriminatory pursuit of the interest of ethnic groups. Even in 
more democratic settings resentment can emerge in cases of inadequate representation 
in government structures. This makes much sense in the case of Burundi; the political 
system was discriminatory and exclusionary, in that, a section of people hailing from 
one region dominated state institutions including the army. This created deep anger 
and resentment among those that were excluded and discriminated against and thus, 
mobilised group solidarity for conflict.    
 
Exclusionary national ideologies- the nature of the prevailing national ideology in the 
country concerned determines the stability of the country. In some countries, 
nationalism and citizenship are determined by one’s ethnicity, rather than the idea that 
everyone who lives in a country has the same rights and privileges. Inter-group 
politics- the prospects for conflict are massive if groups- whether they are based on 
political, ideological, religious, or ethnic affinities- have ambitious objectives, strong 
identity attachment and conflicting strategies. Elite politics- under this, conflict is 
prone when “desperate and opportunistic politicians” resort to the use of manipulative 
tactics in times of political and economic trouble. Under this, ethnicity is often 
manipulated by elites during periods of political and economic turmoil in an effort to 
silence domestic challenges. 
 
Inter-group politics in Burundi was based on false ideological inclinations and ethnic 
identity; based on massive killings of Tutsis by Hutus in neighbouring Rwanda, the 
Tutsis Burundi had a strongly entrenched belief system that should they not take full 
control of political and military power, they were going to face the same fate as their 
Rwandan counterparts, while on the other hand, based on colonial distortion of the 
history of Burundians, Hutus believed that minority Tutsis were naturally oppressors 
and the solution lay in uprooting them from power. Thus, perceptions attached on 
each group by the other acted as a key ingredient of conflict between the two groups. 
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This, however, was expressed by manipulating ethnicity in attempts to capture and or 
preserve power. 
 
Not only has elite politics played out in Burundi during political and economic 
turmoil, but also in periods of socio-political transitions. For instance, during the 1993 
presidential and parliamentary campaigns, ethnicity played a significant role in 
determining the elections outcome; Hutu elites used an ethnic card to convince voters 
in voting them into power- they argued voters to use the ballot in order to address the 
past injustices that Hutus have suffered. 
 
Three broad economic and social factors have been identified as potential sources of 
internal conflict: economic problems; discriminatory economic systems; and the trials 
and tribulations of economic development and modernization. Economic problems- 
unemployment, inflation, and competition for scarce resources, such as land, 
contribute to frustrations and tensions in a society, and can provide a ground for 
launching conflict. Discriminatory economic systems- whether this is done based on 
class or ethnicity can generate a sense of resentment and frustration which can 
increase the prospects for violence. Economic development and modernization have 
been regarded as the major force behind instability and internal conflict. These raise 
economic and political expectations, and can lead to increased frustration when they 
are not met. The key problem is that the development of political institutions lags 
behind social and economic change. In many African countries the state controls the 
economy, implying that economic participation depends on political links that given 
groups/individuals have with those in power. In order to ensure survival, those 
opposed to the ruling class or from other ethnic groups have often mobilised for 
conflict. Since poverty in Africa has been manipulated by politicians to mobilise 
vulnerable people especially youths to participate in armed conflict as a means of 
survival (source of income), economic development and modernisation cannot qualify 
as the major source of instability and internal conflict in Africa.  
 
Economic problems which were exacerbated by an economic embargo that was 
imposed on the GoB in the late 1990s by regional countries combined with 
competition for lack of land to increase the level of unemployment in Burundi. 
Burundian politicians must have used this vulnerability together with ethnicity to 
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mobilise group conflict. Poverty that was a consequence of this economic malaise was 
reflected in frequent robberies committed against Tutsi victims before they were burnt 
to death in ambushes by the rebels. In Burundi the economic system largely depended 
on the political system, the two were closely linked. Political discrimination was 
mainly based on ethnicity and regionalism; key government positions were occupied 
by Tutsis from Bururi province and while Hutus from the same region benefited from 
the system the Tutsis from other regions did not. This created resentment and anger 
among Burundian groups from the rest of the country. This discrimination is 
considered to be the key motivating factor that forced some Tutsis to join the Hutu 
rebel movements173.  
 
It is analytically incorrect to suggest that conflict breaks out broadly due to failure to 
meet expectations from economic development and modernisation; it is rather the 
political management of these processes that should be blamed for conflict. This is 
premised on the fact that in Africa the state plays a significant role in the economy 
such that if this is not guided by the principles of fairness and equitability in sharing a 
country’s resources among all groups, conflict is bound to arise. This was the case in 
Burundi, where the civil conflict was largely motivated by political discrimination, 
which translated into economic discrimination and hence, causing frustration and 
consequently resulting in conflict.    
 
Two cultural and perceptual factors have also been identified as potential sources of 
internal conflict: cultural discrimination against minorities; and group histories and 
perceptions of themselves and others. Problems encountered under the first case 
include inequitable opportunities in education, legal and political constraints on the 
use and teaching of minority languages, and constraints on religious freedom. Groups’ 
histories and perceptions of themselves and others- some “ancient hatred” can be 
legitimately acknowledged as factual. However, it is also true that some groups tend 
to view their histories as being superior than those of their neighbours, rivals and 
enemies. Stories told from generation to the next are taken as “gospel truth”. They 
often become distorted and exaggerated, and are regarded as invaluable knowledge by 
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group members. These ethnic mythologies have a potential to create conflict if rival 
groups have distorted images of each other.  
 
In the case of Burundi, ethnic mythologies played an important role in fuelling the 
civil conflict; Hutus were told that Tutsis are inhumane and terrible and are bent 
towards oppressing the Hutus while Tutsis were told that Hutus were killers and for 
that matter Tutsis have got to have full control over political power and the military in 
order to prevent them from massacring Tutsis. In addition, history also played a 
crucial role in instigating antagonism between Hutus and Tutsis. This is traced in the 
colonial legacy, whereby colonialists documented that Tutsis were invaders who came 
from Ethiopia and imposed their oppressive rule on the indigenous Hutus174. This 
created deep-seated anger and resentment against Tutsis to the extent that political 
discrimination against Hutus by Tutsis in the post-colonial era, served to endorse this 
historical assertion. 
 
A number of factors explain the root causes of Africa’s civil conflicts: “weak or failed 
states; authoritarian rule; a lack of coincidence between nation and state; the exclusion 
of minorities from governance; and acute social-economic deprivation and 
inequity”175. Since there are factors that contribute to weak or failed states then it is 
analytically incorrect to claim that weak or failed states is a factor explaining the root 
cause of conflict in Africa. A weak or failed state is a result of an underlying factor(s) 
at the root of the conflict. For example, political and economic exclusion can be a 
basis for ethnic antagonism, which may result in a weak state. Although, Burundi is a 
classical example of this, it was rather the exclusion of the majority Hutus from the 
governance structures that was significantly responsible for the civil conflict. 
Considering that in Burundi majority Hutus and Tutsis outside Bururi province were 
economically excluded, it meant that they were automatically deprived of essential 
social services, such as, education, health and housing. Naturally, this created a sense 
of resentment and resistance against the status quo and thus motivating conflict.   
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According to research by Paul Collier of the World Bank, civil wars are mainly 
caused by the ease with which economic plunder is carried out and the unfair 
accumulation of economic benefits, while paying no attention to legitimate 
grievances176. Reno argues that the culture of expropriating economic resources of the 
state through the system of patronage results in the creation of a “shadow state” and 
increases the likelihood of civil war177. In other words collier reveals that civil wars 
are significantly motivated by corrupt practices of, or private accumulation of state 
resources by, state officials while disregarding key pressing concerns of other groups. 
In the case of Burundi, economic fortune was broadly related to political influence, to 
the extent, that economic life was dependent on political life; the two were closely 
interconnected, whereby without political connection, it was difficult to access or gain 
economic benefits on a considerable scale. And because political connection was 
based on one’s ethnic background and region of origin, this meant that unless one was 
a Tutsi from Bururi province or a Hutu from the same province, he/she would hardly 
attain political influence and thus economic benefits. This political exclusion that 
translated into economic exclusion created a strong sense of resentment, anger and 
frustration in the excluded, who were therefore forced to mobilise for conflict.     
 
The post-Cold War era in Africa has been marked by raising incidences of internal 
conflicts, which are fundamentally rooted in ethnic confrontation and “scrambles” for 
natural and state resources178. While this argument does not fully hold in the case of 
Burundi, given that the Burundi conflict has been ongoing since the country’s 
independence in 1962 (i.e., during the Cold War), it was during the post-Cold War 
that the conflict escalated. Massive retrenchment following the election of the first 
democratically Hutu President in 1993, meant that the Tutsis who had dominated 
political and economic realms were to lose their means of survival. However, this was 
reversed by some elements from the Tutsi dominated army when they assassinated the 
Hutu President. Considering that it was impossible to consolidate political power 
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without the backing of the army, the Hutus mobilised to form a military campaign 
against the Tutsi establishment. While ethnicity played a key role in influencing the 
civil conflict in Burundi, the fact that, the rebel movements were composed of both 
Hutus and Tutsis (see fieldwork information), implies that the conflict was a struggle 
for political power with a view to access or obtain economic benefits that accrue from 
holding power. This is supported by a negotiated settlement to the conflict reached in 
the Arusha peace process that came as a result of political and military/police power 
sharing; political and military power were the most key contentious issues around 
which the conflict was waged and, therefore, their resolution laid the foundation on 
which the Burundi conflict was addressed.    
  
Excessive dominance by the executive over political processes in sub-Saharan Africa 
is seen to be another key root cause of conflict. This manifests itself in a zero-sum 
game, where securing the chief executive office of a state is considered as 
“everything”179. This is compounded by a desire to remain in power by any means 
possible regardless of the will of the people, and the absence of checks and balances 
that are offered by independent institutions of a state. This state of affairs, inter alia, is 
characterised by the absence of the rule of law, human rights abuses, and weak 
institutions of the state, conditions which lay the ground for conflict. Excessive 
dominance of the executive in Burundi is considered to be one of the key factors that 
that explain the Burundi civil conflict; the executive had total control over all state 
apparatuses and power was organised around regionalism, this created resentment and 
anger against those from the ruling region and, therefore, resulted in conflict.            
 
Africa’s conflicts are often seen to be a result of religious or ethnic clashes, but in 
reality, many of the underlying causes of contemporary African conflicts are informed 
by “issues arising within African society”- that is, issues related to the artificial 
borders created by the colonialists. This has created racial, ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious problems that are characteristic of contemporary Africa. In other words, 
“conflicts in Africa are closely linked with problems concerning the legitimacy of 
state authority”180. While the creation of artificial borders by colonialists poses a 
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challenge to the social and ethnic dynamics of African states, it is chiefly the 
mismanagement of these challenges or the lack of effective mechanisms to deal with 
them that offers the greatest resource for conflict. For instance, had the post-colonial 
Burundian leaders effectively addressed colonial historical distortions about 
Burundian groups, the deep-seated hatred among Burundian ethnic groups that was 
effectively manipulated by politicians to achieve their political ends, would not have 
surfaced to deepen the conflict.     
 
Falola argues that one of the key roots of conflicts in Africa is located in the misuse of 
political power; political leadership is mired by embezzlement of public funds and 
bad governance. Through a system of clientele, political leaders reward supporters 
with positions and state funds. Corruption on such a large scale stifles proper 
management of state affairs, creates resentment, and “wrecks the fabric of society”. 
Because of the private gains associated with possessing state power are enormous, 
competition to control the state is characterized by severe conflicts. The “end justifies 
the means”, the zero-sum game is the order, and an occupant of state power ensures 
that he monopolizes and preserves state power181. Unless the political leadership has 
strong backing of the army in such state of affairs, very often the military intervenes 
in the name of liberators to usher in a new era of change. However, in most cases this 
is a mere change of state occupants and not a fundamental change of the existing 
status quo. Besides, the military entrenches itself in power and thereby, attracting new 
conflicts. In Burundi, state or political power was associated with economic benefits, 
the state was the major source of survival for many and hence, exclusions that 
characterised the newly elected Hutu presidency in 1993 were met with resistance and 
resulted in the assassination of the president, consequently, leading to massive 
massacres of both Hutu and Tutsi civilians.    
 
Dramé points to the failure of power sharing by many African leadership as an 
incentive for armed confrontation against a state. These conflicts raise questions about 
the governance system of the African state, particularly its capacity to govern its 
people effectively and fairly. The conflicts demonstrate a strong sense of frustration 
against the state by sections of the population. Very often these conflicts are caused 
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by the lack of proper mechanisms through which differences between political actors, 
and between rulers and the ruled can be reconciled. For instance, whenever there is 
little room or none for dialogue between the government and the opposition, this 
degenerates into armed conflict. This, therefore, raises the question of democracy in 
African societies and of authoritarianism in the African leadership182. It is not that 
there are totally no existing proper mechanisms to manage conflicts between political 
actors, but the danger is that they have been marred with corruption by state 
operatives. For instance, one suing the state can hardly get justice because of state 
influence in the judicial process. Thus, although, there are some existing mechanisms 
for conflict management, there is increasingly lack of credible personnel to run them. 
Corruption, therefore, emerges as an important incentive for conflict; since the 
aggrieved cannot obtain justice in the judicial system nor from other mechanisms, 
they resort to subversive or violent practices. Indeed, the Burundi conflict affirms the 
proposition that lack of power sharing provides an incentive for conflict; the proposed 
power sharing deal in Arusha culminated in the end of violent conflict between the 
government of Burundi and the main rebel group, the FDD when the latter joined the 
transitional government.      
 
According to a series of studies done on Africa’s internal conflicts, it was found out 
that participatory systems of government were more likely to promote “better modes 
of conflict resolution and maintenance of peace than non-participatory systems”183. 
This is crucial in that it provides a solution to what I consider as the key source of 
internal conflict in Africa, that is, inequitable distribution of a country’s resources. 
Moreover, it also provides a checks and balance system that discourages the ills of 
autocratic leadership such as human rights abuses and misuse of political power, 
which create ground for conflict. However, in order to ensure the realisation of proper 
mechanisms of conflict resolution and maintenance of peace, participatory systems of 
government must devolve real power to the people so that they can determine their 
own destiny.         
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Despite the resolution of many of Africa’s prolonged conflicts (e.g., Ethiopia and 
Mozambique) as a result of the end of ideological confrontation by the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R, internal conflicts have increased on the continent. These conflicts take a 
number of various forms:184  
 
o Conflicts related to the end and post-War reconciliation (e.g., Ethiopia, 
Liberia, Rwanda, Angola and Mozambique); 
o Conflicts over resource distribution- these include countries implementing 
structural adjustment programs with distribution effects that create conflict 
(e.g., Mozambique); and conflicts over distribution that are associated with 
conflicts over reconciliation (e.g., South Africa); 
o Conflicts over political participation- in which groups and individuals are 
demanding political rights, the establishment of multi-party democracy, an 
end to autocratic rule and more accountability from those in positions of 
power (e.g., Zimbabwe and the former Zaire); 
o Conflicts over political identity- in which conflict is organized around ethnic, 
tribal, religious, linguistic and other sub-national ties (e.g., former Zaire, 
Angola, Rwanda, Sudan and South Africa). In these conflicts sections of a 
population mobilize to fight for or demand political change. 
 
Batchelor argues that these different forms of internal conflicts are often characterized 
by high levels of political violence and instability. As a consequence, these conflicts 
lead to increased demand for small arms by both state and non-state actors185. In 
addition, these conflicts lead to massive killings, displacements, and floods of 
refugees into neighbouring countries and thus create regional instability (e.g., Rwanda 
during the 1994 genocide and Burundi at the height of the civil conflict in 1993) in 
which case, conflicts of this magnitude demand international attention in form of 
humanitarian intervention in order to address them and thus secure protection to 
civilians under severe threat.    
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Newman and Balachandran observe that conflicts in Africa are “fuelled by underlying 
socio-economic factors such as poverty; poor access to food, health care and 
education; the proliferation of weapons; and repercussions of colonialism”186. Indeed, 
poverty and the general lack of meeting basic human needs by large numbers of 
people are incentives, which strongly influence conflicts in Africa. Such ill conditions 
create a sense of desperacy among people, which is preyed upon by opportunist 
politicians in several ways like creating ethnic consciousness with a view to mobilise 
for group conflict. Moreover, a poverty-stricken population provides a better avenue 
for recruitment to launch armed struggle against state establishments. Further, 
negative consequences of colonial legacy like group stratification played a key role in 
fuelling the Burundi civil conflict by creating a sense of inferiority among the socially 
disadvantaged.          
 
Jackson attributes the cause of civil conflicts to “domestic rather than systemic 
factors”. These conflicts involve politically motivated violence that primarily occurs 
within the boundaries of a single state. He suggests that conflicts in Africa are rooted 
in the conduct of politics and “discourses of weak states” and not in escalation of 
ancient hatreds, the character of individual rulers, or the collapse of stable peaceful 
domestic systems187. It is safe not to suggest that conflicts in Africa are solely caused 
by domestic and not systematic factors; while it is true that political practice 
influences conflict in Africa, it is equally true that ancient hatred, provided that the 
leadership does not make effort to address it, can extensively influence violent 
conflict (e.g., deep-seated hatred between Hutus and Tutsis played a key role in the 
1994 Rwandan genocide, and also this has had a bearing on killings among Burundian 
Hutus and Tutsis). It is also impossible in many African states to separate the conduct 
of politics from the character of individual rulers. This is because of the 
overwhelming power and extent of dominance by individual rulers (chief executives 
of states) in governance structures. 
 
Considerable academic debate about the causes of recent wars in Africa and 
elsewhere traces their roots in greed or grievance. However, an overarching view of 
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Africa’s conflicts is more likely to suggest that marginalisation in terms of both 
material resources and political participation stands as the key factor explaining 
motivations for conflict and its causes188. It should be, however, noted that greed is 
ingrained in the policy of marginalisation; both the two ills serve to promote a similar 
goal by denying an opponent the means of survival, that is, economic and political 
(which very often in Africa translate into economic advantage) benefits. Although, the 
civil conflict in Burundi is mainly considered to be ethnically motivated but given that 
fighting between the main warring parties came to an end as a result of joining the 
power sharing arrangement, affirms the above assertion.       
 
Responding more effectively to Africa’s conflict demands consensus in understanding 
its causes. Past responses to conflict have been unable to spell out the context within 
which conflict occurred or failed to address the root causes of conflict. Key among the 
root causes of internal conflict in Africa include: 1) Inequality- inequality between 
groups is considered to be the major cause of conflict in Africa. It exists on three 
“mutually reinforcing arenas, economic; social; and political. For example, in 
countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda, political power and the benefits 
thereof were monopolised by one group; 2) State collapse- the collapse of state 
institutions has led to internal and regional conflict. In this situation, the state is no 
longer able to meet basic services for its people and therefore loses its legitimacy. As 
Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrated, both institutional and physical infrastructure 
together with ethnic violence, create conditions which reinforce violence and result in 
factional confrontation; 3) History- a number of conflicts occur in absence of a 
peaceful tradition of addressing problems. Political violence is reinforced by state 
instruments such as the army, the police and the judiciary. For instance, in countries 
such as the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi history played a major role in creating a state 
model “based on the artificial creation and abuse of ethnicity to maintain power”189. 
 
It is true that inequality among groups is likely to be the major cause of conflict in 
Africa. For instance, in Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide, power had been 
monopolised by Hutus from the northern region. This left Tutsis and Hutus from other 
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regions marginalised. While Tutsis were affected because of their ethnic orientation, 
Hutus suffered because of the effects of regionalism. This created deep resentment 
among Hutu politicians from other regions, who expressed their discontent by joining 
the opposition (the current ruling government which was then fighting the 
government of President Habyarimana). To the extent that at the eruption of the state 
sponsored genocide, Hutu opposition leaders were massacred alongside the Tutsis. 
Moreover, because the private sector in Africa has not fully developed to absorb many 
politically active people, political exclusion in Rwanda meant economic exclusion 
and in effect a denial to their livelihood and thus creating ripe conditions for conflict. 
 
According to Annan, a key source of conflict in Africa is the nature of political power 
coupled with the “real and perceived consequences of capturing and maintaining 
power. It is frequently the case that political victory assumes a “winner-takes all” 
form with respect to wealth and resources, patronage, and the prestige and 
prerogatives of office. A continual sense of advantage or disadvantage is often closely 
linked to this phenomenon, which is heightened in many cases by reliance on 
centralized and highly personalized forms of governance. Where there is insufficient 
accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and 
balances, non-adherence to the rule of the law, absence to peaceful means to change 
or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control becomes 
excessively important, and the stakes become dangerously high. This situation is 
exacerbated when, as is often the case in Africa, the state is the major provider of 
employment and political parties are largely either regionally or ethnically based, … 
the multi-ethnic character of most African states makes conflict even more likely, 
leading to an often violent politicisation of ethnicity”190.  
 
Ethnicity per se does not engineer conflict but it is only manipulated by, those who 
feel that they are discriminated against or excluded by the governing authority, and 
those in authority who seek to preserve power. The excluded use ethnicity to mobilise 
for conflict while those in power use ethnicity in order to consolidate, and preserve 
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themselves in, power. In addition, non-adherence to the rule of law and absence of 
peaceful means to change leadership are key ingredients of autocratic leadership 
sponsoring conflict in Africa. These also attract external sympathy by aiding the 
opposition to fight the unpopular regime, which very often extends the conflict across 
boundaries of a state and, thereby, affect relations between neighbouring countries. 
Burundi is a classic example qualifying this argument; Tanzania was seen by the 
Burundian government to support the FDD rebels and this affected relations of the 
two countries. 
 
Colonial legacy- imposition of boundaries that did not match the social and ethnic 
dynamics is also seen as a major source of Africa’s conflicts hindering national unity 
upon which strong political leadership could be constructed191. However, this has 
much to do with opportunistic politicians who use the effects of colonial legacy with a 
goal of achieving personal interests. This argument is premised on, the fact that, even 
homogeneous states such as Rwanda and Burundi where groups share a similar 
culture, language and values, national unity is still far from being achieved. Therefore, 
it is not always the case that sharing similar social and ethnic characteristics will 
translate into national unity.    
 
The proliferation of armed groups and militias (in some instances supported by 
external political forces to fight proxy wars in neighbouring countries), the inability of 
state security apparatuses to control the movements of militias and armed groups, 
proliferation of small arms, have contributed to regional insecurity and destabilised 
the governance system of states. Economic instability and raising poverty levels in 
Africa, the struggle among various communities for access to land, water or control 
over mineral resources such as oil have also been at the root of, or have in some cases 
contributed to, some internal conflicts192. Access to land, especially in densely 
populated African states like Rwanda and Burundi, has been over the years a conflict 
resource used by politicians to mobilise groups for conflict. In order to attract many 
locals to participate in the 1994 genocide, Rwandan politicians told them that their 
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plight was caused by Tutsis occupying large pieces of land and so if they killed them 
they would take possession of their land. Burundi also faced a similar problem, people 
were told to kill their neighbours in order to take possession of their land. Land 
related conflicts are premised on the fact that, land in many African countries is 
regarded sacred because big numbers of people still depend on it for their livelihood.        
 
Lyon observes that coup-makers, real or potential, communalism, tribalism, religious 
fundamentalism, economic mismanagement and “sheer misery”, as well as 
inequitable distribution of resources are key factors contributing to conflict in 
contemporary Africa193. Although coup-makers, in a sense, contribute to conflict in 
Africa, this is simply a manifestation of an already existing factor(s) causing conflict, 
for example, economic instability, which motivates the coup plotters to change 
government with a goal to address the instability. However, I agree with Lyon that 
inequitable distribution of resources is one of the key factors contributing to conflict 
in contemporary Africa. This is influenced by factors such as sectarianism and 
regionalism. This creates resentment and anger in the marginalized groups and 
consequently motivating them to engage in conflict with a view to change the status 
quo.  
 
In concise, the nature of post-Cold War civil conflicts in Africa has created massive 
refugees into neighbouring countries and has destabilized sub-regional political and 
socio-economic sectors. Conflicts on the African continent are characterized by 
massive destruction and alarming magnitude. Most of Africa’s contemporary wars 
possess a mixture of internal and external features. Thus, African governments are 
quick to expect spill over effects, such as refugees, proliferation of arms or some form 
of destabilization from a neighbouring country engaged in war. While African 
conflicts in the Cold War might have been exacerbated by superpower rivalry, the 
post-Cold War African conflicts are likely to be informed by regional instability, 
political disunity and weak state structures. The end of the Cold War created a trend 
of death and despair, which was marked by an inflation of sports of violence all over 
the African continent. A number of entrenched military and one party regimes 
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collapsed as a result of the end of the Cold War, emerging of pro-democracy 
movements and an explosion of ethnic and other social conflicts. Many conflicts in 
Africa are based on grievances of ethnic minorities or majorities. However, even 
states that are homogeneous such as Somalia are characterized by sub-ethnic 
differences that have a potential to breed violent conflict. The unfair distribution of 
resources among groups is considered to be a critical motivation for conflict. A 
number of factors explain the root causes of Africa’s civil conflicts. These include 
weak or failed states; authoritarian rule; a lack of coincidence between nation and 
state; the exclusion of minorities from governance; and acute social-economic 
deprivation and inequity. Moreover, post-Cold War Africa’s civil conflicts are 
fundamentally rooted in ethnic confrontation and scrambles for natural and state 
resources.  
 
After broadly looking at the nature and factors informing Africa’s civil conflicts, we 
then pursue our discussion by focussing on Burundi’s intractable civil conflict, its 
implications on regional peace and security, and the implications of Burundi’s peace 
process towards achieving enduring peace.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      77
CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE BURUNDI CIVIL CONFLICT 
 
“Nowhere else in Africa has so much violence killed so many people on so many occasions 
in so small a space as in Burundi”194.  
 
This chapter critically discusses the nature and characteristics of the Burundi conflict 
and its implications on international /regional peace and security. The discussion 
includes the historical evolution of the conflict; its root causes and effects on the 
neighboring countries. This chapter also attempts to critically analyze the effects of 
ethnic extremism/solidarity as a feature of the Burundi conflict on regional peace and 
stability. Also the chapter makes a critical examination of the Burundi peace process 
(that culminated in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi) and 
its implications on enduring peace in Burundi.  
 
 
Burundi is a small, mountainous and impoverished country in Eastern Central Africa, 
ranked by the United Nations as one of the world’s poorest states. It is the second 
most densely populated country in sub-Saharan Africa. The country got its 
independence in July 1962 after 46 years of Belgian administration, which preceded 
20 years of German rule. At the time of its independence the country was governed 
under a monarchy with the National and Union Progress Party (UPRONA) as the 
major political organization. The Government was officially a variant of the Belgian 
Constitutional monarchy. However, in practice, Burundi’s royal court wielded much 
influence and power, in the National Assembly that was elected in September 1961, 
and in the state bureaucratic structures195. 
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Burundi's social system has been considered as "one of the most complex and least 
understood in Africa"196. Its ethnic composition comprises of three groups: the Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa197. The Hutu, who account for 85% of Burundi's population, have been 
described as a Bantu people who are traditionally agriculturalists. The Tutsi, who 
represent 14% of the population, are identified as a Hamitic people, who migrated 
from Ethiopia from the sixteenth century. A number of ethnographers reveal that the 
Tutsi established a dominant position over the Hutu in the economy and governance 
of the region198. The Twa, who comprise 1% of the population, are traditionally 
hunters and potters, who inhabit the forests and are politically, economically and 
socially marginalised. The Ganwa are identified as the fourth group, who are feudal 
princes of mixed blood. The Ganwa considered themselves neither as Hutu nor Tutsi, 
but above both groups199.   
 
Unlike many countries in Africa, pre-colonial Burundi was a politically integrated 
unit with a quasi-feudal monarchy headed by a King (the Mwami), who was selected 
from the Ganwa. Burundi was, however, traditionally a highly centralised kingdom, in 
which the Ganwa wielded much power and often fought among themselves and the 
King. Below the Ganwa were chiefs and administrators, who composed of both the 
Hutu and the Tutsi. This ensured continuity of the social structure, in which some 
Hutu attained a superior status than the Tutsi. It was possible for a Hutu to be 
identified as a Tutsi and for a Ganwa to be "demoted to a Tutsi"200. Much of society 
was organised around a client-patron system. This promoted social mobility and 
cohesion201.  
  
Traditionally, there has been some degree of difference in identity between the Hutu 
and Tutsi in Burundi. Jeremy reveals considerable linguistic and anthropological 
evidence pointing to an historic inequality and confrontation between the Tutsi, Hutu 
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and Twa202. While some observers, including a substantial contemporary Hutu 
community, regard the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Burundi as the product of centuries-old 
enmities and oppression, most ethnographical and historical studies reveal that the 
Hutu-Tutsi conflict is a relatively recent phenomenon and that violent conflict 
between the groups was unheard of until 1965203. According to René and Warren, the 
Hutu and Tutsi share a similar language and culture, and have common social and 
political institutions, and have often intermarried and lived together peacefully for 
centuries. The Hutu-Tutsi animosity came as a result of such factors as colonialism, 
modernisation, the traumatic experience in the Rwandan Hutu rebellion and 
repressive and discriminatory post-colonial policies204. Indeed, while colonialism 
played a crucial role in antagonising Burundian ethnic groups, the Rwandan Hutu 
rebellion, which killed thousands of Tutsis and caused thousands of others to flee into 
neighbouring countries had a big influence in shaping and determining the Hutu-Tutsi 
conflict in Burundi. In order to insure their security, Tutsis had to dominate both in 
politics and the military, factors that are considered to be key in motivating the violent 
confrontation between the two groups. 
 
 4.1 Background to the Civil Conflict 
 
Burundi's colonial experience was quite brief, but it left a significant land mark on the 
development of the country. It was only in the latter years of the nineteenth century 
that the first European explorers arrived in Burundi, which gave way to the Germany 
army at the end of the century. German administration was indirect and was not 
influential to affect Burundi's traditional social setup205.  In 1918, Belgian troops 
drove the Germans out and jointly administered the territory with Rwanda until 
Burundi's Independence. This administration was later mandated by the League of 
Nations in 1923, and by the United Nations Trusteeship after the second World 
War206.  
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 Belgians attempted to administer Burundi guided by the country's traditional political 
setup. Many observers state that Belgian policies had an overwhelming impact on 
both the social and political system and were responsible for igniting the Hutu-Tutsi 
conflict. Guided by the misconception that the Tutsi domination of the political 
system was as strong in Burundi as it was in Rwanda, Belgium granted greater power 
and educational opportunities to the Ganwa and the Tutsi207. Attempts by the Belgians 
to structure the traditional administrative system served to entrench the Tutsi 
dominance208. Such policies elevated the social status of both Ganwas and Tutsis, and 
coupled with the seeds of domination that were sawn by colonialists, they created 
animosity among Hutus and thus acting as resources in the post-colonial conflict. 
Furthermore, the Burundian social and economic fabrics were increasingly influenced 
by colonialism. For instance, Christianity significantly replaced the indigenous 
religion; the client system, which was used by the Tutsi as an important source of 
income was abolished and replaced with salaries paid to those working in 
administrative structures of the state; and missionary activities contributed to the 
education of the Hutu, and spread Western values of equality and democracy that 
were unheard of in the Burundian society. This resulted in intense ethnic 
differentiation and created eliticism in the Burundian society, in which the two major 
ones, the Ganwa and Tutsi dominated the political and economic system, and the 
third, the Hutu with significant representation in positions of power increasingly 
resented the dominance of the other two groups209.  
 
The Hutu view the Tutsi as "alien invaders", who subjugated the indigenous majority 
centuries ago, and link post-colonial Tutsi oppression to this historical perspective.. 
Moreover, in line with this view is the perception that the Tutsi are "monolithically 
evil people" with whom no peaceful coexistence has never been, and never will be, 
possible. On the other hand, the Tutsi have either denied the intensity existing 
between the groups or have blamed colonialism and external forces to be responsible 
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for this. Such perceptions provided grounded justification for the "perpetuation of 
Tutsi hegemony and the repression of the Hutu"210.    
  
Events in Burundi have led to "a spiralling syndrome of suspicion, fear and hatred" 
between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Thus each level of violence lays the ground for the 
next, as "mutual suspicion and fear" have dominantly characterised the perceptions of 
both groups. As a result, while in the past violence that surrounded a coup attempt 
would have remained limited, now such violence is far more likely to involve the 
entire Burundian society and degenerate into genocidal campaigns211. 
 
Although, there is no consensus on the exact meaning attached to Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa labels in pre-colonial Burundi, it is generally accepted that all three groups 
shared a single language, religion, and political system and lived in harmony with one 
another212. Colonial policies aimed at distorting pre-colonial social and political 
arrangements, and to label Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa as completely distinct ethnic groups. 
They achieved this by using “racist ideas” about classifying people213. It is probably 
based on colonial distortion of the social setting of Burundian society especially the 
use of racial ideology, that a Tutsi-Hutu cleavage and consequently animosity 
between the groups were created, which ills, have influenced the Burundi conflict to 
be viewed by some as ethnic.   
   
4.2 Nature and Perspectives of the Conflict 
 
The short lived and unplanned decolonization (1958-1962) created power conflicts 
between the politically dominant groups: Ganwa aristocrats, Tutsi, and a small 
emergent Hutu elite. The King attempted to address the conflict by using material 
concessions as a means to appease conflicting individuals and factions. However, he 
was unwilling to devolve much political power, the monarchy soon became a source 
of conflict, and in 1964 two years after Burundi’s independence, members of the main 
political party, UPRONA together with the elected National Assembly challenged the 
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legitimacy of the monarchy. Moreover, between 1962-1965 the Ganwa and Tutsi 
dominance was increasingly questioned and this posed a big challenge for them to 
address heightened criticism of its power and privileges214. Thus, this implies that 
failure by colonialists to plan for their departure, that is, by putting in place a 
framework or political structure by which power could be shared among all 
Burundian groups, sowed seeds of political dominance from which power would be 
monopolised by the powerful.  
     
Lemarchand states that the end of colonial rule in Burundi was followed by 
“genocides and mass killings”, and deeply entrenched historical conflicts emerge 
whenever there is a broader social-political transition. He states that, in both cases, “a 
history of conflict and antagonism fuels a power struggle that ends in genocide”215. 
Tribalism is the “age-old” vehicle that accounts for the spread of violence and 
killings216.  
 
Hutu and Tutsi lived peacefully as neighbours for centuries in pre-colonial era. The 
incidences of exclusion that emerged during and after independence “cannot be 
reduced to “deep-seated ancestral enmities”217. However, according to Lemarchand 
the politics of exclusion was orchestrated on Burundians by colonialists218. Given that 
the two groups lived in harmony in pre-colonial era, it is obvious that there must have 
been an external force (in this case, colonialists) responsible for the disharmony 
between the groups. This could have been facilitated by the policy of divide and rule, 
particularly, where they convinced the King to strip Hutus of their administrative 
positions and elevate the status of Tutsis by granting them greater power and 
educational opportunities. This discrimination created the class of the haves and have-
nots and considering that possession of power and education translated into economic 
benefits and associated advantages and thereby, creating a rift between the Hutus and 
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Tutsis. Thus, as discussed earlier, this served to entrench Tutsi dominance over the 
Hutus, naturally, causing resentment and anger in the Hutus and hence, breeding 
conflict between the two groups.      
 
The post-colonial conflict in Burundi has been premised on the "Tutsi-Hutu 
continuum". The Tutsi have been in power since independence except from 1993-96, 
when three Hutu presidents ruled, but even then, they were deposed by the Tutsi who 
controlled the military, a situation that explains the confrontation between the 
"politically disenfranchised Hutu majority and the ruling privileged Tutsi 
minority"219. According to the preceding argument, the conflict between Hutus and 
Tutsis has been motivated by political exclusion. However, a number of factors such 
as economic exclusion, ethnicity and colonial legacy must be employed in order to 
provide a profound explanation of the conflict between the two groups.   
 
The contemporary society of Burundi is fundamentally problematic. The Tutsi 
minority “seek ethnic security” from the Hutu majority, while on the other hand, the 
Hutu seek the political power that ‘legitimately’ belongs to them due to being the 
ethnic majority. The Tutsi, who have for three decades of independence politically 
dominated have denied the Hutu access to power. The society has failed to resolve 
this dilemma. “Outbursts of violence between the two groups in 1965, 1969, 1972, 
1988 and 1991 have claimed hundreds of thousands of lives”220. Thus, the two 
opposing and irreconcilable motivations for seeking power by the two groups 
suggested the urgent need for third party intervention to design a formula by which 
power would be shared.   
 
 Herisse submits that, the crisis that has over the years afflicted Burundi is rooted in 
“imported and misapplied ideologies. Most notorious among these are Christianity, 
racial[sic] superiority and western-style democracy”221. Herisse posits that, 
institutions that were established in order to sustain these concepts replaced traditional 
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practices and distorted indigenous social contracts. It is apparent that these factors 
have damaged the social fabric and created an atmosphere, which is anti-
development. Among other effects of colonialism is the creation of “ethnocide” (mass 
killings engineered by ethnicity), which has occurred at every stage of political 
transition. From 1960s, the period in which the country got its independence, the Hutu 
and Tutsi ethnic groups have been afflicted by massive violence. These killings have 
occurred within the context of power struggles, but are in fact “fuelled” by ethnic 
prejudice222. Thus, in conformity to this argument, the Burundi conflict is “sustained 
by the competition among rival political elites for state power, who mobilize their 
followers around ethnicity”223. Accordingly, ideologies that were introduced by 
colonialists into the Burundian society are responsible for ethnic prejudice, which has 
escalated into violent conflict in pursuit of political power. In other words, based on 
the ideological distortions of the Burundian society, ethnicity was used as a key 
instrument by rival politicians to pursue political power.    
 
Heresse further points out that the Tutsi-Hutu conflict in Burundi is informed by 
ethnocentrism and ethnocracy. He argues that Burundians do not qualify in 
anthropological terms as distinct tribes or ethnic groups since they share similar 
culture, customs, language, and spiritual beliefs, political institutions, and cuisine. 
Once ethnic differences in Burundi had been manipulated as “symbols of superiority 
versus inferiority”, they were used as weapons in later conflicts. As a consequence, 
in-group members were forced to “live in a constant state of readiness for aggressive 
response. And so began a vicious cycle of action-reaction-vengeance”224. Thus, based 
on the above argument, anthropologically, Burundians qualify as a monoethnic group 
of people. But in order to exercise control over them, colonialists had to introduce the 
policy of “divide and rule” (like they did in other countries) by elevating the status of 
one group over the other. Naturally, this became an incentive for conflict among the 
Burundians.    
 
Heresse observes that, the end of the Cold War is seen to be a major source of 
conflict. No longer are political struggles in pursuit of political hegemony seen in 
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terms of democracy and communism, but in terms of ethnicity. Whereby, in case of 
Burundi this bred ethnocracy. In its realistic sense, this is translated as a “racial 
ideology”. In Burundi, the Belgian explorers are partly accountable for circumstances 
that created the “racial ideology”. Missionaries, colonialists, and “neo-colonial 
hegemony” received some Burundian aid in constructing a “racial ideology in 
Burundi. Burundi’s “ethnocracic racial ideology” gave rise to a distinctive feature of 
ethnocracy, in which its proponents mobilize its followers towards “genocidal 
tendencies and behaviours. In Burundi any one can subscribe to this ideology so long 
as that individual has power or privilege to protect”225.  
 
Ndikumana argues that the Burundi conflict is largely a product of “institutional 
failure that has perpetuated economic and political inequality across ethnic groups and 
regions”226. He suggests that the solution to the crisis must be found in political and 
economic liberalization. According to him, political liberalization aims at correcting 
“the tradition of ethnic exclusion in politics that which contributed to ethnic 
polarization”, which is a key resource for violence. While economic liberalization 
aims at permitting equal access to national resources by limiting the role of 
government as a conduit for wealth accumulation by the elite in power, thereby 
eliminating “ethno-regional monopolies”227. Related to the foregoing argument is that 
the continuing conflict is “fuelled” by political antagonism between Tutsi and Hutu 
ethnic elites, who are competing for control of scarce economic resources228. Since 
according to Ndikumana obtaining economic fortune in Burundi is related to one’s 
connections to state power structure, then the solution to the intractable conflict in 
Burundi lies in a power sharing deal across ethnic and regional spectrum.     
 
However, according to Heresse, conflict in Burundi is rooted in “ethnic prejudice”, 
which is informed by colonial legacy. He states that mass killings in Burundi has 
often occurred during power contests, though catalysed by “ethnic prejudice”. Thus, 
effective third party interventionist policy in Burundi’s civil conflict, not only, 
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requires redress of the colonial legacy regarding ethnicity in Burundi, but a power 
sharing formula that promotes confidence in the political system and national identity 
over ethnic identity. 
 
Ndikumana acknowledges that, “while ethnic groups do exist and have always existed 
in Burundi, ethnic diversity per se is not central to the genesis of conflicts; it is 
politicization of ethnicity that matters”229. He argues that the Burundi conflict is not 
directly caused by ethnic diversity, but it is because of political purposes that ethnic 
differences were exploited, thereby, making ethnic diversity an ingredient in 
generating conflict. In a bid to control power by excluding other ethnic groups, the 
Tutsi-Hima from the south used ethnic identity as a tool of exploitation. On the other 
hand, the political groups excluded from state resources, mobilise ethnic solidarities 
to challenge the regime in power. Thus, ethnic diversity emerged as a tool for 
“political competition in pursuit of economic advantages”. What is important for 
conflict is not about ethnic diversity, but the way in which resources from the state are 
distributed across ethnic groups. When the political system is discriminatory along 
ethnic lines, then ethnicity raises as a major cause of conflict230.  
 
Ndikumana argues that the conflict in Burundi is not based on ethnic diversity, but 
political exclusion and inequitable distribution of resources. However, how can we 
explain the persistence of the conflict in Burundi after the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, which in effect, is designed to address such 
imbalances? This perhaps introduces a new dimension to the civil conflict in Burundi, 
which requires the use of the theory of protracted social change to aid us in explaining 
the complexity surrounding the conflict, an aim that this research responds to.   
 
Human Rights Watch argues that although the Burundi conflict is disguised as ethnic, 
but largely, it is a struggle over political and economic power much like similar 
conflicts in other parts of the world231. The protagonists engage in a fight for political 
power, which paves the way for gaining or controlling economic power. However, in 
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order to mobilise for solidarity in support of their cause, they manipulate ethnicity by 
referring to the past injustices. Because the Arusha peace and reconciliation 
agreement for Burundi provided for power sharing, a deal which helped to end the 
conflict between the main warring parties, is an affirmation of the above assertion that 
the Burundi conflict is largely a conflict over political and economic power.    
 
According to the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi, the pre-
colonial period was marked by cohesion among the three groups of people in Burundi. 
Apart from certain traditional practices that constituted some form of indiscriminate 
injustice, and frustration among the Hutus, Tutsis and Twas, there was “no known 
ethnic conflicts” between the groups. This was due to the popular and effective 
system of administration under the monarch. During the colonial era, the colonialists 
employed a strategy of “divide and rule”, in which they introduced “a racist vision” of 
the Burundian people that was enforced by “prejudices and clichés relating to 
morphological considerations” aimed at antagonizing the different components of  
Burundi’s population based on physical characteristics and character traits. Also in 
this era, colonialists introduced an identity card, which indicated ethnic origin, 
thereby promoting ethnic identity at the expense of National identity. This facilitated 
the colonizer to accord specific treatment to a particular ethnic group depending on its 
“theories”. In the post-colonial period, a number of “constant phenomena” are 
responsible for the ignition and persistence of the conflict in Burundi. They include 
massive and deliberate killings, widespread violence and exclusion232.  
 
However, other authors document that Burundi has been “ruled by patrimonial 
regimes” from the pre-colonial era to the colonial and the post-colonial eras. 
Patrimonialism was a “self-reinforcing system” in that, leaders established institutions 
and mechanisms to 1) “protect and preserve privileges acquired in the system and 2) 
prevent entry in the club of born-leaders”. In pre-colonial Burundi, leaders were 
naturally determined; opportunities for social elevation were strongly determined by 
one’s birth rights. During the colonial era, the colonizers enforced the pre-colonial 
system of administration in exercising control over the population. In order to achieve 
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this, the European colonizers needed the support of the monarch and so they 
institutionalized the domination of the Tutsis over the rest of the population233.  
 
During the post-colonial era, “leaders perpetuated patrimonialism by actively 
engineering institutions and mechanisms of exclusion and repression”. In order to 
ensure this, force and intimidation were used as tools against those who were 
perceived to oppose “state ideology”. Therefore, ethnic identity became a key 
consideration for one’s social elevation, and ethnic exclusion became the basis for the 
political system, which resulted in political instability and consequently causing 
conflict234.  
 
The patrimonial system also “sawed seeds of conflict by perpetuating alienation and 
frustration among the majority of the population, who are Hutus and non-southern 
Tutsis”. This created a political atmosphere that was liable to exploitation by those 
seeking to change the regime. Since ethnicity was the major ingredient for 
discrimination, it is unsurprising that the persistent conflict was perceived as ethnic235.  
 
Thus, since from pre-colonial to post-colonial eras Burundi has been ruled under a 
patrimonial system, which has been promoted by mechanisms and institutions of 
exclusion, any durable solution to the Burundi conflict needs to provide for a socio-
political system that is free from any form of ethnic exclusion, and that promotes 
national identity over ethnic identity. 
 
According to Isabirye and Mahmoudi events that have occurred in Burundi since 1976 
are rooted in the massive massacres that were directed against the majority 
Hutu population, in which up to 250, 000 of them were killed in 1972, and explain the 
frequent confrontation between the two ethnic groups. "The current ethnic 
polarisation between the two ethnic groups is neither historic nor incorrigible, but a 
recent phenomenon perpetrated by vested interests within and outside the country"236.  
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Explaining the clashes between the two groups since 1976 based on the 1972 Hutu 
massacres without mentioning the objective behind such an atrocity or without 
accounting for the massacres that occurred before 1972, such as, those of 1965 and 
1969, is not grounded enough; as discussed earlier, this has been mainly the question 
of power struggles between the groups, whereby ethnicity has been used as a tool. 
Also a cursory view of the pre-colonial and colonial periods, in which groups had 
different roles to play depending on the class they belonged to, disputes against the 
argument that ethnic polarisation between the two groups is not historical.  
   
Apparently, there are conflicting accounts of what is at the root of the conflict in 
Burundi. This might explain why the two major rebel groups, FDD and FNL refused 
to be party to the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement which was signed in 
August 2000, and also why the latter continues to reject any appeal for joining the 
peace process. Thus, any possible settlement to the civil conflict in Burundi would 
require diagnosis of a clear explanation surrounding root causes of the conflict. The 
research applies the theory of protracted social change and responses from in-depth 
interviews with key informants in providing tenable explanations motivating the 
conflict.   
 
"Whatever flexibility, complexity and harmony characterised Burundi society prior to 
its independence, certainly by the 1970s the Hutu-Tutsi cleavage had become the 
dominant division in the country and identification as either Hutu or Tutsi the primary 
determinant of political, social and economic status"237. The fact that Burundi’s 
traditional social cohesion was disintegrated in the face of colonialism and 
modernisation, this explains the cleavage between the two groups. Moreover, the 
Rwandan Hutu revolt against the Tutsi domination during the early 1960s 
complemented by political developments in Burundi also catapulted the shift in the 
Hutu-Tutsi elite cleavage into violent conflict238.  
  
The Hutu elite education, the exposure by Western political and social values and 
concepts, and the experience of the Rwandan Hutu inspired the Hutu to aspire for 
power that was over the years denied to them. This prompted the Hutu elite to resort 
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to use of force in order to obtain power. For most of the country's history, the 
government dismissed the existence of ethnic conflict, arguing that ethnicity was a 
colonial construction or part of a deliberate strategy of the proponents of neo-
colonialism that is designed to divide the Burundian society239.  It was not until after 
the violence that erupted in 1988 that the government formally acknowledged that 
ethnic conflict existed in Burundi240. Largely, this conflict has been engineered by 
both Hutu and Tutsi politicians, with a goal of achieving their political ambitions by 
manipulating Burundi's history241. The fact that the conflict is driven by rival 
politicians from both groups with an objective of attaining political power by 
manipulating Burundi’s history, especially by focusing on colonial distortion in the 
social setting of Burundi’s ethnic groups (e.g., elevating the status of Tutsis over 
Hutus), it is analytically incorrect to label the Burundi conflict as exclusively ethnic. 
Politicians manipulate the past injustices that were orchestrated on the Burundian 
society by colonialists to mobilise their group for conflict. 
 
The regional dimension of the Burundi conflict has broadly been neglected in 
analyzing the conflict. Incorporating the regional dimension permits a clear 
understanding of the fact that ethnicity is not exclusively responsible for causing 
conflict in Burundi. “Like the ethnic factor, regionalism appears as a tool which has 
been instrumented for rent seeking, the root cause of civil wars in Burundi. Ethnic and 
regional factors complement each other to shape rent collection and sharing, and none 
of them can explain violence alone”242. Thus, both ethnicity and regionalism are 
linked to conflicts insofar as they are dimensions on which power and resources have 
been premised and monopolized243.  
 
According to Furley and May, the violence that characterised the Burundi civil war 
which escalated after the 1993 assassination of the Hutu President and three ministers, 
“naturally affected neighbouring countries”; Hutu refugees fled to Rwanda, Zaire, 
southern Uganda and north-west Tanzania. The entire region was destabilised by the 
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conflict and risked the devastating effects caused by the spreading conflict244. Indeed 
the exodus of Burundian refugees into neighbouring countries especially Tanzania 
was characterised by serious humanitarian conditions, e.g., lack of shelter and food. 
This also created cross-border insecurity and threatened the security of Tanzania and 
Burundi as the latter accused the former for aiding the FDD rebels by providing them 
with bases and military equipments. In addition, this must have affected the socio-
economic stability of neighbouring countries through competition for scarce 
resources. 
  
Further, the United Nations reveals that the Burundi conflict has led to the killing of 
tens of thousands of people and caused hundreds of thousands to flee to neighbouring 
countries. “The conflict is part of wider Hutu-Tutsi tension in the Great Lakes 
Region”245. Purely, this is a serious humanitarian catastrophe that falls within the 
prescription of the United Nations’ Charter- of a conflict that threatens international 
peace and security and therefore demanding urgent attention by the United Nations 
Security Council to address it. The Burundi conflict spread to Congo and some 
elements of the fleeing Hutu refugees in solidarity with their Rwandan Hutu 
counterparts (militias and former government soldiers), who fled Rwanda after 
committing the 1994 Rwandan genocide, engaged in militaristic activities. Not only, 
did these people launch continued attacks on Burundi, and on Rwanda in late 1990s 
but they also joined Congolese forces, such as, the Mai Mai in attacking 
Banyamulenge- Congolese Tutsis.  As a matter of fact, these attacks attracted the 
intervention of Rwanda into Congo together with other countries of the region, such 
as, Uganda and Burundi joining Rwanda, which intervention led to the overthrow of 
President Mobutu. The important feature of this conflict that is worth noting is the 
motivation of parties that was engineered by Hutu-Tutsi extremism/solidarity.   
 
  
4.3 The Peace Process and the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for  
      Burundi   
 
                                                 
244 Oliver Furley and Roy May, Peacekeeping in Africa, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, England,   
      1998, p.254 
245 Nathan Katzenellenbogen, ‘Burundi Faces new Spell of Turmoil’, in Business Day, October 29,    
      2003 
                                                                      92
The Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi that was signed by 19 
Burundian parties including the GoB but without the participation of the rebel 
movements, was a determination by the parties “to put aside” matters that divided 
them and adopt shared value systems that function to unite them, and to work together 
as Burundians in pursuit of national interests. Realising that peace, stability, justice, 
the rule of law, national unity and reconciliation, and development were the key 
aspiration of the Burundians, the parties committed to address the underlying root 
causes of the civil conflict by adopting a political system that would promote justice, 
pluralism, good governance, and fundamental human rights246.    
 
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, which, inter alia, 
provides for transitional institutions that include a Legislature, composed of a 
National Assembly and a Senate, Executive and Judiciary, was considered pre-
eminent over Burundi’s 1992 Constitution to the extent that when any conflict arose 
between that Constitution and the Agreement, the provisions of the Agreement would 
prevail247. In accordance with the Agreement, the transitional National Assembly was 
to be composed of members of the National Assembly elected in 1993 and at least 
three of the representatives of parties not members of the 1993 National Assembly. 
The Legislative body was tasked to adopt, by a two-thirds majority, a post-transition 
Constitution within 18 Months of its existence. In addition, the Agreement made 
provisions of “a broad-based transitional Government of National Unity”, which 
would be composed of representatives of different parties in a proportion, whereby 
Hutus and Tutsis would occupy 60 per cent and 40 per cent of the portfolios 
respectively. The Executive was to be headed by a transitional President and vice-
President, who would come from different ethnic groups and political parties, and 
who would after 18 Months swap positions248. 
 
Given that majority of the members of the 1993 National Assembly were Hutus, 
nominating three representatives from parties that were not members of the 1993 
National Assembly to join the Legislative body clearly implied that, by far, the 
transitional National Assembly would be dominated by Hutus, a development, which 
                                                 
246 ‘Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi’, httt://www.iss.co.za, 2000, p.2 
247 United States Institute of Peace Library, ‘Democracy and Good Governance’, http://www.usip.org,   
      Protocol II, Article 15, para 3, 12 &13, August 28, 2000 
248 Ibid., para 3, 12 &13 
                                                                      93
is not responsive to the ethnic politics in Burundi. This could perhaps help to explain 
why the post-transitional Constitution was extensively unpopular in the Tutsi parties 
to the extent that they did not approve it nor did they participate in the 2005 
referendum that was aimed to endorse the Constitution. This is a recipe for future 
conflicts and thus instability.  
 
In view of the turbulent history characterised by genocide and other crimes against 
humanity, Burundian parties committed themselves to adopt political principles and 
measures designed to ensure that such atrocities never re-occur.  These, inter alia, 
include; 
 
 “prevention, suppression and eradication of acts of genocide, war 
crimes and other crimes against humanity, as well as violations of 
human rights, including those which are gender-based; and 
implementation of a vast awareness and educational programme for 
national peace, unity and reconciliation”249. 
 
Judicial instruments aimed at implementing political principles and measures were to 
include, enactment of legislation to counter genocide and other gross violations of 
human rights; establishment of an international judicial Commission of inquiry on 
genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity; and establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal to try and punish those found to have committed 
atrocities against Burundians250. While this is a novel idea to counter genocidal 
tendencies and investigate and prosecute those found to have committed atrocities 
against Burundians, it requires unwavering support in form of crucial information and 
resources from those holding state power or occupying key positions in government, a 
requirement which is likely not to be forthcoming given the fact that most of those 
holding such positions were themselves perpetrators of serious crimes against the 
people.   
In order to guard against acts of genocide and coups d’e′tat, and the need to achieve 
ethnic balance, Burundian parties proposed that the national army shall not be 
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composed of more than 50 per cent of any one ethnic group. Similarly, an equal 
percentage and rationale applied to the national police force251. Achieving ethnic 
balance in the army and the police, in itself, is no guarantee to preventing acts of 
genocide, rather, introducing policies and measures aimed at addressing the genocidal 
ideology or, to be exact, extremism which is strongly embedded in the thinking of 
some individuals, could go along way in creating a culture of humanism and tolerance 
upon which enduring peace can be built.  
 
In an effort to promote national reconciliation, the parties recommended the 
establishment of a national truth and reconciliation Commission, which shall be 
tasked with investigating serious acts of violence committed in the past, and identify 
the perpetrators and the victims. However, the Commission shall not be mandated to 
deal with acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. On completion 
of investigations, the Commission shall be required to propose to the competent 
institutions or adopt measures deemed appropriate to promote reconciliation and 
forgiveness, “order indemnification or restoration of disputed property”, or propose 
appropriate measures suitable for particular cases252. Instituting a national truth and 
reconciliation Commission is of paramount importance considering that killings and 
counter killings in Burundi have been instituted in form of revenge of past killings. 
However, in order for this exercise to bear positive results, there is need for extensive 
educational programmes through the media and public debates that are aimed at 
revisiting and reconciling the history of Burundi with a view to creating a national 
consciousness in the Burundians.     
 
The current civil war, which has been ongoing since 1993, continues despite the 
Arusha peace agreement signed in August 2000. The war has spread and is “currently 
being fought in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo”253. This, therefore, 
has given the Burundi civil conflict a regional dimension and, hence, requires the 
involvement of the international community in resolving the conflict. This research 
explores the extent to which this effort is made within the context of the contemporary 
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world, in which international norms of sovereignty and intervention have been 
redefined.    
 
The Tutsis who have been at the helm of political, military and economic scenes since 
independence in 1962, have deep-seated fear that if they lost grip on power they 
would “face genocide by extremist Hutus” like one that occurred in Rwanda in 
1994254. It should be recalled that this fear was caused by the 1959 Rwandan Hutu 
revolution, where Hutus overthrew the King and started massacring Tutsis in large 
numbers and thousands of others had to flee into neighbouring countries. Thus, based 
on the trend of events in Rwanda, the Tutsis in Burundi thought that the only way 
they had to insure their security was to have strong control of power and the military.    
 
Since the assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu president in October 
21, 1993 by the military, “Burundi is experiencing genocide, albeit at a slower pace”, 
while the leaders are embroiled in fruitless negotiations. “Several dozens die every 
day. “Hundreds of thousands” have either fled into exile or are living under inhuman 
conditions in displaced areas within the country255. The conflict, which worsened after 
this coup d` Etat, has since then claimed 300,000 people256. Based on the shift in 
focus of Article 2(4) to 2(7) of the UN Charter and the new conception of 
humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era, such a devastating humanitarian 
situation that spread across into neighbouring countries warranted international 
attention in form of intervention for human protection. Not only, this affected the 
security situation of the neighbouring countries especially across their borders, but 
also affected their socio-economic stability by increasing competition on scarce goods 
and services. 
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 The apparent ethnic conflict in Burundi that has resulted in genocide is “largely a 
fight for good jobs, administrative controls and economic advantage”257. In Kirundi 
(Burundi’s indigenous language) there is a saying, “he who takes food out of your 
mouth is the one who kills you”. Meaning that any massive retrenchment or dismissal 
following an election victory of a given party is perceived as genocide258. A close 
look at the current conflict in Burundi, conflicts with Heresse’s statement: What then 
explains the ongoing conflict in Burundi, given that both the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi and the power sharing deal signed in October 
2003 invite all parties to participate in the governing process and thereby benefit 
politically and economically?   
 
Dludlu argues that the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement signed in August 
2000, which he calls the “Mandela deal”, is faulty. It was only signed by politicians 
and not the armed movements. Under the arrangement, it is unimaginable that the 
power-sharing deal will ever bring peace to Burundians. However, there is no viable 
alternative to “Mandela’s deal” on the table. The lack of a ceasefire with rebels also 
fundamentally reflects the limitation in the deal. It is hoped that the transitional 
government will engage with rebels in negotiating a ceasefire in which Mandela’s 
mediation is expected to play a significant role in achieving this- a step that is 
considered fundamental in bringing to an end the civil war. Mandela’s “rush” to 
signing of the Arusha agreement is considered as one of the flaws in the deal. 
However, his aides argue that “there is no perfect timing” for such a process. 
“Waiting would simply have stalled the process further”259.   
 
Without necessarily dismissing the argument that waiting would have delayed the 
peace process, however, any deal made without the participation of all the key 
stakeholders, is bound to encounter difficulty or at the worst fail in its 
implementation. Although, the major rebel group the FDD later joined the peace 
process because they were confident that they would win an election organised under 
the Arusha peace process and reconciliation agreement for Burundi, this leaves much 
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concern and casts doubt on the successful implementation of all the key provisions in 
the Agreement that were often very contentious in the Arusha peace process.       
  
The Arusha Accord did not produce the "promised land", however, it produced a road 
map paving the way to get there. Neither party- Tutsi nor Hutu "won" in Arusha and 
neither party "lost". The Accord resulted in a "win-win" mentality, the very belief that 
had characterised the conflict for decades and had hindered efforts to address it. It was 
due to this mentality that substantive progress was very difficult to achieve in the first 
few years of negotiations. It was only through the negotiation skills of former 
President Nelson Mandela that parties attempted to adopt a "win-win" outcome. 
Although, this new compromise might have been agreed upon for tactical purposes 
and was apparently reluctantly subscribed to by some parties, it did eventually lead to 
the signing of the Arusha Accord on 28th August 2000. However, since almost all 
parties expressed concern about the Accord, it was evident that the Arusha Accord 
was "a very fragile agreement" which required much effort to make it more 
functional260. Besides the reluctance by some parties in signing the Accord, and 
expression of concern by almost all parties, the Accord was not signed by the rebel 
movements and, therefore, this cannot be reduced to a “win-win” outcome. To those 
who were not wholly committed to the signing of the Accord and those outside the 
process not by choice, the outcome was a “lose-win” situation. This was to be 
reflected in the fighting that ensued even after the Accord had been signed. Thus, 
unless mechanisms were put in place to bring aboard those outside the peace process 
and to cultivate confidence in parties that were signatories to the Accord, its 
implementation would encounter difficulties and thereby inhibit durable peace in 
Burundi.   
 
The FNL which is the second largest rebel group rejected a peace deal designed to 
bring an end to Burundi’s 10 year civil war and vowed to continue fighting. The FNL 
spokesman Pasteur Habimana said that they wanted to negotiate with the senior Tutsi 
army officers and not with government. A call by the United Nations Secretary 
General Kofi Annan to join the peace process was dismissed by the FNL. Habimana 
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stated that , “our movement has no problems with the Hutus but with Tutsis. We need 
to ask mutual forgiveness for crimes committed over the past few years and set up a 
cohabitation pact between both ethnicities”261. Perhaps the desire to negotiate with the 
military and not with government rests in, the fact that, the military in Burundi like in 
many African countries is the guarantor of political power. Indeed, the FNL’s demand 
for “mutual forgiveness” for the past atrocities committed is not without basis; for 
durable peace to be attained in Burundi or for peace to be built on a firm foundation, 
there is strong and urgent need for reconciliation between the Hutus and Tutsis. 
However, the demand by the FNL is not based on honesty, since they have failed to 
join the peace process in order to address their concerns through negotiations.          
 
Key aspects and developments in the Arusha peace process which contributed to the 
"win-lose" approach and undermined the commitment to compromise included: the 
exclusion of the two main rebel groups, the FDD and FNL; the exclusion of the Tutsi 
"hardline" groups from the process; the weakening of the two main opposition parties 
as a team- Tutsi-led Government and the Hutu-led FRODEBU party. Rather than 
encouraging the two main parties reach agreement based on the belief that the 
Burundian problem could have been resolved by realising this, the parties were 
undermined by treating them equally with smaller parties- even some insignificant 
ones; the creation and strengthening of multi-ethnic alliance- the Arusha process 
encouraged this based on the belief that it would address the Burundian ethnic 
division, even though the alliance partners had no common vision for the future of 
Burundi; leaving the critical issues of "genocide" and "Putsch" unresolved prevented 
trust-building- the Arusha process allowed the parties not to address the "most 
emotional and divisive issues" in the politics of Burundi, that is, "Putsch" of 1993 
during which the first democratically elected president together with many senior 
Hutu officials were assassinated, the subsequent “genocide” during which "more than 
100,000 Tutsis were killed by Hutus in revenge and the "massacres of even more 
Hutus by the Burundian army" in retaliation; the failure to produce rewards for the 
parties to the negotiations- both sides perceived Arusha and the host country as 
partisan. More critical was the blanket and untargeted sanctions that were imposed by 
the region of the chief facilitator of the Burundi peace process, former President 
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Mwalimu Nyerere (in spite of the fact that the Government was engaged in 
negotiations, a move which cost them by splitting the Tutsi community); key regional 
players continual promise of victory to certain parties- some parties were 
continuously told that they would be supported to “defeat” their opponents during the 
negotiation process so that they can emerge as the “victors”. As a result of this, these 
parties were reluctant to engage seriously with the opposition in search for 
compromise solutions; and attempts by Arusha process to fail the internal partnership- 
the formation of the internal partnership between the UPRONA- led Government of 
President Buyoya and the central component of the largest Hutu party, FRODEBU in 
1998 was seen as a positive development by a cross-section of both Hutu and Tutsi. 
This arrangement included a new multi-ethnic “power-sharing” Government and 
some sort of “interim constitution”. However, some regional players perceived this 
partnership as “a clever attempt by the Buyoya government and the Burundi Tutsi to 
evade all inclusive regionally-organised negotiations at Arusha”, and went ahead 
discouraging key representatives of FRODEBU from signing the partnership. As a 
result of the divisions caused over the partnership through deliberate regional 
intervention, FRODEBU split into two factions262.  
 
As argued in the preceding paragraph, the exclusion of the FDD and FNL from the 
peace process did not help to promote peace in Burundi. This, rather, postponed the 
search for comprehensive peace through negotiations with the parties who did not 
participate in the peace process. Further, by excluding Tutsi “hardline” groups from 
the peace process, puts the future of comprehensive peace in Burundi in jeopardy; 
given the long history of confrontation and seemingly irreconcilable differences 
between the warring parties, all Burundian groups needed a chance to contribute 
towards identifying a durable solution to the problems confronting them. Thus, this is 
likely to undermine efforts that were made in the Arusha Agreement, consequently, 
blocking avenues to promote long-lasting stability in Burundi.            
 
It was not incorrect to have treated all Burundian parties equally regardless of the size 
of their constituency; Burundi is a fragile society that has been almost for four 
decades ruled by minority Tutsis and without experience of a democratic culture, thus, 
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based on this reality and the ethnic politics that have over the years characterised 
conflict between Hutus and Tutsis, it was strategically feasible to treat all parties 
equally.       
 
By having left out critical issues such as genocide unresolved in the Arusha peace 
process, is a big challenge that could undermine efforts to achieve comprehensive 
peace in Burundi. For instance, by having failed to address the subsequent genocide 
after the 1993 assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu President, did not 
help to settle deep sentiments of revenge that are still harboured by some Burundians, 
a move likely to encourage impunity.     
 
Even after signing the Arusha Agreement and the ceasefire on December 2, 2002, 
which was seen as a breakthrough, fighting erupted in the Burundian capital. The 
ceasefire could not be honoured because Nkurunziza, leader of the FDD felt excluded 
from the Arusha peace process. Agaton Rwasa, leader of the FNL has never 
recognised the Arusha peace process. Both Nkurunziza and Rwasa were excluded 
from the Arusha negotiations that were meant to end the fighting that has killed 
300,000 people. When it became clear that without the participation of the rebel 
leaders peace would not be achieved, Regional peace brokers will have to “unpack the 
hard-won” Arusha Agreement in order to involve the two major rebel movements in 
the peace process. They expected the rebels to accept decisions that were made 
without them, which included power-sharing between Tutsis and Hutus263. The 
Arusha peace Agreement “failed to provide for a cessation of hostilities”264. 
Inevitably, by excluding the rebels meant that peace was far from being realised. 
Although, the FDD has joined the peace process with the FNL still outside the 
process, without revisiting the Agreement to involve all Burundian parties especially 
the rebels in discussing the major provisions that were arrived at after more than 3 
years of negotiations, the agreement leaves room for future contention and, thus, 
sliding the country back into conflict.     
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The failure of the Summit of Regional leaders in Dar es Salaam to reach an agreement 
on implementing the Burundi ceasefire signed on December 2, 2002 has devastated 
public opinion in Burundi and the people have lost faith in Arusha peace process. This 
is also a reflection of the flawedness in the Arusha Peace Agreement, which failed to 
involve the FDD and the FNL. The Agreement “must be revisited and probably 
reopened. Parts of it will have to be renegotiated to include the FDD and the FNL … 
it never was feasible to come aboard late and be forced to accept a fait accompli”265. 
The fact that, the rebels were not involved in the peace process that produced the 
Arusha Agreement and which had provided for the ceasefire accord, it was bound to 
be difficult to reach agreement on implementing the ceasefire. Not only, would the 
full participation of all parties to the conflict ensured successful implementation of the 
agreement, but would have also more possibly provided a guarantee to comprehensive 
peace in Burundi. 
 
Long-term stability in Burundi is far from being realized given that the FNL has 
refused to halt fighting. Burundi’s second largest rebel group, the National Liberation 
Forces (FNL), which was not party to the December 2002 ceasefire agreement 
between the government of Burundi and warring parties, has repeatedly rejected peace 
talks with government. Pasteur Habimana, an FNL spokesperson, dismissed the 
October 2003 Pretoria deal as a “non event”. The deal was signed between the 
president of Burundi’s transition government, Domitien Ndayizeye, and the leader of 
the main Hutu rebel group, Pierre Nkurunziza, of the Forces for the Defence of 
Democracy (FDD) to implement the December 2002 ceasefire agreement. Habimana 
who said that he did not recognize Ndayizeye’s government, asserted that, the 
agreement was “not a solution to Burundi’s problem, the war will continue because 
there can be no solution as long as there is no real negotiation between the Hutu and 
Tutsis”266. Despite the ethnic composition of the government, the FNL, which is 
composed of the Hutu, views the conflict in ethnic terms and treats “the Tutsi as its 
real enemy” and the Hutu in government as Tutsi puppets267. Incorporating the FNL’s 
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position, which is informed by Habimana’s statement into any possible intervention 
efforts, perhaps, might be part of key considerations to route Burundi on the road 
toward comprehensive peace.  
 
After failing to defeat the FNL, Van Eck suggests that for Burundi to achieve durable 
peace, a political solution must be forged to include the FNL in government rather 
than opting for a military solution268. Moreover, without including the FNL in the 
peace process, “the war and the killings will continue”269. Van Eck argues that if this 
persists, political and ethnic polarization will continue to broaden, a situation that will 
hinder a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Thus, inquiring into the FNL’s 
perspective toward resolving Burundi’s civil conflict is crucial in the search for a 
plausible explanation of the complexity surrounding the intractable conflict. 
  
4.4 Field Work Information: Burundian Officials 
 
4.4.1 Dimensions of the Burundi civil conflict 
 
Before colonialism, ethnicity was not a problem at all, Burundi was a very integrated 
Kingdom and Burundians lived peacefully under the same King. The King wielded all 
power and neither Hutus, Tutsis nor Twas claimed ownership of power. Both Hutus 
and Tutsis were equally appointed by the King to serve on the loyal court each with a 
different role to play. Many chiefs were from the loyal family and only a few Hutus 
and Tutsis occupied such positions. It was only after the end of the colonial era with 
the negative influence of colonialism, such as divide and rule, that ethnicity became 
an issue and became a tool that was used by politicians to accede to political power; 
they excluded some groups while giving opportunities to a few and this created deep-
seated resentment towards those rulers and a desire for vengeance in the excluded. 
The excluded therefore thought that the only way to liberate themselves was to launch 
a military campaign using ethnicity as an instrument. The Hutus felt alienated on 
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ground of their ethnic background since they were excluded from occupying all the 
key positions in the country and thus the only way out was to launch a military 
campaign based on ethnicity. Therefore, based on this information, ethnicity which 
was unheard of in pre-colonial Burundi could have been a creation of colonialists 
through the policy of divide and rule. Post-colonial leaders manipulated this by using 
ethnicity as an instrument to exclude those from a different ethnic background. This 
created resentment in the excluded, who in turn, mobilised around ethnicity to 
escalate the civil conflict.      
 
Ethnicity started during colonial administrative reforms: Only Tutsis and Ganwas 
were retained in administration and given education. However, the ethnic problem 
escalated during the period between 1962 and 1966 in Parliament. This involved the 
killing of the first Prime Minister, Ngendanumwe Pierre in 1964. Between 1967 and 
1968 Hutus plotted to oust President Micombero, he turned against them and killed all 
the Hutus in the army and a number of civilians. In 1972 Hutus from Tanzania killed 
a lot of Tutsis in an attempt to oust Micombero, who in turn took vengeance by killing 
a number of Hutus. This created resentment and scepticism between Hutus and Tutsis. 
During the first democratic elections of 1993 ethnicity was used as a major tool by 
Hutu politicians in order to win power; they drew from the exclusion that Hutus 
experienced under the Tutsi decades of rule and killings inflicted on them during that 
period. The civil conflict escalated after the death of the first democratically elected 
Hutu President. Hutus killed Tutsis massively and this was the time similar killings 
were being done in Rwanda and thereby creating regional instability. It was after this 
that Hutu rebel movements were born with a goal of fighting the Tutsi army that was 
anti-democracy. In all this, killings were carried out based on ethnicity. In light of the 
preceding information, the fight for political power stands out as a key issue of 
consideration; both Hutus and Tutsis in an attempt to capture and/or defend/ maintain 
political power used ethnically motivated killings and the past exclusionary policies 
(on the part of Hutus) and a history of massacres (on account of Tutsis).        
 
Ethnicity has a very big influence in the Burundi conflict. Both in Rwanda and 
Burundi ethnicity did not exist per se, it was a creation of colonialism. They created 
this by drawing a distinction of who was a Hutu and a Tutsi, initially, favouring Tutsis 
and later favouring Hutus towards independence. In Rwanda during 1959, colonialists 
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supported the social revolution of the Hutus, this was a turning point because ethnicity 
became violent for the first time in the history of the region. People were killed based 
on ethnicity and also people captured power in the name of ethnicity. From that time 
until now the history of Burundi has been a “fight between Tutsis, Hutus and power”. 
Hutus in Burundi tried to emulate the Rwandan example by taking power by violence 
(e.g., in 1965, 1969, 1970, 1980) and while on the other hand, Tutsis resisting by 
arguing that if Hutus took over power they will have to be massacred and become 
refugees. Thus, “ethnicity is at the centre of the political life in Burundi”. Massive 
killings were committed in the name of ethnicity e.g., the 1993 assassination of 
President Ndadaye was followed by massive killings of Tutsis. Events that happened 
in Rwanda in 1994 where Tutsis were massively killed often were repeated in 
Burundi.  
 
According to some respondents, ethnicity is not the cause of conflict in Burundi but 
those who launched the conflict used it as a tool to protect and pursue their interests. 
Politicians used ethnicity as a mobilization tool in order to pursue their interests. For 
example, the Tutsis mobilized around this by arguing that since Hutus were the 
majority they were going to exterminate us and so we should join hands to fight them. 
Similarly, Hutu politicians in pursuit of their interests called upon their counterparts 
to fight and defend themselves against the Tutsis- argued that the Tutsis dominated 
the army. While another respondent argued that ethnicity was not a major problem but 
was used as an instrument by politicians to exclude people from a different ethnic 
background, which resulted in deep-seated anger and resentment between Hutus and 
Tutsis. 
 
Regionalism is a component of the civil conflict in Burundi. During the Arusha talks 
it was established that the Burundi conflict was political with a strong influence of 
ethnicity and regionalism. Regionalism is very recent compared to ethnicity. It 
emerged after the departure of colonialists and it was exploited as a means of 
consolidating and capturing power: On November 28, 1966 Captain Michel 
Micombero, who was then the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Burundi waged a 
military coup and toppled the King and formed the first Republic of Burundi. Because 
he was from the south of the country, Bururi province he appointed only people from 
Bururi since power had previously been concentrated in the centre of the country in 
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the province of Murambya, which was the headquarters of the kingdom. He dismissed 
all those from Murambya and appointed majority from the south (Bururi). Burundians 
from other provinces thought that there was an imbalance and injustice because all 
presidents hailed from Bururi, with all key positions in government held by people 
from Bururi. Politicians sought to consolidate power at the expense of the other 
regions while politicians from other regions mobilized around regionalism in order to 
capture it by arguing that Burundi will only attain peace when power shifts from the 
south to the north. This divided the country along regional lines and from that time 
until now regionalism is a reality (even in the rebel ranks people were divided along 
regionalism and also among the political parties regionalism is a dividing line). For 
example, Tutsis from Bururi had closer ties with Hutus from the same region (Bururi) 
than their Tutsi counterparts from other regions. Tutsis in power gave opportunities 
like jobs to Hutus from Bururi and not to Tutsis from other regions.  
 
Regionalism played a big role in the Burundi conflict. For instance, because the army 
was considered as a guarantor of those in power, all senior positions were occupied by 
those from the President’s region (Bururi province). Business opportunities were 
given based on one’s regional background. Only Tutsis from Bururi were considered 
for key positions in government and that explains why Tutsis from other regions 
joined CDD-FDD (a Hutu party) in protest of their marginalization. Tutsis from other 
regions were considered as “second class” by Tutsis from Bururi province. In the 
same vein, Hutus from other regions resented Hutus from Bururi. As a matter of fact, 
the current government is dominated by people from other regions with Bururi 
marginalized. It is said that “there was a change of government from Tutsis to Hutus 
and change from one ruling region (Bururi) to other regions- it is regarded as 
independence from Bururi political dominance”. 
 
However, a respondent argued that regionalism was not a big issue in Burundi as it 
was in Rwanda; the main problem is ethnicity because when killings breakout both 
Hutus and Tutsis gang together as an ethnic group- killings are done indiscriminately 
against a given ethnic group regardless of one’s regional background. 
 
Accordingly, based on the role that regionalism played in influencing the conflict, 
respondents consider it as a key component of the Burundi civil conflict: For instance, 
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key appointments were based on one’s regional background regardless of their ethnic 
orientation; key politicians (e.g., head of state) and senior military officers hailed 
from the South (Bururi); and regionalism was used to consolidate and capture power. 
The fact that some Tutsis joined CNDD-FDD, a Hutu party which was responsible for 
the killings of thousands of Tutsis is evident enough to illustrate the extent to which 
regionalism was influential in the civil conflict in Burundi. Thus, we can fairly say 
that both ethnicity and regionalism were used by politicians as tools to preserve, and 
to struggle for, power.             
 
People were excluded because of their ethnic background, this created a strong ethnic 
consciousness which resulted into conflict. Exclusion has been a strong factor in 
fuelling the civil conflict in Burundi; political power in Burundi was regarded as the 
source of wealth, thus political exclusion created a feeling of alienation in Hutus and 
created conflict. In Burundi and in many African countries the economy is dominated 
by the state; the state is the major employer, there is no strong private sector. “If you 
have a strong position in politics then you will also have a strong position in the 
economy. In Burundi, business with the private sector was guided by relations one 
had with government officials and where one hailed. The Tutsis have dominated in 
politics for a long time and indeed they have also dominated the economy because the 
two are linked”. Thus, politics created economic exclusion; “when you are denied 
political power you are inevitably denied economic wealth”. In other words, those 
who were denied political opportunities were inevitably denied the means of survival 
and so this was exploited by politicians in mobilizing support from the economically 
disadvantaged in order to change the status quo through armed confrontation. Also 
this raised both regional and ethnic sentiments against those in power. For instance, if 
one had to conduct a survey, “80 per cent of the rich people whether directly or 
indirectly got their wealth from government”. Thus, since government was the 
guarantor of such opportunities, people had to wage war in order to capture power as 
the source of employment, money and livelihood. 
 
 Hutus who were economically sabotaged by those in authority could not get justice as 
the justice system was dominated by Tutsis- this created desperacy in that the only 
option left was to launch an armed struggle. Economic exclusion also created 
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increased poverty in the people, who were left vulnerable to join armed struggle as a 
means of survival. 
 
What can be drawn from the above arguments is that, not only, did exclusion based on 
one’s ethnic background create strong ethnic consciousness, a resource that highly 
motivated conflict, but the strong link between political power and one’s economic 
wellbeing was another key factor that greatly influenced the civil conflict; conflict 
was waged in order to end political alienation and therefore ensure economic survival.       
 
Colonial legacy is the basis of imbalances, exclusions and injustices that were later 
observed in the Burundian society; they created ethnic consciousness among 
Burundians by labelling some as Tutsis and the others as Hutus and classifying some 
(Tutsis) to be wise and intelligent and were therefore sent to good schools to prepare 
them as administrators while others (Hutus) were considered less intelligent and were 
prepared to engage in agriculture. In 1935 the Belgians carried out administrative 
reforms and advised the King to dismiss all Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs alleging that 
they were inefficient. Only Tutsis and Ganwas were sent to schools because they 
thought that they had more in common with Europeans. However, at the time of 
independence in 1960s when Tutsis demanded immediate independence, they shifted 
allegiance to Hutus (majority) suggesting that democracy should be introduced in the 
country whereby, the majority should rule and so they began to prepare them for 
leadership by supporting the creation of their political parties. In Rwanda they 
supported the Hutus to overthrow the Monarchy. Thus, the divide and rule policy of 
colonialists was reflected in the way the country was run by successive governments 
in Burundi. 
 
Colonialists antagonized Burundi ideologically; although they classified Tutsis as 
good, knowledgeable and efficient administrators and while Hutus as bad and less 
knowledgeable people, they claimed that Tutsis had come as invaders who imposed a 
monarchy system on the indigenous people- Hutus. This created resentment and low 
self-esteem in Hutus and thought to revolt against Tutsis. Later colonialist reasoned 
that for stability to prevail, the indigenous people, the Hutus have to take charge of 
political power. Given what had happened in Rwanda in 1959, the Tutsis had to create 
their own army and consolidate state power so that Hutus could not eliminate them. 
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However, much as colonialists failed to prepare Burundians to govern themselves 
after they had left, it is not true to claim that the divide and rule policies of colonialists 
created antagonism among the Burundians, this was deliberately orchestrated by the 
elite in order to serve their interests. In other words, “post-colonial leaders used 
colonial legacy as a pretext in order to mask the real problem”. Burundians failed to 
realize that bad leadership was ruining the country, but chose to interpret this as bad 
seeds that were sawn by colonialists. For example, Prime Minister Rwagasore was 
overwhelmingly elected by both Tutsis and Hutus because he had a nationalistic 
vision, suggesting that the impact of colonialism had not divided Burundians as 
people claim. 
 
Based on the submissions above, we could conclude that colonialism was responsible 
for divisive policies and unfair class stratification, key factors that created ethnic 
antagonism among Burundian groups and, as a result, significantly influenced violent 
conflict in post-colonial Burundi. However, this should not rule out, the fact that, 
post-colonial leaders have had a role to play in creating conflict among Burundians. 
This has been expressed through greed for power- have manipulated colonial legacy 
in pursuit of their personal ends.        
 
The root cause of Burundi’s civil conflict lies in the manipulation of ethnicity and 
regionalism to gain power. Hutus claim power because of their big numbers while 
Tutsis claim it under fear of massacres if Hutus captured it. Thus, “Tutsis used power 
as their source of security”. Implying that the fight for power is the root cause of the 
Burundi civil conflict. For example, power has been acceded to through coups d’Etat 
until 1993 when the first democratic Hutu President was elected. On the other hand, it 
is argued that the fight for power is driven by the desire to obtain economic 
opportunities and benefits which extend to relatives and cronies. When one “occupies 
a political position his whole clan becomes rich”, which in turn attracts resentment 
from those denied such benefits. Greed of politicians which resulted in exclusion and 
consequently, ethnic antagonism explains the root cause of the civil conflict in 
Burundi.  
 
Civil conflict in Burundi is rooted in ethnicity-“strong attachment to one’s ethnic 
group creates sentiments to exclude others who do not belong to one’s group”. This 
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has been perpetuated by the elite in their struggle for power. However, other 
respondents argued that it is the “divide and rule” policy of colonialists that created 
antagonism among Burundians after they had left. 
 
Bad governance; leaders not visionary and failure to promote national interests by 
treating people equitably. For instance, People from the same locality “monopolized 
power in the name of Tutsis with a goal of mobilizing Tutsi solidarity against Hutus 
while not all Tutsis were benefiting”. Thus, they masked under pursuit of security for 
Tutsis while monopolizing political and economic power. Other respondents singled 
out exclusion as the root cause of the conflict; the feeling that certain people cannot 
rule and so power should be controlled and dominated by a certain group. On the 
other hand, some respondents argued that poverty was to blame for civil conflict in 
Burundi; politicians used it as a tool to mobilize peasants to kill their neighbours of a 
different ethnic group and thereafter take their possessions. 
 
One should then, fundamentally, argue that the fight for power and exclusionally 
policies mark the root cause of Burundi’s civil conflict. As argued earlier, political 
power in Burundi determined economic life implying that when one was left out of 
the political scene it was a condemnation to starvation and, therefore, a basis for 
mobilising for conflict by manipulating ethnicity as a tool.     
 
4.4.2 The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi and  
         Addressing the Burundi Civil Conflict 
 
The Agreement and the Constitution, which was produced by the Agreement, are 
fundamentals upon which power, which is the key ingredient of conflict, was 
addressed. The Agreement also provided a solution to the problem of power in 
security sector, whereby it was decided that security institutions be shared equally 
between Hutus and Tutsis. Although, the Agreement is fundamentally good, a key to 
resolving the conflict but the problem lies in its implementation: representation of 
Hutus and Tutsis in the National Assembly is problematic- are Tutsis representing 
Tutsis supposed to come from Tutsi parties or not? Tutsis lost somewhere; what they 
had won in Arusha was lost in the Pretoria Agreement during negotiations. South 
African experience was not favourable to the Tutsis; 40 per cent representing Tutsis 
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were to be drawn from any party regardless of whether the party was a Hutu party or 
not. The concern is that most of the 40% representing Tutsis in the present 
government were drawn from the ruling party which is a Hutu party, CDD-FDD. 
Moreover, Tutsi parties claim that those Tutsis from Hutu parties “are not wholly 
Tutsis because they have a Hutu ideology”. Thus, the ethnic power sharing quota 
system is not a solution in the long-run because the problem in Burundi is not ethnic 
but political. Ethnicity was simply used as a tool to obtain political power. In addition, 
one respondent argued that the power sharing quota system could perpetuate the 
Hutu/Tutsi sentiment among the Burundians. For instance, why doesn’t 40 per cent 
for Tutsis and 60 per cent for Hutus march population representation of the ethnic 
groups? Although, the power sharing formula, which will only apply in the first 
Legislative Assembly is not sustainable, it was the only tenable solution at the time as 
a means to end fighting. 
 
It is fundamentally, important to address grievances of the Tutsi parties concerning 
genuine representation of the Tutsis in both cabinet and legislative assembly in order 
to avoid future confrontation of Hutus and Tutsis. This is based on the fact that, 
sharing a similar ethnic background does not necessarily imply that you share similar 
convictions or ideologies, thus, justifying concerns of the Tutsi parties. This further 
affirms the argument that conflict in Burundi is not ethnic but political. However, this 
does not imply that ethnicity has not influenced the conflict to some considerable 
degree. Thus, this requires political mechanisms that are strongly influenced by the 
ethnic configuration of the Burundian society in order to address the conflict. 
Suggesting that in order to ensure successful implementation of the Arusha 
Agreement and, therefore, route Burundi on a firm road to enduring peace, fair 
representation of both Hutu-Tutsi parties, which should go beyond the first legislative 
assembly is inevitable.          
 
“Arusha is like a bible for Burundi”, said a respondent. It addressed all issues and 
concerns that faced Burundian parties. It provided a foundation upon which the 
ceasefire negotiations were carried out between rebels (who had not participated in 
the Arusha negotiations) and the government of Burundi. Although, some smaller 
parties had refused to sign the agreement with the influence of Mandela and President 
Kagame of Rwanda they signed it with reservation, it was nonetheless, a strong 
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commitment of the Burundian parties to end the civil conflict. However, the 
agreement failed to address the problem of impunity, in that, those who killed 
massively are the ones now occupying government. By having signed the agreement 
with reservation implies that unless there are further discussions to address concerns 
underlying such reservation, implementation of the agreement will encounter 
difficulty, a situation that may slide the country back into violent conflict. The 
question of impunity must be dealt with decisively as a measure to discourage the 
promotion of a culture of impunity, and to promote reconciliation. This will also 
prevent revenge killings like was the case in 1993 after the death of the first 
democratically elected Hutu president.        
 
The agreement was the basis on which all subsequent accords like the ceasefire were 
made. It provided the framework for reforms in the Judiciary, Army and Police. 
However, the agreement was only negotiated by party representatives without 
consulting or, the participation of, the Burundian public. Only politicians participated 
without the rebel movements and that is why even after signing the Agreement armed 
confrontation went on, though, this was later addressed by the ceasefire agreement 
that was signed between the government of Burundi and the CNDD- FDD. The 
ceasefire agreement acted as “a seal” for the Arusha peace and reconciliation 
agreement for Burundi since it was, unlike the latter, signed by the belligerent forces 
consequently leading to peace in most parts of the country. In addition, the agreement 
provided for a Constitution, which was accepted by Burundians through a 
referendum, and now the focus to bring about desired change. Although, CNDD-FDD 
did not participate in the Arusha peace agreement, thy recognized it because it 
addressed the fundamental problems of Burundi. The failure of the FNL to join the 
peace process challenges the Hutu cause of fighting as the Hutu concerns have been 
addressed (for example, through political and military power sharing). The fighting 
will not have a big impact since they are politically bankrupt. At some point 
government agreed to meet their demands but they kept adding on the list of demands, 
thereby frustrating the peace process. 
 
In order to allow for successful implementation of the Arusha Agreement there was 
need for the participation of all Burundians. Thus, there is need to unpack and 
rediscuss key parts of the agreement, e.g., the question of justice/impunity, by 
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involving all Burundians. This will ensure that all Burundians own the peace process 
and, therefore, help smooth implementation of the agreement. On the question of the 
FNL, with cooperation of neighbouring countries and support from the international 
community, the government of Burundi should engage with the rebel group in an 
attempt to address their concerns, or else, the country will not achieve comprehensive 
peace.    
 
The Arusha agreement enabled the return of refugees and holding of elections, 
however, there is need for extensive discussions among Burundians as a society, if at 
all, enduring peace is to be possible. Although, the Arusha agreement permitted 
various parties to discuss issues confronting Burundians, it is not sufficient enough to 
resolve the conflict among Burundian groups without addressing the problem of 
poverty. 
 
Indeed, there is need for extensive discussions among Burundians concerning the 
Arusha agreement in order to ensure long-lasting stability in Burundi. For instance, 
the distorted history of Burundi’s ethnic groups that was coined by colonialists, needs 
to be discussed at length as a measure to address the deep-seated enmity between 
Hutus and Tutsis, a factor that has been seen by some to be the source of Burundi’s 
civil conflict.     
 
Further, the agreement was both beneficial and a limitation; it helped to cultivate a 
democratic culture and, therefore, address the change of governments through coups. 
This has encouraged accountability in the current leaders as opposed to the past 
leaders who only pursued their interests and, on the other hand, the agreement 
imposed a flawed Constitution, which promotes ethnic power sharing in favour of 
Hutus while all communities are equal. This is a basis for future conflicts. 
 
It is early to conclude that the Arusha agreement has created a democratic culture 
through which peaceful change of governments is a reality; without effectively 
addressing the issue of political power in which all parties will not have a feeling of 
alienation (like it is the case now), peaceful change of governments in Burundi may 
not happen in the foreseeable future. Although, the current Constitution was passed 
through a referendum, it was not generally accepted by Tutsis. Given that Burundians 
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did not participate in Constitution-making undermines the legitimacy of the 
Constitution and, therefore, fails to provide a solid ground for peace-building in 
Burundi.  
 
4.4.3 External Intervention and Resolving Burundi’s Civil Conflict  
 
Third parties have played a tremendous role in avoiding escalation of the conflict. 
Although Burundian parties had tried to resolve the conflict on their own, they 
realized that they could not manage without third party intervention. Conflict had 
escalated by 1996 and it is during this time that former President Nyerere was 
nominated as chief mediator. The regional initiative for Burundi together with 
Nyerere and Mandela played an important role in the negotiations as they could 
exercise pressure on different parties. External parties (AU- that is, SA, Mozambique, 
and Ethiopia) also played a crucial role after the ceasefire agreement had been signed, 
considering that the UN had refused to send troops because FDD had not disarmed. 
AU force monitored and observed the implementation of the ceasefire by both parties. 
Even after signing of the ceasefire in December 2002, fighting went on until 
November 2003, with the AU troops only reporting the fighting.  
 
Had the Regional Initiative for Burundi not imposed an embargo on Burundi to force 
the government of President Buyoya to negotiate with rebels, there was a 
determination to resolve the conflict militarily since the Burundian army was strong, 
however, the rebels were also determined to fight on. Moreover, it was important that 
third parties intervened in the Burundi peace process since it had become obvious that 
parties had failed to agree; both held conflicting positions, which seemed 
irreconcilable. Thus, without the intervention of third parties, parties could have opted 
to fight on until one side was defeated, a situation which would have resulted into a 
number of deaths and massive population displacements. 
 
However, President Nyerere and leaders of the regional initiative for Burundi very 
often despised and rejected opinions of representatives of the government of Burundi, 
this led to delays in the negotiations. For example, Tanzania and Uganda’s neutrality 
was questioned as they were considered to favour the rebel movements.   
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If third parties had not intervened, lots of people would have continued to die, and 
others displaced, as long as issues of concerns between parties were not addressed. A 
respondent submitted that had third parties not intervened “things would have 
seriously worsened; we would have had another Rwanda because both warring parties 
were desperate”. The role of third parties has been extensive; they played a key role in 
instilling confidence in Burundians by insuring that the situation in Burundi does not 
degenerate into chaos. While third parties played a key political role in restraining 
belligerent parties from continuing with the fighting, they also restrained some 
elements in the army who would have desired to threaten stability. 
 
Third parties helped to support the peace process by ensuring that the Arusha 
agreement was implemented or else warring parties would have disregarded the 
agreement leading to renewed confrontation. For instance, Ndayizeye’s government 
had blocked food supplies to the CNDD-FDD combatants who had regrouped for 
disarmament, the UN had to intervene by providing food supplies, otherwise, out of 
desperacy the rebels would have resorted to fighting in search of food and thus 
resulting into massacres.   
 
Third parties also managed to resolve three contentious issues that would have 
escalated the conflict: proposed a 50/50 per cent composition of the army to both 
Hutus and Tutsis, which had been rejected by Tutsis; determined the transition period 
and who had to rule during the first period; and brokered the ceasefire agreement, 
which created confidence in exile Hutus and those who were fleeing into Rwanda. 
 
On the other hand, a respondent claimed that third parties only intervened after 
genocide had occurred in Burundi; they were only helpful in facilitating talks between 
parties that aimed to search for a solution to eradicate genocidal tendencies. Third 
parties did not play a significant role since they only intervened when the armed 
confrontation had almost ceased, that is, around 1998. Third parties did not prevent 
civilians from being killed sometimes by government or rebel forces. For example, 
almost four years back when the FNL attacked Bujumbura, external forces had to flee 
the fighting.  
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Additionally, external intervention helped to instil both moral and psychological 
security in Hutus especially former exile leaders since they had lost trust in the 
Burundian army. Hutus were confident that in the event that the army developed an 
intention to overthrow government, external forces would quickly intervene to foil the 
move. 
 
Although the presence of external parties has helped prevent killings and population 
displacements, but after they have left “whether or not it takes a while, unless there is 
justice, people will have to revenge on those who killed their relatives. SA troops 
offered protection to former exile leaders who left the country after killing people. 
This has been followed by the release of political leaders found guilty by courts of 
law to have incited killings. Intervention would have rather started with tribunals to 
try such leaders, otherwise, this has created room for future armed conflicts.  
 
As submitted by respondents, third party intervention has been enormous on the 
diplomatic and political front; were helpful in facilitating negotiations that addressed 
key issues, e.g., power sharing, which were a source of conflict. However, as far as, 
military intervention is concerned, third parties contribution was insignificant; 
although, they intervened late after massive killings had been carried out, they failed 
to prevent civilian killings perpetrated by warring parties. This also challenges the 
need to launch intervention for human protection that has been occasioned by the 
post-Cold War era, in which human rights have gained wider recognition, and 
international norms of sovereignty and non- intervention redefined. 
 
 Moreover, this raises the question of early warning mechanisms, which would unveil 
potentially precarious situations that demand urgent intervention both in terms of 
diplomatic/political and military policies in order to address them and, thereby, 
prevent mass killings of civilians.  
South Africa played a key role in promoting peace in Burundi. Mandela’s mediation 
was a key factor during the negotiations; “I am not sure whether we would have 
reached agreement without Mandela”. His personality and experience in negotiations 
greatly facilitated reaching the agreement. Mandela used his charisma and 
international standing to mobilize the international community (the United Nations, 
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US, EU and AU) to come to the attention of the Burundi conflict. He often invited 
heads of states to boost the negotiations, for example, during the signing of the 
Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi, he invited President Clinton 
to witness the occasion. Unlike his predecessor, Nyerere, Mandela was impartial in 
the sense that “he pushed hard on both sides”, applied a softer stance on all parties, 
this created trust in parties and quickened the negotiation process. He used this 
through administration of carrots and sticks. Although, Mandela appeared tough at 
times, he was very honest and just, he was “a gift of God to reconcile Burundians” 
because without him the peace process would have not been successful. Without his 
intervention efforts, the Burundi “conflict would have escalated into a very big civil 
war”. Realizing that political power was at the heart of conflict in Burundi, Mandela 
proposed a power sharing quota system (60 per cent Hutus and 40 per cent Tutsis) in 
cabinet and parliament with equal numbers of the two groups in the military and 
police. 
 
Mandela’s charisma, fear and respect that the Burundians attached to his person, made 
it possible for some decisions, which were considered impossible to be made. For 
example, the 50/50 per cent split in the army shared by both parties. Whenever there 
was a problem, Mandela invited parties to SA and all were keen to listen to him 
because he represented a big country whose conflict was quite similar to the Burundi 
conflict. 
 
SA’s experience in addressing the white and black conflict was greatly borrowed in 
helping to resolve the Burundi civil conflict because to some extent the two countries 
underwent a similar experience. Moreover, SA was instrumental in organizing several 
meetings designed to convince parties towards resolving the conflict, and in 
negotiating the return of former exile leaders to participate in negotiations and in the 
transitional government. Mbeki’s political weight helped to reduce tension among 
parties. 
Zuma and Mbeki also played an important role by helping parties reach compromise. 
Their wider experience in negotiations, and in particular Mbeki’s intelligence and 
diplomatic craftiness, and Zuma’s wisdom and patience, greatly helped the Burundi 
peace process. President Mbeki’s intervention whenever there was a deadlock in the 
ceasefire agreement was crucial in striking compromise between the warring parties. 
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In addition, SA diplomats employed “strict diplomacy with impartiality”, and they 
drew upon SA’s experience in resolving their conflict in order to facilitate the 
Burundi peace process. However, SA’s technical teams were not so helpful; they 
lacked a clear understanding of the issues under negotiation. 
 
SA approach of resolving the Burundi conflict by inviting and negotiating with 
individual parties and after which negotiating with both parties in collaboration with 
Tanzania, helped tremendously in addressing the Burundi conflict. After such effort, 
SA would call a regional meeting in order to harmonize efforts aimed to promote 
peace in Burundi. 
 
However, according to a respondent, South African diplomats did not possess 
profound knowledge of the dynamics of Burundi’s civil conflict, they only followed 
what they had been told to the extent that they thought that the Burundi conflict had a 
lot in common with pre-1994 South Africa, whereby they thought that Hutus lived in 
separate provinces, suburbs, towns, etc., different from the Tutsis, which was not the 
case. SA’s diplomats were “supposed to study the history of Burundi” especially 
regarding conflict resolution, that is, how authorities in Burundi beginning with the 
reign of the Monarchy resolved conflicts or how justice was arbitrated. Thus, 
although, SA diplomacy was helpful, but will not address the conflict in the long run; 
“according to the Burundian culture without asking for forgiveness or making 
reparations, one has to revenge for the killing of his relatives even if it takes a 
hundred years”. 
 
Accordingly, South Africa’s diplomatic mediation has extensively benefited the 
Burundi peace process, for instance, Mandela’s international accreditation, 
impartiality and experience in negotiations lent big weight to the peace process by 
creating trust and respect in both parties. South Africa’s approach in engaging with 
the international community  in an attempt to seek for support, and with Burundi’s 
neighbouring countries that were involved in the search for peace in Burundi, 
notwithstanding, several supportive meetings (to the efforts of the regional initiative 
for peace in Burundi) held with the warring parties, combined to move the peace 
process forward. Further, the peace process was facilitated by, the fact that, South 
Africa, to some extent, shared similar experience (during apartheid) with Burundi. 
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However, the peace process was undermined by the insufficient and inaccurate 
information on historical arbitration of justice that was possessed by South African 
negotiators and technicians. Since the two countries underwent different historical 
experiences regarding the governance system and the genesis of the conflicts, it was a 
diplomatic oversight to have largely treated the Burundi civil conflict as the pre-1994 
South African conflict. Thus, unless the question of justice is addressed by borrowing 
from Burundi’s historical justice system, it is highly unlikely that the country will 
enjoy comprehensive peace in the long term.              
 
After the Arusha agreement had been signed, the UN was supposed to send 
peacekeepers but refused arguing that the major rebel group, CNDD-FDD were still 
fighting. SA had to stand in by deploying its troops. This was crucial as it helped 
implementation of the Arusha agreement, in particular, the transitional government, as 
a number of signatory parties had refused to return home and join the government 
without the presence of a foreign force to assure their security. Following SA’s 
deployment, Hutu exile leaders returned in large numbers. Their presence created an 
equilibrium force, which facilitated negotiations inside the country. For example, 
because of the presence of SA troops, Hutu politicians felt confident during 
negotiations with their Tutsi counterparts. Moreover, it would have been impossible 
for President Ndayizeye, a Hutu to dismiss his Tutsi vice-president without the 
intervention of the army. Thus, the presence of SA troops dispelled any intention of 
an attack on the returning leaders.  In addition, the show of force exhibited by SA 
troops instilled a sense of security in the population. Further, the presence of SA 
peacekeepers brought an end to Hutu mobilization by politicians, which was 
motivated by intimidation and threats posed by the Burundian army.  
 
We can therefore argue that the presence of South African troops dispelled tension 
and fear that was apparent in Hutus by creating a sense of psychological security in 
them, thereby, promoting a peaceful environment upon which negotiations would take 
place, and also by eliminating the build-up (mobilisation) for conflict that was on-
going.    
 
When the AU took over from SA, SA contingents led the Mission. Until the arrival of 
the UN troops, SA contingents only provided protection to Hutu former exile leaders, 
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but did peacekeeping under the UN mission. SA troops helped to provide protection 
to former exile leaders, who had lost trust in the Burundian army. This enabled former 
exile leaders to participate in the negotiations that were aimed at implementing what 
had been agreed upon in the Arusha agreement. This also created a sense of security 
in the Burundians who supported exile leaders. 
 
Although, protection to former exile leaders (thought to have committed atrocities 
against the Burundian people especially in 1993 after the assassination of the first 
democratically elected Hutu President) by South African troops created a sense of 
stability by preventing any attack against the leaders, which attack would have 
otherwise escalated the conflict, this in reality should be seen as a temporary measure 
since South African troops are not going to ensure permanent protection for these 
leaders. Which, scenario raises the issue of justice for peace in Burundi.     
 
However, civilians continued to be killed by rebels even in the presence of SA troops, 
who did not intervene to protect them. In collaboration with the Burundian 
government SA troops played a role of observer after the ceasefire had been signed. 
While under the AU, SA troops provided protection to former exile leaders, under the 
UN they were deployed in various parts of the country and their role extended to 
include civilian protection, and protection of ex-combatants in areas of reassembling 
and demobilization, and their role also included monitoring and observing to ensure 
that parties respect the ceasefire.  
 
On the other hand, some respondents said that South African troops did not do much 
in peacekeeping in Burundi, even though, they gained prominence under the UN. 
Besides, they were not well equipped to intervene and promote peace; they only 
monitored and reported the security situation. Government was scared of them in 
reporting its human rights abuses to the United Nations, which actions would have led 
to the imposition of sanctions and aid cuts. 
Whether or not South African troops failed to intervene in preventing civilian killings 
owing to their mandate that did not include civilian protection or because of 
insufficient military equipments, it remains a challenge to the widely recognised post-
Cold War norm of intervention for human protection and, therefore, a challenge to 
promote peace in the contemporary world.    
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 4.4.4 Ensuring Lasting Peace in Burundi 
 
While striving to convince the FNL to join the peace process power sharing should be 
well managed. Indeed given that the key driving force behind Burundi’s civil conflict 
centres around power, there is need to ensure that effective and fair mechanisms (in 
the eyes of all the parties) of power sharing are put in place in order to build 
permanent peace in Burundi. Power sharing should, however, be a long-term initiative 
until Burundians have embraced a national identity i.e., see themselves as Burundians 
and not in terms of Hutu-Tutsi ethnic groups.    
 
The role of international community should be paramount to ensure enduring peace in 
Burundi. They should ensure that alliances of the FNL with negative forces in Congo, 
such as, the Mai Mai and former Rwandan militias come to an end by cutting off 
supplies and resources of those supporting the FNL, and support initiatives aimed at 
convincing the FNL to start negotiations with government. Countries of the region 
should cooperate to promote regional peace because peace in Burundi depends on the 
prevailing regional environment. For example, consider how the war in Uganda 
influenced war in Rwanda, and how the war in Rwanda influenced the war in Congo, 
and also how the peace process in Burundi was influenced by what happened in 
Rwanda. It is through broader promotion of regional peace that pressure will be 
exerted on the FNL to join negotiations with government.  
 
While it is, indeed, difficult to address the FNL issue without dealing with the broader 
regional instability, which is partly blamed on the FNL’s alliance partners, such as, 
the former Rwandan militias who participated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide,  it is in 
the interest of peace to treat the FNL as a party pursuing an agenda that demands 
attention and, therefore, grant them status of an equal party to the negotiations and not 
simply reducing them to a wasted force without any coherent political goals. This 
would increase chances for cooperation by the FNL, and thus raise prospects for 
reaching a negotiated settlement to the conflict. 
 
The international community should also support Burundi’s economic recovery and 
reconstruction in order to provide opportunities for the youth who could easily be 
convinced to join rebel activities as a means of survival. Because of the devastation to 
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the economy left by over a decade long civil war, unemployment especially in the 
youth is alarming and, thus, there is urgent international support to rebuild the 
economy as a measure to prevent the vulnerable youth from engaging in activities that 
could destabilise the country.  
 
Promotion of good governance; a nationalistic government should be installed and not 
a government that promotes ethnicism, regionalism and interests of a clique of 
individuals, that is, a government that promotes the general welfare of people 
regardless of their ethnic and regional background. There should be an end to 
impunity by putting in place a justice system, which is fair in the eyes of all 
Burundians. A new Constitution that is agreed upon by all Burundians should be 
made as the current one was influenced by the Arusha peace process. The question of 
justice should be dealt with decisively; a Commission of Truth and Reconciliation 
should be set up in order for people to know what happened and forgive, short of that, 
Burundi will never have stability. The new Constitution should be made in such a way 
as to address the past imbalances and injustices, and should be a document that is 
reconciliatory in the eyes of all Burundians. It should provide the basis upon which 
mechanisms to promote justice should be established.  
  
Education for peace; sensitize people to get rid of ethnicism and rather promote 
national identity- people should be seen as Burundians and not in terms of Tutsis or 
Hutus. This initiative would include extensive and nation-wide public information 
system designed to correct the past distortions in Burundi’s ethnic group history, 
which partly share blame for ethnic antagonism in Burundi.   
 
Not much was expected from SA peacekeepers regarding civilian protection as this 
did not fall under their mandate. However, since the UN had a Chapter VII mandate, 
intervention to protect civilians under imminent threat was expected of them, though, 
it was not done. For instance, third parties were expected to deploy in Bujumbura 
rural where FNL operates from but this was not the case. Even when their positions 
were attacked by the FNL, they did not fight back. Intervention was also expected to 
involve fighting negative forces in order to stabilize Burundi. Third parties were also 
expected to help stabilize the security situation and make it possible for elections to 
take place. Although, the latter was successfully done, the former has not been 
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realized because of the FNL factor. According to the respondents, third parties did not 
militarily intervene to protect civilians faced with imminent threat nor did they make 
any attempt to prevent attacks on them by deploying in operational areas of the rebels. 
Thus, while diplomatically/politically intervention by third parties was helpful in 
enabling negotiations between the main warring parties, which eventually achieved 
partial peace, military intervention to protect civilians was not given due attention.       
 
Involvement of the public in the negotiations through civil society organizations was 
expected from third parties, which they did not do. By failing to involve the public in 
the negotiations, denied popular ownership of the peace process (the Arusha 
Agreement in particular), a resource which is essential in ensuring popular 
participation in the implementation of the Agreement and, consequently, promoting 
durable peace.    
 
In addition, third parties were expected to help set up a fair justice system that would 
help to bring to justice those who killed with impunity. This has not been done and 
could force people to seek their own justice- revenge, thereby, undermining the 
prevailing peace. The significance attached to the issue of justice by Burundians 
clearly reveals that comprehensive peace in Burundi is far from being realised without 
bringing the perpetrators to face justice, or establishing a truth and reconciliation 
commission to deal with the past atrocities that were committed against the 
Burundians and, therefore, promote national reconciliation.    
 
On the other hand, a respondent submitted that as government they expected nothing 
from interveners and that is why they had rejected their deployment although they 
were imposed on them. He argued that protecting former exile Hutu leaders 
undermined the army of Burundi, and by protecting individuals and not civilians who 
were being killed by rebels was unrealistic. Moreover, another respondent argued that 
very little was expected from third parties based on their dismal failures in the past 
peacekeeping operations, for example, in Katanga, Congo in the 1960’s. This reveals 
the challenges encountered by third party intervention in sovereign countries and 
demonstrates the need to enforce intervention for civilian protection in situations 
where the country in question is unwilling to cooperate. This also challenges the 
object of protection in an intervention like that in Burundi; was it appropriate to offer 
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protection to individuals and not the public at large, or what number of civilian 
casualties or humanitarian catastrophe should attract military intervention by third 
parties?      
 
4.5 Field Work Information: Perspectives of Field Experts  
      Specializing on Conflict in the Great Lakes Region 
 
4.5.1 Internationalisation of Burundi’s civil conflict 
   
The Burundi conflict is part of a sub-regional conflict, which is the inability in many 
decades of the majority Hutus and minority Tutsis living peacefully together without 
conflict. The problem is not limited to Burundi but also to Rwanda. After the 1994 
Rwandan genocide large numbers of Rwandans, many of them guilty of genocide, 
fled into Eastern Congo, the ethnic conflict which is politically motivated moved into 
Eastern Congo and, therefore, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda to a certain extent 
cannot stabilize if Eastern Congo is not stabilized. Thus, the possibility of resolving a 
conflict in one country without resolving it in the other cannot lead to enduring peace. 
 
The Burundi conflict should not be looked at in isolation of what is happening in 
Uganda, Rwanda and Congo particularly in Eastern Congo but as one broader conflict 
system, in which, conflict of one country is integrated in terms of the other. The 
conflict should be looked at within the context of ethnicity, war economy and 
perspective of spoilers. In each of these cases, there are similarities between Burundi 
and other countries. For example, genocide in Rwanda resulted in fear among the 
Tutsis in Burundi, which influenced Pierre Buyoya by acting on the fear in terms of 
launching a military coup. Also ethnic solidarity (Hutu/Tutsi sentiment) that spreads 
across borders stands as a major challenge; Hutus that fled Burundi and Rwanda into 
Congo have joined other negative forces, such as, Mai Mai to spread the conflict. 
While there are various factors, such as the need to control mineral resources, which 
are responsible for conflict in the region, ethnic solidarity/extremism or sentiment ties 
the negative forces/belligerent parties together across borders to perpetuate conflict. 
For instance, the 2004 Gatumba massacres of Congolese Tutsi refugees are believed 
to have been carried out by FNL aided by former Rwandan Hutu militias who fled 
into Congo after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, an atrocity that raised tension in the 
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region, where Burundi and Rwanda threatened to intervene in Congo in pursuit of the 
negative forces. 
 
Initially, the Burundi conflict attracted less international attention which led to 
conflict escalation. However, the country does suffer from resource scarcity in 
relation to Congo- there is little to fight over and thus stands a better chance of 
enjoying durable peace despite the fact that there are still problems with the FNL. Not 
only did the conflict escalate but it created catastrophic humanitarian conditions, 
which forced hundreds of thousands to flee into neighbouring countries. Thus, by its 
nature, the Burundi conflict created a situation, which threatened international peace 
and stability and, thereby, demanded international attention to address the conflict. 
 
Large masses of the population fled into neighbouring countries, which undermined 
their development agenda; it created socio-economic consequences and humanitarian 
crises. In addition, the conflict created antagonistic relationship between Burundi and 
Tanzania, for example, the government of President Buyoya always felt that Tanzania 
was supporting Burundian rebels. This could have resulted into war between these 
countries. The apparent distrust between the two neighbouring countries reinforced by 
ethnic solidarity across borders undermined international/regional efforts designed to 
address Burundi’s civil conflict, thereby, leading to prolonged negotiations for a 
peaceful solution to the conflict.     
 
Destabilization of regional economic cooperation/trade; created unsafe transport 
routes, therefore, stifling importation and exportation of goods and services- leading 
to illegal trade. Inevitably, this adversely affected living conditions of the people and 
added to the humanitarian catastrophe caused by the armed conflict, consequently, 
leading to massive displacements and floods of refugees into neighbouring countries 
in search of survival. 
Ethnic manipulation or mistreatment of a group creates a negative response to the 
other group; if one ethnic group in Burundi is badly treated it impacts on, and is likely 
to activate, people from the same ethnic group in neighbouring countries. If the Hutus 
in Burundi are suffering, those in Rwanda and Eastern Congo are going to get angry 
with the government that mistreats them, and this has been the practice. For instance, 
former Rwandan militias are receiving support from Hutus living in Eastern Congo 
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because they do not want a Tutsi dominated government in Kigali. In Eastern Congo 
there is an alliance of the Mai Mai with former Rwandan militias against Tutsis, 
which was reflected in the mistreatment of Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsis) viewed 
as Tutsis who originated from Rwanda.  In addition, close ties between Burundian 
rebels, FNL and FDD with former Rwandan militias and government soldiers was 
based on the fact that they were all fighting a common enemy, that is, the Tutsis. In 
fact, some viewed the Congo war, which erupted as a result of the killings perpetuated 
on Congolese Tutsis and attracted a number of countries from the region, to have had 
strong ethnic connotations. They argued that Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda rendered 
support to Congolese Tutsis because they were of himitic group while Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and Angola supported former President, Laurent Kabila based on a Bantu 
sentiment.    
 
4.5.2 Dimensions of the Burundi civil conflict 
 
Total absence of trust between the ethnic groups; the Tutsis in Burundi believed that 
the Hutus will exterminate them as Hutus in Rwanda did to the Tutsis. They believed 
there were enough genocidal leaders amongst Hutus to create genocide in Burundi 
and in defence they had to apply such repressive rules and laws since independence. 
However, another respondent said that the root cause of the Burundi civil conflict lies 
in the minority domination over the majority. Lack of trust between the ethnic groups 
is rather an effect and not a cause; a valid cause of the distrust could be traced 
beginning from the arrival of colonialists since it is documented that in pre-colonial 
Burundi, the ethnic groups lived in harmony under a monarchy system of 
administration.  
 
One respondent uses Marxism to explain what lies at the root of Burundi’s civil 
conflict: Land and resource scarcity- people mobilize against their neighbours by 
making use of ethnic identity. The political question resulted from land and resource 
scarcity, in the sense that, economic infrastructure determines the socio-political 
superstructure to the extent that ethnicity and so on are regarded as false 
consciousness. Political authority was very authoritative and so people would not 
access the political superstructure for redress. Complicated to that is Burundi’s place 
in the international division of labour, whereby what was earned today from one acre 
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of coffee became less and less as the world prices fluctuated. You need more acres to 
survive, which you strive to achieve by exterminating your neighbours.  If scarcity of 
land and resources lead to mobilisation of people against their neighbours by using 
ethnic identity as a tool, what then explains conflict in mineral and resource rich 
countries with huge chunks of land like DRC? The question in all the cases lies in 
how equitable resources of a country are managed and distributed across ethnic 
groups. 
 
4.5.3 The Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi and    
         addressing the Burundi civil conflict 
 
There was general consensus before last October 2005 elections among all Burundian 
parties and the government inclusive that a lot of issues had not been dealt with. 
Primary among these was the issue of the FNL. President Nkurunziza committed 
himself to negotiate with the FNL in an effort to achieve comprehensive peace. Other 
outstanding unresolved issues about the implementation of the Arusha peace accord 
include, dispute over the new Constitution that was unilaterally imposed on 
Burundians by the Regional Initiative for Burundi and SA when all Tutsi parties had 
rejected it. This is not conducive for enduring peace, “it is simply moving from 
violent to a non-violent conflict”; and there are lots of disputes that erupted between 
parties and the government after the elections about whether they had got the correct 
number of ministerial positions based on the number of votes they had polled. Given 
the fragility in the Burundian society (in terms of the ethnic question), it was 
important that the Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land be agreed upon 
by all ethnic groups. An unpopular Constitution in the eyes of one ethnic group does 
not promise enduring peace even if the FNL question is resolved. The questioning of 
power sharing after October 2005 elections is a reflection in the limitation of the new 
Burundian Constitution. By implication, this reveals that the key issue, power sharing, 
which is said to be the most important motivating factor behind Burundi’s civil 
conflict was not adequately resolved.    
 
The question of the military; Tutsis still dominate the military-10 per cent of the 
population having a veto on the military apparatus causes unhappiness within the 
military ranks. Although, the 50/50 representation by Hutus and Tutsis in the army 
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does not match population representation of the groups, given that the Tutsis were by 
far dominating in the army it was a considerable concession made by the Tutsis, and 
provides balance in the most sensitive institution in Burundi, which has been since 
independence the guarantor of state/political power. 
 
The forthcoming elections in the DRC; will there be a spill over violence? Some areas 
in Congo such as Ituli, Katanga and Kasai are likely to have a knock-on-effect. 
Indeed, given the integration of conflicts in the region, comprehensive peace in 
Burundi is based on stability in the DRC. Provided that the outcome of the elections 
in the DRC is disputed by former rebels, there is a likelihood that the conflict may 
erupt and, thereby, strengthen the alliance of the FNL with negative forces, such as, 
the Mai Mai and former Rwandan militias and soldiers in the DRC and, therefore, 
destabilise Burundi. 
 
Arusha peace process can be called “a crisis of legitimacy” because there were only 
political parties and no military wing of the rebels. FRODEBU were the only 
politicians who claimed to represent CNDD-FDD and FNL, which was not the case. 
The Tutsis were uninterested in the Arusha process because every time negotiations 
were going on the war was continuing in Burundi. CNDD-FDD was excluded when 
former President Mwarimu Julius Nyerere was facilitator. Although, the FNL had 
wanted to participate in the negotiations, Mwarimu refused arguing that they had a 
representative and yet he had been ousted by the FNL. The CNDD-FDD was 
represented but had a coup against its leader, Nyangoma and Michel 
Ndayikengurukiye was made leader, but Mwarimu insisted to keep Nyangoma and 
conditioned them to participate through the leadership of Nyangoma. The result was 
that both armed movements had to stay outside the peace process. When Mandela had 
taken over the facilitation, he invited the rebel movements and informed the parties 
that in few months they would have to sign the peace agreement but the rebels 
rejected the proposal arguing that they had been outside the process for 3 years and in 
that regard, there was no way they could simply sign the peace agreement. Thus, 
Arusha was badly managed it should have been fully inclusive from the beginning. 
And that is why there was “stop-start process”- today there is peace and the next day 
there is not.  
 
                                                                      128
The Arusha process was not an attempt to attain a genuine consensus among all the 
Burundian parties and that is why some parties refused to sign the agreement while 
others did not attend at all. And so, there is no consensus amongst Burundians about 
anything. The absence of the FNL is undermining the success of the new government 
of Nkurunziza. Looking at what is happening around Bujumbura and Bubanza 
province, casts a dilemma on the part of funders; the FNL is still fighting at a very 
low capacity at the moment but their ability is much bigger than what is seen. 
 
However, although, it is important to have a peace process which is as inclusive as 
possible by taking into consideration the needs and fears of respective communities or 
political players, you cannot have one or two groups or a minority or a small group 
derail a peace process. Negotiating players should keep the door open for non 
participating groups but not keep the peace process hostage to a couple of spoilers. 
What can be done is to create a situation that is inclusive as possible but at the same 
time, you cannot allow a group to spoil the peace process and attack you, in which 
case you have to attack the group. “It is in the interest of peace sometimes that war is 
declared”. There are no likely repercussions since the FDD came on board afterwards. 
However, you cannot move the peace process forward unless the key players are 
involved, but there are other ways around it as well and that is to seek for an 
alternative adjudication. Often these organizations function as part of a personality of 
a leader and so you could approach other leaders and other constituencies to influence 
such a leader into joining the peace process. 
 
The fact that the armed movements were excluded in the peace process, and that other 
parties refused to sign while others refused to attend the signing of the peace 
agreement, it is evident that the Arusha peace process failed to attain consensus in 
addressing Burundi’s contentious issues. Although, the main rebel group, FDD joined 
the peace process later, by itself, does not guarantee enduring peace unless all 
Burundian parties, including the FNL participate in the peace process by revisiting 
key contentious issues in the Arusha peace agreement for Burundi, issues which could 
be a ground for launching future conflicts.   
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4.5.4 Ensuring lasting peace in Burundi  
 
Truth and justice and the question of impunity; there is need for truth-telling and 
reconciliation in order for people to deal with the past- not to forget but to forgive. 
Since 1965 people have used violence against others up to the recent past. There is 
need especially to establish the truth of what transpired in 1993 when the first 
democratically elected Hutu President was assassinated, an event that escalated the 
Burundi civil conflict. The perpetual violence has often manifested itself in form of 
revenge killings on a group for the past violence committed on another group. Some 
form of reconciliation is required to appease the deep-seated anger harboured by some 
Burundians and, therefore, prevent eruption of future conflicts committed in the name 
of avenging what was suffered by a group.   
 
Government should be inclusive as possible- it should involve the FNL in the 
governance system if at all enduring peace is to be possible. All parties should be 
encouraged to participate in the peace process. Indeed if enduring peace in Burundi is 
to be possible, all Burundian parties including the FNL need to be included in the 
governance of the country. Implying that Burundi needs a government of national 
unity that will work to cement differences and promote national unity. However, the 
government should be willing to extend greater concessions to the FNL as a means to 
convince the rebel group to join the peace process.  
  
Total transformation of the military and police must be realized, and establishment of 
effective state institutions should be done. In this regard, there is a lot of international 
help needed. However, this cannot be realised in an overnight given that Burundi has 
experienced difficult times that have shattered state institutions or prevented effective 
state institutionalisation since independence.   
 
There is need to look at the overall political system for two things: 
 
1) The split in the armed forces and Parliament should be treated as a temporary 
measure to make the other party comfortable for a while and afterwards move 
to nation-building. This is because you could make the majority antagonistic-
why should 10 per cent of the population occupy 40 per cent of positions in 
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Parliament. To the extent that this is regarded as a temporary measure while 
building an inclusive state structure is positive. That the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi providing for this split is temporary, 
there is need to create a broader nation-building framework through which 
groups can see themselves as Burundians.  
2) Because of the course of history of genocide political parties that are exclusive 
to one ethnic group should be banned as this is a recipe for future chaos. It is 
important for political parties to achieve a wider appeal. 
 
Although, it is important to treat power sharing in the security apparatuses and 
parliament as a temporary measure, this period should be long enough to allow 
nation-building to take route first. It would be unrealistic to reverse this after a short 
while before reassuring the security of Tutsis considering that the Tutsis have since 
independence argued that their security lies in securing control of the military and the 
state apparatus. Certainly, embarking on nation-building would require to outlaw any 
activity, including parties that are exclusive to one group, which promote ethnicism at 
the expense of national unity.    
 
We can briefly state that, Burundi’s conflict is not per se caused by ethnic diversity, 
but it is because of political purposes that ethnic differences were exploited, thereby, 
making ethnic diversity an ingredient in generating conflict. The end of colonial rule 
in Burundi was followed by genocides and mass killings. Colonialism is responsible 
for divisive policies and unfair class stratification, which created ethnic antagonism 
among Burundian groups and, therefore, influencing violent conflict in post-colonial 
Burundi. The post-colonial conflict in Burundi was premised on the Tutsi-Hutu 
continuum. The Tutsi have been in power since independence, except from 1993-96, 
when three Hutu presidents ruled, but even then, they were deposed by the Tutsi who 
controlled the military, a situation which explains the confrontation between the 
politically disenfranchised Hutu majority and the ruling privileged Tutsi minority. 
The Hutu-Tutsi animosity came as a result of such factors as colonialism, 
modernisation, the traumatic experience in the Rwandan Hutu rebellion and 
repressive and discriminatory post-colonial policies. Ethnic solidarity (Hutu/Tutsi 
sentiment) that spreads across borders stands as a major challenge; Hutus who fled 
Burundi and Rwanda into Congo have joined other negative forces, such as, Mai Mai 
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to spread the conflict. While there are various factors, such as the need to control 
mineral resources, which are responsible for conflict in the region, ethnic 
solidarity/extremism or sentiment ties the negative forces/belligerent parties together 
across borders to perpetuate conflict. Although, the Arusha agreement provided a 
basis upon which key contentious issues, such as, power sharing and security 
institutions were ‘addressed’ through a quota system, it was only signed by some 
political parties and others refused to sign while others refused to attend the signing of 
the Agreement, and the rebel movements were excluded. Thus, the Arusha peace 
process failed to achieve consensus in addressing Burundi’s contentious issues. The 
Agreement also produced a Constitution that was unilaterally imposed on Burundians 
by external parties, and yet it had been rejected by all Tutsi parties. The issue of 
power sharing, which is embedded in the Constitution, emerged after the 2005 
elections as parties questioned the basis for cabinet appointments. This is not a good 
sign for enduring peace as it is a mere shift from violent to non-violent conflict. It is 
critical, in the next chapter, to inquire into efforts that were made to address this 
decade-long intractable civil conflict by examining South Africa’s key role in the 
peace process. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
SOUTH AFRICA’S PEACE MISSION AND THE BURUNDI 
CIVIL CONFLICT 
 
 
This chapter examines the diplomatic negotiation and mediation, and peacekeeping 
efforts of South Africa in helping to resolve the Burundi civil conflict. South Africa’s 
motivation in intervention in Burundi’s civil conflict is investigated within the context 
of its foreign policy on Africa and its national interests. The chapter also makes an 
assessment of SA’s successes, and limitations encountered in its efforts to peacefully 
resolve the intractable conflict in Burundi. 
 
5.1 South Africa’s Peace Mission: Peacekeeping in Burundi  
 
South Africa (SA) views peace missions as long-term endeavours, which include 
extensive investment in peace building, and not simply short-term initiatives. Peace 
building involves the “inculcation of respect for human rights and political pluralism; 
the accommodation of diversity; building the capacity of state and civil institutions; 
and promoting economic growth and equity”. While these measures are the “most 
effective means of preventing crisis”, they can as well serve as both pre-crisis and 
post-crisis incentives. In all cases, peace missions should be purposed to empower the 
people and should be tied to local practices and experiences, and not informed by 
foreign styles of conflict management and governance. Thus, preventive diplomacy, 
peace building and peacemaking are the fundamentals of SA’s peace missions270.  
 
SA’s peace missions are informed by its recent history in negotiating a peaceful 
transition based on its own approach of “conflict resolution techniques and vision of 
meaningful and enduring development. This strong national interest and experience in 
the peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts compels it to participate in 
peace missions” with a view to help resolve related conflicts that are experienced by 
other peoples271. The question worth pausing is, how does SA go about resolving the 
intractable conflict in Burundi in light of its national interests and experience in 
                                                 
270 Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘White Paper on South African Participation in  
      International Peace Mission’, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 1998, pp-26-27 
271 Ibid., p.28 
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dealing with intractable conflicts? A response to this lies in investigating SA’s foreign 
policy on Africa, and its diplomatic machinery aimed at addressing the Burundi civil 
conflict (including SA’s engagement with other third parties involved in the Burundi 
peace process). 
 
The defence White Paper, Defence in Democracy of May 1996 provides for specific 
deployment of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) units in support of 
peace missions. According to the document, SA as a responsible member of the  
international community commits to fulfil its responsibility to participate in 
international peace operations. The SANDF may participate in two types of peace 
operations: 1) peacekeeping, which refers to military operations without resort to the 
conflict designed to monitor and support the implementation of a peace agreement; 
and 2) Peace enforcement, which refers to the utilization or threat of force sanctioned 
by the international community, with an aim to compel compliance with resolutions 
or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order272.  
 
According to the defence White Paper, SA military intervention in Burundi falls 
under peacekeeping. However, according to the mandate of the Burundi mission, SA 
troops were only to offer protection to the former exile politicians. Thus, this fell short 
of the obligations of the peacekeepers as stipulated in peacekeeping operation. 
Perhaps this could have been limited by the memorandum of understanding between 
SA and GoB, or lack of military capacity to undertake such a role since at the time of 
SA’s deployment, serious fighting between rebels and government forces was on-
going. 
 
The document further provides a framework that will guide SA’s participation in 
specific peace operations. These include: 
1) Parliamentary approval and public support for involvement. This will demand 
an inquiry into the associated costs and risks, including the financial costs and 
risk to the military personnel;  
2) The operation should have a clear mandate, mission and objectives; 
3) There should be realistic exit strategy; 
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4) The operation should be sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council;  
5) and operations in Southern Africa should be authorized by SADC and should 
be multilaterally undertaken together with other SADC states. Similarly, 
operations in Africa should be authorized by the Organization of African 
Unity273. 
 
Since the 1994 democratic elections, SA has been reluctant to participate in regional 
peacekeeping contrary to many expectations. However, by the late 1990s SA leaders 
recognized the need to participate more actively in Africa’s conflict resolution. This 
was emphasized in the words of the former director in the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Jackie Selebi: “we cannot talk of an African renaissance, or even achieve a 
better life for people in South Africa, if around us countries are in conflict, … If 
Africa disintegrates, there will be no South Africa”274. 
 
The Arusha Peace Accord for Burundi signed in August 2000, which was facilitated 
by former President Nelson Mandela, provides the foundation for South Africa’s 
involvement in the Burundi peace process. This is seen by SA’s deployment of its 
troops as a protection force for Burundian parties involved in the negotiations, and as 
a key component of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) that was composed also 
of contingents drawn from Ethiopia and Mozambique275.  
 
South African troops are deployed in Burundi on a mission to help the country’s 
peaceful transition to democracy. The mission coded the South African Protection 
Support Detachment (SAPSD), it is the country’s largest, “most expensive and 
riskiest military mission since 1994. The troops’ main task is to offer protection to 
former exile Hutu politicians who have returned to participate in the transitional 
government and parliament, but who have no trust in the Burundian army. The 
mandate of SAPSD does not include peacekeeping, the right and obligation to 
intervene in the civil war. According to the commanders, in the event of the Arusha 
Agreement failing or in case of an attack by any of the warring parties, the SAPSD 
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                                                                      135
will leave the country276. Thus, according to SAPSD’s mandate SA troop deployment 
in Burundi fell short of humanitarian intervention for civilian protection; by exiting in 
case the Arusha agreement failed implies that civilians would be subjected to great 
risk as a result of eruption of new confrontation between the warring parties. Hence, a 
challenge to the global recognition (in the contemporary world) of the responsibility 
to protect civilians caught up in dire humanitarian circumstances. This would also 
outrightly challenge the ideals of the African renaissance and NEPAD, initiatives 
which are SA’s brain-child, and which fundamentally aim at resolving Africa’s 
problems and thereby promote economic development. 
 
However the decision to deploy SA troops was unwelcome by the Tutsi hard-line 
parties277. They argued that troops were being sent “for the sole purpose of protecting 
genocidal ‘terrorists’278. This was an aggression against the people of Burundi”279. 
Although the decision to deploy SA troops in Burundi had been made without a 
ceasefire in place, heavy weaponry was not provided for to defend the troops in case 
of an attack. Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal had promised to deploy their troops on 
condition that there was a ceasefire in place. According to Helmoed Rorner- Heitman, 
an analyst and writer for Jane’s Defence weekly, SA’s decision pointed to a solution 
that was “quickly cobbled together” and “those are the ones that go wrong”280. The 
refusal by some parties to deploy external forces raises a big challenge to 
humanitarian intervention for civilian protection (a classical example being Sudanese 
government refusal to allow the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers in Darfur). Thus, 
given that this was the situation faced by SA troop deployment, and the fact that there 
was no ceasefire in place, the mission was more like peace enforcement and which, 
therefore, required thorough preparation in terms of military resources.     
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277 Tutsi hard-line parties are those parties whose ideological thinking draws from extremism to the   
      extent that compromise, as a means of addressing the animosity between Hutus and Tutsis, was     
      unwelcome      
278 Hutu exile leaders that were protected by SA troops were largely believed to have orchestrated the   
     mass killings of Tutsis immediately after the assassination of President Ndadaye in 1993.  
279 Julia Crawford and Peter Fabricius, ‘Rise up against SA Force, Burundians argued: Even Mandela   
      discouraged by Attitude of Hardliners’, in The Star, October 24, 2001 
280 Bonile Ngqiyaza, ‘How to Keep the Peace in Burundi’, in Business Day, October 25, 2001 
                                                                      136
The deployment of SA’s first troops in the latter part of October enabled the 
installation of the transitional government of Burundi on November 1, 2001 as was 
scheduled. The contingent was mandated to guard about 150 Burundian politicians, 
who had returned from exile to participate in the country’s power-sharing transitional 
government. According to the chief of the SANDF, General Siphiwe Nyanda, SA 
troops would remain in Burundi until that time when the transitional government felt 
secure and a new Burundian multi-ethnic army was installed. However, the decision 
to deploy SA’s troops to Burundi was made without the approval of Parliament, 
thereby, subjecting the opposition to question the international mandate of the 
mission. In accordance to the White Paper on South African participation in 
international peace missions, the SANDF was not an international peacekeeping force 
operating under the auspices of the U.N., but simply a South African “protection 
force”281. We could argue that SANDF deployment enabled the establishment of the 
transitional government in Burundi, and internal negotiations between the former 
exile leaders and the government of Burundi without which the peace process would 
have stalled. However, while SA troops played a key role in guaranteeing the security 
of former exile leaders, their limited mandate fell short of providing the urgently 
needed humanitarian assistance in form of civilian protection. This meant that the 
status of civilian security was left to be determined by what would transpire in the 
diplomatic/political negotiations that were on-going. This poses a challenge to 
intervention for human protection in the contemporary era; should civilian protection 
be left at the mercy of diplomatic/political outcomes? Or rather, you need to ensure 
civilian protection first while you seek for a diplomatic/political solution to the 
conflict.   
 
 The second deployment was authorized under the auspices of the African Union 
(AU). According to the AU, the mission was mandated, among other things, to 
monitor the ceasefire agreement, secure assembly and disarmament areas, and ensure 
protection of parties to designated areas. While the African Mission in Burundi 
(AMIB) was authorized and deployed under the aegis of AU, SA played a major role 
in drafting the mandate and had to bear the task of ensuring its successful 
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implementation. Thus, SA provided the force commander and was designated as lead 
nation for the mission282. This signifies that both SA and AMIB’s mandates were to 
guarantee a partial ceasefire or simply provide partial peace since one of the key 
conflicting parties, FNL was not a signatory to the ceasefire accord and neither was it 
a party to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi. Also, since 
the mandate of the peacekeepers did not include protection of the civilian population 
afflicted by FNL’s atrocities, durable peace was far from being realized. 
 
Given increasing violations of the ceasefire by signatory parties and the fact that the 
Forces for National Liberation (FNL) have not joined the peace process, AMIB has 
inadequate military resources to contain the situation. This is likely to undermine the 
efforts of AMIB in observing, monitoring and verifying the implementation of the 
partial ceasefire. Past experience has revealed that “without firm consent from all 
parties”, fighting will continue and peacekeeping troops might be “part of the 
problem, rather than the solution”. In a statement, the Forces for the Defence of 
Democracy (FDD), one of the signatory to the ceasefire, noted that since they were 
not consulted during the process of constituting the African Mission, not only would 
they not recognize their presence, but the African forces would be seen as enemies of 
peace in Burundi283.   
 
I am inclined to argue that since, in the first place, the FNL was a non-party to the 
ceasefire agreement and up to date not a party to the Burundi peace process, and the 
fact that the FDD, which was then the largest rebel group was not consulted in 
constituting the African Mission, it was tantamount to saying that the mission was a 
peace enforcement and not a peacekeeping mission. Suggesting that the force had to 
be adequately equipped, if at all, it was to fulfil its mandate. This unveils the 
challenges encountered by third party intervention in civil conflicts, where obtaining 
consent from conflicting parties is problematic. 
 
The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA) was critical of the exorbitant 
cost the deployment of AMIB was to cost the South African taxpayers. Although the 
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European Union and other independent states had committed to fund the 
peacekeeping mission, they argued that South Africa required more than foreign 
assistance to sustain the deployment of its troops for a lengthy period. They further 
revealed that SANDF had not planned for an exit strategy, and argued that the 
government had overestimated the capacity of the SANDF given that the force had 
“obsolete equipment at home”284. Although to a great extent concerns raised above 
are valid owing to the large amount of resources, in terms of financial and military, 
required for an effective peacekeeping mission, the fact that SA was willing to 
commit its troops towards the peace mission before the signing of the ceasefire by the 
Burundian warring parties, by itself, was an important import in efforts aimed to 
promote peace in an intractable conflict. According to SA’s Deputy foreign affairs 
minister, Aziz Pahad, provided that the “current success of the mission and peace 
process” was sustainable, then SA’s decision to deploy before the signing of a 
ceasefire could set a precedence from which incidences such as the Rwandan 
genocide can be prevented by enabling much quicker responses in the UN system285.          
 
South African troops had to go beyond their mandate by providing facilities and 
medication for the former fighters in cantonment areas. The stretch was caused by 
delays in funding from donors, which prevented Ethiopian and Mozambican troops to 
arrive in time. Effective implementation of the ceasefire agreement depended on the 
availability of adequate facilities and arrangements to support the former rebels in 
cantonment areas. Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration which began with 
cantonment of former rebels under SA protection were a key part of the peace 
process286. This raises the importance of financial and military resources in meeting 
the challenges of peacekeeping in Africa. SA’s promptness in meeting requirements 
for the cantonment of former rebels, not only, helped to strengthen the peace process 
by subsequently enabling disarmament but was crucial in speeding it up. 
 
However, the image of SA’s peacekeepers in Burundi has been dented by ill-
discipline of both senior officers and lower ranking soldiers in SANDF. This has 
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resulted into shooting of some peacekeepers by their colleagues over arguments, and 
drunkenness by a number of peacekeepers287. Such behaviour could hamper efforts 
designed to promote peace in a conflict situation by creating resentment in the 
nationals of the host country, who could resort to actions of sabotage against 
peacekeeping activities and conceal information crucial to promotion of effective 
peacekeeping. This, as well, could spoil the image of the country the peacekeeping 
force is representing.     
 
SA peacekeepers in Burundi will not intervene to stop rebel attacks on Bujumbura, 
the capital of Burundi that has left more than 200 civilians dead and forcing thousands 
to flee from their homes after a week-long rebel offensive. SA troops have been 
deployed in Bujumbura since 2001 with a mission to protect former exile leaders, and 
have began to oversee the disarmament of the ex-combatants as part of an African 
peacekeeping force since an unhonoured ceasefire signed in December 2002. An SA 
government official was quoted saying, “we are not looking to change the mandate for 
the SA force at all. We think it is the task of the Burundi army to protect the 
civilians”288. While the cardinal responsibility of protecting civilians rests on the host 
government, within the broader framework of intervention for human protection, third 
parties (in this case South Africa) have got a responsibility to protect civilians under 
imminent threat, that is, in cases where such a government is unable or is itself acting 
as the perpetrator. However, this would require sufficient military resources in order 
to be effective.        
 
The level of preparedness by the South African forces deployed in November 2001 to 
provide security for the transitional government was raised as a concern by the 
Burundians. However, this was dismissed by an analyst on Burundian affairs, Jan Van 
Eck by arguing that the force was not a “peacekeeping mission but rather a protection 
mission”. Van Eck further submitted that the SA contingent was in Burundi in order 
to “protect individuals and not to get involved in the conflict”, and that if a ceasefire 
agreement was not reached, there was an exit plan for the force. The South African 
government would then have to decide if it wanted to get involved militarily, a move 
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which would require enforcement troops and a new mandate289.  Although SA forces 
were only mandated to protect individual politicians from exile, the volatility of the 
situation at the time of their deployment demanded a given level of preparedness, i.e., 
sufficient military resources capable of repulsing any attack on the politicians whose 
security they were charged, and most importantly to dispense their discretionally duty 
of protecting civilians under serious threat. 
 
Several strategic interests motivated SA’s deployment to Burundi. These interests 
include, “investments” that had been made by former South African President Nelson 
Mandela, who helped Burundian parties reach a power sharing agreement; and by 
Deputy President Jacob Zuma, who was the chief facilitator of the Burundi peace 
process. Furthermore, as chair of the AU, President Mbeki had played a leading role 
in the decision to deploy the AU-led mission to Burundi. Thus, the need to remain 
engaged and committed by providing facilitation to the Burundi mission resulted in a 
decision to deploy the SANDF to the AU-led mission290. Perhaps, also SA’s 
motivation to intervene in Burundi falls within the broader framework of NEPAD, 
that is, the need to promote peace, security, democracy, good governance, human 
rights, e.t.c., conditions that are essential for sustainable development291.  
 
South Africa’s increased deployment to Burundi tasted the degree at which the 
country was able to confront an ongoing crisis. The political and military risks were 
enormous, and the need to project a credible ground force was crucial. However, 
according to the mandate of the mission, peacekeepers are only there to “create a 
space” from which peace-building can be premised. Therefore, “unless the mission is 
able to identify the sources of the conflict, the prospect of negotiating and 
implementing a sustainable peace is next to impossible”292. According to this 
perspective, SA played a minimal role in peacekeeping especially regarding military 
operations. The fact that the Arusha negotiations that were facilitated by SA did not 
lead to successful implementation of sustainable peace (especially before the CNDD-
FDD joined the peace process in subsequent peace deals, and the failure to involve the 
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FNL in the negotiations) was indicative of incorrect diagnosis of the root causes of 
Burundi’s civil conflict. 
 
A 3,000 strong African Union force comprised mainly of SA troops, struggled to 
maintain peace during the transfer of the transitional government presidency from 
Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi military leader to Ndayizeye Domitien, a Hutu leader of the 
Front for the Democratic Forces of Burundi, who had been the vice-President. The 
peace initiative, which was led by SA’s former President Nelson Mandela and former 
deputy President Jacob Zuma, allowed for an 18-month term of office for Buyoya 
subsequently followed by an equal term for Ndayizeye. The force was unable to 
prevent the fighting that was launched by the main rebel group, FDD on Burundi’s 
capital, Bujumbura in opposition to Ndayizeye’s “puppet” leadership. The FDD 
believed that the settlement would by no means lead to majority Hutu rule, in which 
they argued that the regime was bent on “perpetuating Tutsi dominance” in a country 
where the Tutsi comprised only 14% of the population293. This stresses the need to 
deploy a sufficiently equipped force in terms of numbers and military hardware to 
deal more effectively with the complex nature of Africa’s contemporary civil 
conflicts. This would, however, demand more proactive or flexible mandates that are 
designed to suit contemporary international environment in which humanitarian 
intervention for civilian protection has been widely recognised.  
 
SA General, Derrick Ngwebi was appointed force commander for the UN operation in 
Burundi, replacing the African Union Mission in Burundi, of which he had also been 
the military head. UNOB was to operate under a Chapter VII mandate and was tasked 
with the objectives, which included disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR), electoral assistance, which was due to take place in October 2004, and 
facilitation of the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons294. It is 
certain that the role of SA peacekeepers under UNOB was significant since the head 
of the peacekeeping force was South African and the fact that SA had the largest 
military contingent in Burundi.  
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Rehatting of the African peacekeeping mission into a UN peacekeeping mission 
owing to lack of capacity to stop serious fighting295 between the rebels and the 
government forces is an indication that Africa’s ability to deal with complex 
peacekeeping operations is still wanting and thus stresses the need for supplementary 
effort by the international community/UN. However, this leaves emergency cases, 
which require urgent and immediate attention in a vulnerable position since action by 
the UN is determined by Security Council members whose ‘national interests’ 
motivate them into action. This means that as long as a given conflict situation does 
not meet the national interests of a member(s) of the Security Council, action by the 
UN will be paralyzed and hence, subject the lives of civilians into acute danger. The 
1994 Rwandan genocide, and the current conflict in Darfur, where hundreds of 
thousands of people have been killed epitomizes the above argument.  
 
SA Defence Minister, Mosiua Lekota, argues that in order for peacekeeping missions 
to register success, weaponry used in conflicts must be destroyed. It is in line with this 
that SA was keenly involved in collecting arms from the demobilised combatants for 
eventual destruction296. In addition, this activity contributed to the prospects for 
achieving enduring peace in Burundi by ensuring the disarmament of warring parties. 
However, realising long-term stability requires reinforcement of diplomatic activity 
aimed to address the political aspects motivating the conflict or else the conflict may 
re-erupt         
   
5.2 SA Foreign Policy on Africa and National Interests vis à vis Intervention in     
      Burundi Civil Conflict 
 
The extent of SA’s contribution to any given peace mission depends on how closely 
the mission relates to the country’s national interests297. As a responsible member of 
the international community, SA is prepared to actively participate in peace missions 
and in humanitarian intervention, where it is feasible and mandated to do so. Such 
participation will not only aim to achieve international and regional peace and 
security, but will also strive to protect and promote the country’s national interests. 
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South African foreign policy places Africa high on its future engagements. SA has 
“an obvious interest” in ensuring regional peace and stability, which is to create an 
environment within which trade and development will thrive, and prevent devastating 
effects by conflicts in the neighbourhood298. Perhaps, based on this argument, SA’s 
intervention in Burundi’s civil conflict was partly motivated by the need to promote 
peace and stability in the Great Lakes region by using Burundi as a conduit and 
thereby create an environment conducive for trade and investment.  
 
South Africa has a major stake in helping to resolve the Burundi conflict. Though, this 
is “not simply humanitarian”, it is “most certainly that too”299. However, this is 
informed by the need for South Africa to pursue the moral and material interests of its 
people by engaging in the search for peace throughout the entire continent. It is also 
based on a recognition that “democracy and development in South Africa are both 
inextricably linked to progress towards those goals throughout Africa as a whole”300.  
 
Moreover, South Africa’s policies are based on fundamental assumptions of NEPAD: 
that Africa is one and thereby responsible for its future; attainment of peace is crucial 
for economic development; alleviating suffering and constructing pillars of improving 
living conditions of all Africans. Thus, South Africa pursues peace in Burundi within 
a broader context of constructing peace in Central Africa301.  
 
Apparently, not only does South Africa’s national interests pursued in the search for 
peace in Burundi, but also broader continental objectives aimed at promoting stability 
and development in Africa. Therefore, by inquiring into SA’s national interests and 
foreign policy on Africa, helps to locate SA’s motivation in addressing the Burundi 
civil conflict. 
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SA’s foreign policy has in the past been largely, and will continue to be, shaped by 
domestic economic imperatives. The drive for key investment and trade opportunities 
new and old and new markets remains crucial in SA’s foreign policy goals302. SA’s 
exports to Africa are currently the largest destination for value-added products, 
accounting for nearly 30 per cent of total processed exports303. We can therefore argue 
that, perhaps, SA’s intervention in Burundi was partly motivated not by substantive 
investment and trade opportunities owing to the poverty level of the country, but a 
desire to create market access for its industries, e.g., supplies to government. 
 
South African foreign policy is ground in the belief that “just and lasting solutions to 
the problems of human kind can only come through the promotion of democracy”304. 
The democratic nature of SA’s foreign policy is informed by the country’s transition 
from apartheid305. According to Mandela, SA’s foreign policy is informed by the 
belief in the following: 1) that human rights concerns are fundamental to international 
relations and that they extend beyond the political, including the economic, social and 
environmental issues; 2) that “just and lasting solutions to the problems of 
humankind” can only be found in entrenchment of democracy in all nations of the 
world; 3) that relations between nations should be guided by values of justice and 
respect for international law; 4) that all nations should strive for peace, and where it is 
compromised, internationally sanctioned and peaceful means, including arms-control 
regimes, must guide international action; 5) that foreign policy choices should reflect 
“concerns and interests” of the African continent; and 6) that economic development 
is based on the promotion of both regional and internal economic cooperation in a 
globalised world306.  
 
Human rights is the “light” that guides SA’s foreign affairs. “Only true democracy 
can guarantee rights”. SA will therefore play a key role in the global efforts aimed at 
promoting and fostering democratic systems of government. This is crucial in Africa, 
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in which this goal shall be realized by “securing a spirit of tolerance and the ethos of 
governance throughout the continent”307. SA’s central foreign policy goal aims at 
promoting institutions and forces that through democratic means seek to create a 
better world for all308. 
 
Kane-Berman looks at SA’s foreign policy under Mandela’s presidency to have 
emphasized the promotion of international justice, international morality and human 
rights. These ideals and goals were the guiding principles of the liberation struggle, 
and they were institutionalized in the post-apartheid political system in South 
Africa309. According to Evans, this was to be the “moral reference point” of SA’s 
readmission into the community of nations and the basic principle upon which foreign 
policy decisions were to be made and implemented. However, Evans argues that a 
commitment to human rights or ethical principles as the corner stone of policy implies 
the willingness to intervene in order to prevent or deal with human suffering310. 
Perhaps it was based on the commitment to promote human rights that SA was willing 
to deploy in Burundi even before the signing of the ceasefire by the warring parties, a 
condition that had hindered the deployment of UN peacekeepers. 
 
Representation of developing countries has emerged as the central motivation of 
democratic South Africa’s foreign policy engagements both at the global and 
continental level. SA’s model of a negotiated settlement is seen as a framework that 
could inform Africa’s democratization process and the basis for SA’s relations with 
the rest of the continent. The idea of conflict resolution and prevention of war through 
the theory of “democratic peace” is inextricably linked to the idea of promoting peace 
and effective negotiations in conflict-prone Africa through the “dispensation of a 
liberal democratic tradition. What has become central to “the democracy through 
peace deal” model is the import of SA’s own style of a negotiated settlement into 
peace processes that it seeks to establish in the conflict-ridden societies311. SA should, 
                                                 
307 Ibid., p.88  
308 Ibid., p.89 
309 John Kane-Berman, ‘Ideology and Foreign Policy’, in Fast Facts, no.7, July 2005, p.2 
310 Graham Evans, ‘Nelson Mandela’s Farewell Address: The End of the Rainbow’, in The World    
      Today , January 1999, pp.10-12 
311 Sanusha Naidu, ‘South Africa and Africa: Mixed Messages?’, in Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (ed.),   
     Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South Africa’s Foreign Policy 1994-2004, The South African   
     Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg, 2004 pp.208-209 
                                                                      146
however, avoid the temptation of applying the whole package of its conflict resolution 
approach to conflict situations in other countries. This argument is premised on the 
fact that society’s historical experiences, culture, language, governance system, etc, 
shape and determine the application of a given approach of conflict resolution. For 
example, treating the White-Black issue in apartheid SA as the Hutu-Tutsi issue in 
Burundi and thereby apply wholly a similar conflict resolution approach, will not be 
feasible. 
 
Policy documents reveal that “if we do not devote our energies to this continent, we 
too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its various parts”312; that 
the “fate of democratic South Africa is inextricably bound up with what happens in 
the rest of the continent and our foreign policy should reflect the interests of the 
continent of Africa”313. This could be the driving force behind SA’s motivation to 
intervene in Burundi, a country that is without any material resources and seemingly 
without any strategic interests to benefit SA, factors that are very often the driving 
force that attract countries’ interventionist policies. 
 
However, the opposing school of thought argues that South Africa is motivated by 
hegemonic ambitions. It has been instrumental in designing a continent-wide vision in 
the form of the African renaissance and NEPAD; and it has been a key proponent of 
institutional capacity building, especially through the AU. Furthermore, it has on 
certain occasions exerted its political will, for instance, in Lesotho, where it militarily 
intervened, a move that could escalate into regional instability314. Whether or not SA 
is motivated by hegemonic ambitions is not the salient issue to consider especially 
when the African continent is devastated by conflicts and ruined by acute 
underdevelopment. Thus, the issue should be rather, whether SA’s African policies 
are pursued or implemented in contradiction to the ideals of the African renaissance 
and NEPAD. 
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Moreover, the other school of thought departs from the arguments raised above, by 
holding that South Africa’s role in multilateral forums like World Trade Organisation, 
the G-8, the Bretons Wood institutions (such as, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund) and even in continental initiatives like NEPAD is driven by “sub-
imperial” ambitions. It is argued that South African authorities engage in negotiations 
in pursuit of their country’s “national agenda” and in order to create market access for 
their corporates into Africa and the developed economies, with less consideration for 
their neighbours and the continent at large315. Indeed every nation pursues a given 
agenda in dealing with other nations, however, the issue is whether or not such 
policies are exploitative. For instance, by arguing that SA intervention in Burundi was 
motivated by creating market access for their corporates can be contested given that 
Burundi is not endowed with mineral or material resources and moreover, it has a 
very poor and small population of less than 7 million, which cannot meet such an 
aspiration.   
 
South Africa’s foreign policy is not based on a single doctrine, but on a set of clear 
strategic goals that view foreign policy, among other things, as an extension of 
domestic policy, and a means to search for solutions to domestic, regional and global 
problems316. Moreover, the desire to share South African experience with fragmented 
societies elsewhere is at the root of South Africa’s foreign policy. This is grounded in 
the principle that “foreign policies of all states invariably, in whatever muted a form, 
reflect the values that inform their domestic societies”317. One of the key foreign 
policy challenges that post-apartheid SA encountered was the extent to which the 
extension of democracy and protection of human rights around the world were to 
inform the new South Africa’s foreign policy. Secondly, Pretoria had to face high 
expectations from friendly countries that had supported it during the fight against 
apartheid. Pretoria has shown that its approach is not as simple as choosing whether 
or not its foreign relations should be designed to favour those who supported the anti-
apartheid struggle or those in possession of Euros and US dollars. It is about making 
choices informed by similar and shared norms and values, for instance, adherence to 
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multilateralism in search for solutions to global and regional issues and more 
significantly, those that serve to promote national interests318. It is against this 
backdrop that SA intervened in Burundi; it was undoubtedly within SA’s national 
interests to be part of Burundi’s peace process as commitment towards helping the 
implementation of the hard-won peace deal that former president Nelson Mandela had 
helped to broker.  
 
The guiding principle for South African foreign policy during the reign of Mandela 
was the promotion of human rights, democracy, justice and international law, 
international peace, Africa in the world, and economic development through regional 
and international cooperation. Although the guiding principle was clear, strategies, 
goals, objectives and plans were not. However, Pretoria’s Africa policy, which gained 
prominence in the country’s foreign policy, was extensively clear. Its expressed aim 
was to provide for an environment that would promote the ideals of the African 
Renaissance, based on the belief that problems and challenges confronting the sub-
region demand a concerted effort by all countries of the South319. According to Nzo, 
the main thrust of foreign policy during Mandela’s presidency was:320 
The promotion and attainment of a state of peace and prosperity for 
our own citizens as well as the citizens of our region, continent and 
planet … This is derived from the fundamental belief that there can 
be no prosperity without peace, but also no peace without prosperity, 
both within countries and between countries, as well as between the 
developed and developing worlds.  
 
In late 1996, Mbeki started to play a significant role in crafting of South Africa’s 
foreign policy. Since then, South Africa’s African policy has “coalesced around the 
notion of an African Renaissance”321. In 1997, the office of South Africa’s Deputy 
President released a document entitled, ‘The African Renaissance: A workable 
Dream’. The document suggested five areas through which South Africa would 
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engage with the African continent. These include promotion of cultural exchange; 
liberating the African woman from ‘patriarchy’; youth mobilization; extending, 
entrenching and preserving democracy; and promotion of sustainable economic 
development322. Ever since those pronouncements, Mbeki has advocated for South 
Africa’s lead in confronting Africa’s problems guided by the renaissance vision. 
Thus, it can be deduced that the notion of renaissance fundamentally strives to 
maximize “South Africa’s strategic options on the continent”323. In line with this 
thinking, Vale and Maseko state that the African Renaissance championed by Mbeki 
reflects a global approach designed to address Africa’s problems324.   
 
At his inauguration in 1999, President Mbeki pointed out clearly that Africa would be 
one of the key priority areas of his administration. Mbeki argued that regardless of the 
challenges that Africa is facing, it will be at peace and that in spite of the negative 
shadow cast by sceptics, Africa will prosper325. Mandela’s pragmatic policy of “South 
Africa first” paved way for a new ideology under Mbeki that put Africa at the 
forefront of foreign policy. South Africa’s Africa relations “became by and large a 
multilateral exercise subjected to a Pan African Veto, while the rest of external 
relations were seen through a prism of Afro centrism and third worldism”326. South 
African national interests were “defined by Afro centrism, a missionary commitment 
to improve the plight of the poor of the world, benevolent altruism …”327. It is within 
this thinking that SA under Mbeki’s presidency launched the most significant peace 
intervention since attaining democracy- in the Burundi peace process, which precedes 
other peace interventions in Africa’s conflict-ridden countries, such as, Sierra Leone, 
Ivory Coast, Sudan, etc. 
 
According to the foreign affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, “South Africa 
has both a responsibility and an obligation to contribute to the continent’s renewal in 
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building a peaceful and prosperous continent”328. This commitment falls within the 
broader framework of the African renaissance and NEPAD, initiatives whose chief 
architect is SA. And they entail promoting efforts designed to address the continent’s 
woes both in terms of violent conflict and development-related hardships and thereby, 
route the continent on the right path to development. 
 
The African National Congress (ANC) argues that their involvement in conflict 
resolution on the continent is motivated by the need to create a peaceful and 
democratic continent within which SA’s model of democracy can be promoted. SA 
also believes that experiencing growth and development as a country within a 
continent that is characterized by poverty and underdevelopment, will only exacerbate 
the problems of illegal migration into the country, drug trafficking and many other 
related problems. It is against this backdrop that SA has to ensure that it is massively 
involved in the reconstruction, economic growth and development of the continent329. 
 
South Africa views the devastating wars waged on the African continent as 
“anathema” to the ideals of an African Renaissance. Realizing that there can be no 
liberation of the African people from socio-economic malaise in the face of conflicts, 
the South African government has prioritized the resolution of these conflicts as one 
of the key foreign policy goals. South Africa’s Ambassador to the United Nations 
noted that, “South Africa believes that in the Southern African context as also further 
afield, the fundamental objective of our regional policy should be preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking and humanitarian assistance”330.     
 
In emphasis of that, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
stated that:331 
The regional conflicts wreaking havoc across the continent cast a dark 
shadow over the prospects of success of the vision of the African renaissance 
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… It is wrong to think that all conflicts should be resolved through the barrel 
of the gun. Political solutions should be explored at all times.  
 
Indeed, the interconnectedness of conflicts in regions is a big challenge to the 
realisation of the vision of the African renaissance. For instance, the conflict in 
Burundi is linked to DRC, Tanzania and Rwanda and thus, it is difficult to attain 
peace in Burundi in isolation of regional forces influencing conflict in Burundi.  
 
Although, it is true that all conflicts cannot be addressed militarily and that political 
solutions should be attempted in every conflict situation, but what should be done to a 
warring party who consistently rejects concessions and compromises made in order to 
resolve conflict and continues to launch attacks on innocent civilians? The FNL is a 
classical example in this regard; although, efforts have been made (as the 
comprehensive peace deal reveals) to address the root causes of Burundi’s civil 
conflict, they have refused to join the peace process, and have often attacked civilians. 
 
5.3 SA Diplomatic Mediation in the Burundi Civil Conflict 
SA’s participation in Burundi’s peace process is considered as the “most significant 
peace intervention since democracy”332. SA’s direct role in the Burundi peace process 
began with the designation of SA’s former president Nelson Mandela as facilitator in 
December 1999. Following the death of former President Julius Nyerere, Mandela 
was appointed by eastern and southern African leaders as facilitator of the Burundi 
peace negotiations in Arusha. Intensive diplomatic efforts under the facilitation of 
Mandela resulted in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 
which was signed on August 28, 2000 by parties to the Burundi conflict333. SA’s 
motivation in significantly intervening in Burundi considering that other key parties 
like the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, UN and OAU were already involved 
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in the peace process, provides an important component of SA’s motivation in the 
search for peace in Burundi. 
  
On assuming the role of a facilitator in the Burundi peace process, replacing the late 
former President Julius Nyerere, Mandela’s challenge was to forge peace between the 
ruling minority Tutsi, who constitute 15 per cent of the population, and majority 
Hutus, who were excluded from political power334.  
 
Nelson Mandela was under intense pressure to create a transitional government by 
November 1, 2001 that would lead Burundi to achieve peace, but there was growing 
scepticism about his “made-in-Africa peace plan”. He complained that none of the 
parties seemed to be “in a hurry to bring peace. They bring gloom”335. However, 
Mandela’s mediation skills culminated in the November 1 installation of an interim 
government that comprised of both ethnic groups. Mandela drew from his “experience 
of sharing power with his former jailers to impress upon the Burundians that they hold 
the key to lasting peace in their country”336. However, the rebels were not included in 
that peace process leading to the continuation of fighting337. Although, Mandela used 
his reconciliatory experience in South Africa to enable power sharing between Hutus 
and Tutsis in an interim government, without having involved the rebels as some of 
the key stakeholders of the peace process, provided a partial solution to the civil 
conflict as this meant that grievances of the rebels were not accommodated and 
addressed. This seemed like a tactical postponement of negotiations involving all key 
parties to the conflict, a requirement that was necessary to promote durable peace in 
Burundi.   
 
President Pierre Buyoya paid tribute to the Burundi peace talks’ facilitator, Nelson 
Mandela for having persuaded the representative of armed groups to join negotiations. 
Mandela had a series of meetings in Johannesburg with FDD leader Jean-Bosco 
Ndayikengurukiye and FNL leader Kabura Cossan at which they committed 
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themselves in principle to join the peace talks as long as certain conditions were 
met338. 
 
Mandela’s first visit to Burundi to meet Burundian President Pierre Buyoya and the 
Burundi military command as part of his mandate to bring peace to the country, 
devastated by hostilities between Tutsis and Hutus, was aimed at briefing the military 
about the military significance of the Arusha Peace talks. Mandela asked the officers 
to respect the Arusha negotiations designed to integrate Hutu rebel fighters into the 
army and extending amnesty for past atrocities339. After intensive negotiations 
Mandela has been able to convince Burundian warring parties to integrate the armed 
forces, in which the army would be equally represented by Hutus and Tutsis and to 
release people in refugee camps, issues that were key in the Arusha peace talks. The 
camps were created during intensive fighting as a measure to stop rebel groups from 
recruiting new members from rural areas340. Mandela’s effort to persuade warring 
parties to integrate the army was a milestone in Burundi’s peace process; it was 
difficult to attain or even maintain state power without military support or approval. 
This was demonstrated in 1993 when some elements from the army assassinated the 
first democratically elected Hutu President. Thus, it was impossible to resolve the 
political question in Burundi without dealing with the military issue. However, 
although, at the time it was clearly impossible to move the peace process forward 
without extending amnesty for past atrocities committed against Burundians, it is 
salient to note that enduring peace in Burundi is impossible to achieve without 
bringing to justice those accused to have committed serious crimes against the people 
of Burundi. This could fall within broader efforts designed to promote national 
reconciliation and justice, as stipulated in the Arusha Peace and reconciliation 
agreement for Burundi. Moreover, such a move is crucial in resolving the outbreak of 
killings and counter killings that had been periodically perpetrated against the 
Burundi people as a means of vengeance of their ethnic counterparts killed in the past.     
 
Although the signing of Arusha Peace Agreement for Burundi that was overseen by 
Mandela lessened tension in Burundi, and was signed by majority of parties including 
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the Tutsi dominated government, the main rebel group did not sign the deal. Mandela 
announced that parties that did not sign the agreement would meet in SA in the near 
future. Mandela also said that he had called for a meeting between President Buyoya, 
the Tutsi dominated army and the two rebel groups, the FDD and the FNL341. Without 
the participation of the main rebel group, FDD in the peace process, let alone, having 
not signed the Arusha peace agreement for Burundi, rendered the agreement of no 
effect given that the rebel group operated in almost all areas of the country. Although, 
it was important that post-Arusha peace deal discussions between the key parties to 
the conflict be held as a measure to convince the non-signatory parties to join the 
peace process, it was difficult, if not, impossible to realise this goal without having to 
renegotiate substantive parts of the peace deal.   
 
In an effort to involve groups that had not participated in all peace negotiations, 
former President Nelson Mandela had to postpone the signing of the Burundi Peace 
Agreement to August 28 instead of July 20, 2000 as it was originally planned. 
However, the CNDD-FDD rebel group rejected calls to sign the Agreement citing that 
it had not been part of the process for the past two years. Shortly, fighting between the 
Government and the rebel forces escalated342. This raises the importance of 
participation by key parties to the conflict in order for any peace deal to produce 
tangible results or to succeed in promoting comprehensive peace. The conflicting 
demands and often irreconcilable differences demand active participation in the 
negotiations by all warring parties in an attempt to achieve concessions and 
compromises agreeable to all and, hence, leading to a peace deal that through its 
implementation will increase chances of achieving comprehensive peace. This is 
premised on the fact that participation produces accountability and ownership of the 
peace process by the participants, factors likely to increase chances for successful 
implementation of the peace deal. 
 
“Zuma has been among the most proponents of Arusha’s inviolability. He drew 
parallels between the tough tactics used to forge SA’s Convention for a Democratic 
                                                 
341 SAPA, ‘Mandela Confirms All Quiet in Burundi’, in The Citizen, September, 1 2000 
342 H.  Solomon and A. Turton, ‘Is 16/19 Enough?: Burundi Hopes for Peace’, in Conflict Trends, no.2,  
      2000, p.5 
                                                                      155
South Africa agreements and the struggle to negotiate a Burundi settlement”343. Many 
South Africans look at the Burundi situation within the context of majority Hutus 
attempting to take power from the Tutsi minority344. However, it should be 
acknowledged that power in Burundi has been centred more on regionalism than 
ethnicity, to the extent that, Hutus from Bururi Province, which has been the centre of 
power for over three decades, enjoyed more privileges in terms of political 
appointments than Tutsis from other Regions. Thus, we can argue that in the case of 
Burundi, it is rather a struggle to capture power from the south (Bururi province) by 
Burundians who were marginalised, though, using ethnicity as an instrument to reach 
that goal.  
  
With the help of SA, President Buyoya, representing the TgoB and Pierre Nkurunziza, 
representing the CNDD-FDD reached agreement on the implementation of the 
ceasefire agreement they had signed in Arusha, Tanzania on December 2, 2002. 
Among the key issues that were agreed upon was the rapid deployment of the African 
Mission in Burundi that would be constituted by troops from South Africa, 
Mozambique and Ethiopia345. SA’s significant contribution in resolving the 
intractable conflict in Burundi is visibly substantial; seemingly irreconcilable 
differences and conflicting demands between warring parties that Regional peace 
Summits (Great Lakes Initiative for Burundi) were unable to resolve, but with the 
help of Pretoria’s diplomatic craftiness, settlement to the differences were reached.   
 
In an attempt to build trust between the government of Burundi and the FDD and 
thereby, honour the December 2, 2002 ceasefire that had been violated (fighting had 
intensified in nine of Burundi’s sixteen provinces), Pretoria called for peace talks. A 
week earlier, mediator Jacob Zuma spent two days of talks with rebel leader, Pierre 
Nkurunziza. However, the ceasefire remained incomplete in the face of continual 
attacks on Bujumbura by the FNL. The FNL felt excluded because its demands had 
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not been addressed by both the Burundian government and the mediators346. To the 
extent that the ceasefire that was signed between the GoB and the FDD was 
dishonoured because the FDD felt that its demands were not met, it was not 
unreasonable for the FNL to express its disregard for the ceasefire by fighting since it 
was neither a party to the ceasefire nor the Arusha peace agreement. 
 
In an effort to implement the ceasefire accord that was signed by Nkurunziza on 
December 7, 2002 President Mbeki and his former deputy Jacob Zuma had to spend 
three successive all-night negotiating sessions with Burundian President Domitien 
Ndayizeye and rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza. They spent seven more hours to agree 
on the wording of the implementation agreement before informing their delegations, 
who had been kept out of the negotiations. In order to reach at this both President 
Mbeki and Zuma had to use “high pressure tactics”. Zuma repeatedly defended his 
stance by referring to SA’s experience: How do you think they got us to Convention 
for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and kept us there? It is all about pressure”. 
As a result of the “arm twisting”, Nkurunziza declared an immediate ceasefire order 
to his forces, and the President followed suit. In effect this was an agreement that 
fastened “nuts and bolts” of the unhonoured ceasefire accord signed in December 
2002. However, without inclusion of the FNL into the peace process, enduring peace 
looks far a way from being realized, though, Mbeki described the absence of the FNL 
as “a small problem”347. 
 
While the high pressure tactics that were applied by Mbeki and Zuma were crucial to 
push parties into agreement and hence implement the ceasefire accord, it should be 
acknowledged that the same tactics were unable to produce tangible results in SA 
because of the apparent irreconcilable differences and competing interests among 
parties, which as a matter of fact, resulted in the collapse of CODESA. However, after 
nearly a year negotiations were resumed under a Multi-party Planning Conference348. 
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Thus, we should rather argue that the high pressure tactics coupled with the 
negotiation experience that was based on the lessons learned from the failure of 
CODESA enabled Mbeki and Zuma to reconcile conflicting positions of the 
Burundian parties and thus helping the parties to reach agreement on implementation 
of the ceasefire. In contrast, however, while in SA negotiation attempts were made to 
convince parties, such as, Pan Africa Congress (PAC) and the Conservative Party 
(CP) that were not part of CODESA to join a Multi-party Planning Conference, which 
they did, in the case of Burundi, the FNL were not considered, a move which cast 
doubt on attaining comprehensive peace in Burundi. 
 
Under the mediation of the former deputy President Jacob Zuma, President Ndayizeye 
and the rebel leaders set out to negotiate details of the FDD’s participation in the 
transitional government. The lack of progress has been due to the late entry into the 
peace process by the FDD and the on-going non-participation of the FNL. Both of the 
rebel movements were not invited to participate in the Arusha peace for Burundi and 
are not willing to join the peace process not until substantial renegotiations are done. 
Although, Zuma has taken lightly the threat posed by the FNL saying that they will 
join the talks later, Nkurunziza’s FDD movement acknowledges that peace cannot be 
achieved without the FNL’s participation. Zuma’s tactic has been to push the 
outsiders to participate in the transitional process349. It was a diplomatic oversight not 
to involve the rebels to participate in the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement 
for Burundi; considering that the rebels were among the key parties to the conflict, 
comprehensive peace chiefly depended on their participation. By having to 
renegotiate substantial provisions in the peace deal in order to accommodate rebels, 
delayed the peace process and hence, achieving of comprehensive peace in Burundi. 
This is further complicated by having to accommodate the FNL into the peace 
process; this means that structures, that is, government representative institutions, 
such as, Legislature, have got to be dismantled in order to involve the FNL in the 
governmental structures, a process that may result in conflict.  
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In an effort to “breath life” into Burundi’s peace process Zuma, who was the chief 
mediator in the Burundi peace process brought together the country’s President and 
rebel leaders ahead of the Great Lakes Summit on Burundi aimed at evaluating the 
willingness of the rebel movements to negotiate. Also the meeting purposed to 
harmonise proposals of the two parties on power-sharing and the transformation of the 
military. Zuma held separate talks with the parties, who then handed him their 
proposals.350 In a sense, SA’s diplomatic engagement with the key parties to 
Burundi’s civil conflict in pre-negotiations ahead of the Summit was an attempt to 
reduce tension between the parties and ensure feasible proposals to work with during 
the Summit and thus, increase the chances of reaching a negotiated agreement by 
avoiding a stalemate in the discussions. Further, this was an attempt to facilitate the 
Burundi peace process (negotiations) by increasing the pace at which talks should 
progress. 
 
The Burundi peace process had reached “a serious deadlock” by the time the 
Burundian President Domitien Ndayizeye and CNDD-FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza 
met in Pretoria early October 2003. It was apparent during the Heads of State Summit 
held in Dar es Salaam in September, that the “two parties clung to conflicting 
interpretations and irreconcilable demands around power sharing”, particularly 
concerning political and security/defence issues. The “ intransigence” expressed by 
the parties during the Regional Summit inhibited them from reaching agreement, in 
spite of the fact that, the four regional Heads of state had exerted considerable 
pressure on the parties, and a document that comprehensively attempted to address the 
concerns and interests of both parties had been produced by a team of regional 
experts351. It was not uncommon, especially in Burundian politics, for the apparent 
strong and uncompromising stance exhibited by the Burundian warring parties. This is 
because both political and military power meant every thing; political exclusion, and 
military dominance by minority Tutsis (which served to reinforce political decisions 
and protect those in power) were the key factors around which armed conflict was 
centred upon. Moreover, this was further complicated by the fact that the power 
sharing formula designed in the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for 
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Burundi was reached without the participation of the rebel movements. Thus, 
harmonising the deal to accommodate the rebel force, FDD into the political and 
military structures was bound to be problematic.    
 
In an effort to resolve outstanding issues from the stalled power sharing talks that had 
been organized under a Regional Peace Summit held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 
September 2003, South African president Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma the chief 
facilitator mediated between the president of Burundi Domitien Ndayizeye and Pierre 
Nkurunziza leader of FDD. The talks came after negotiations that were held in 
Pretoria in August 2003 to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire agreements 
signed in December, 2002 and January, 2003352. 
 
On October 8, 2003 through the mediation effort of South African President Thabo 
Mbeki, Burundi’s main rebel leader, Pierre Nkurunziza of the Defence of Democracy 
signed a new peace accord with President Domitien Ndayizeye in an effort to end a 
decade of civil war that had killed 300,000 people. The deal was signed on entry into 
government by the rebel group353. However, since the second main rebel group, the 
FNL had refused to stop fighting, “fears remained that long-term stability may prove 
elusive”354. Furthermore, this is compounded by the refusal by Mbeki to acknowledge 
the fact that the absence of the FNL into any peace deal would jeopardize stability in 
Burundi: “Mbeki dismissed the FNL as small problems saying its refusal to negotiate 
was not a major hurdle to the peace process”355. It was diplomatically faulty to 
dismiss the FNL as a weak force, which cannot pose a threat to the peace process; the 
attacks on Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi, which lasted for a week and left more 
than 200 civilians dead and forcing thousands to flee from their homes356, 
disapproved Mbeki’s assertion. This also demonstrates the fact that Burundi cannot 
enjoy comprehensive peace unless the FNL joins the peace process. 
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South African negotiators believed that its conflict resolution approach had yielded 
success after helping the Transitional Government of Burundi (TgoB) and the Forces 
for Defence of Democracy (FDD) reach agreement on two important protocols: the 
October 8 “protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi” 
and the November 2 “protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power 
Sharing issues in Burundi”. The Protocol signed on October 8, 2003 represented the 
settlement of all the outstanding issues mentioned above that deadlocked the Heads of 
State Summit on power sharing in Burundi. In an effort to convince the parties to 
reach agreement and hence overcome the deadlock, President Thabo Mbeki drew 
from the document that was proposed by the regional experts as a guiding framework. 
On November 2, 2003 the parties overcame “what has been perhaps the major 
stumbling block in the Burundi Peace Process”: the ‘Forces Technical Agreement’ 
(FTA). Together with the participation of the South African President, Thabo Mbeki 
as mediator, the parties were able to reach agreement on a crucial framework for the 
‘inclusive’ reform of Burundi’s security institutions. The FTA was officially signed in 
Dar es Salaam on November 16, 2003 under the framework of the Arusha agreement. 
The Global Ceasefire Agreement of November 16, 2003 finalized the political, 
defence and power sharing agreements that were signed in Pretoria on October 8 and 
on November 2, 2003357. Mbeki promised to send the former deputy president Jacob 
Zuma, who was the chief facilitator of the Burundi peace process, to oversee the 
implementation of the Pretoria Protocols358.  
 
Thus, SA’s conflict resolution approach that was employed in resolving outstanding 
issues from the stalled power sharing negotiations that had been organized in 
September 2003 in Dar es Salaam under a Regional Peace Summit, was crucial in 
providing a framework for comprehensive peace in Burundi, and informing Africa’s 
international relations. Fundamentally, this approach was based on South Africa’s 
skilfulness of its diplomats, and was informed by SA’s history in negotiating a 
peaceful settlement to the conflict that confronted whites and blacks; and proposals of 
the regional experts on conflict in the Great lakes. However, Burundian parties 
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doubted the possibility of achieving enduring peach in Burundi as long as the FNL 
remained defiant. The then chief facilitator of the Burundi peace process, Jacob Zuma 
attempted to persuade the FNL leader, Rwasa to join the peace process and halt the 
fighting, warning that failure to do so would lead to withering away of the FNL359. 
  
After the FNL had launched the “fiercest” attack on Burundi’s capital, Bujumbura, 
since the beginning of the civil war in 1993, Zuma the chief mediator in the Burundi 
peace process had discussions with Burundi’s top government officials including the 
military commanders and all agreed to revise the mandate of the African force in 
order to deal with the current escalation of fighting360. It was, therefore, 
diplomatically/politically flawed to have treated the FNL as an insignificant party to 
the conflict without having assessed the potential of the rebel group by questioning 
their support base and allies with negative forces, such as, the former Rwandan forces 
and militias who participated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. By deciding to amend 
the mandate of the African force, was suggestive that the GoB required military 
intervention by the African force in order to root-out the FNL, which has consistently 
rejected to join the peace process. 
 
 
5.4 Field Work Information: The Burundi Peacekeeping   
      Mission/SA Operational Commanders 
  
5.4.1 Mission objectives and challenges encountered in resolving the Burundi   
         civil conflict 
 
According to the respondents, SA had a single mission objective which was to 
provide protection to the VIPs (former exile politicians) in order that they participate 
in negotiations and the transitional government. However, under the AMIB their 
mission extended to include monitoring and observing implementation of the 
ceasefire by the government of Burundi and rebels. Under the United Nations their 
mission included: 
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o Peacekeeping and at some point peace enforcement; 
o Ensuring that the ceasefire is respected by warring parties; and 
o Ensuring a successful electoral process 
To a large extent mission objectives have been achieved as elections were conducted 
smoothly and attacks on former political prisoners were halted. However, peace has 
not been wholly achieved because the FNL are still fighting. This indicates that while 
SA peacekeepers were limited by their mission mandate and that of AMIB, under the 
U.N. their mandate was broadened to include peacekeeping at a much broader sense 
i.e., civilian protection. Indeed it is difficult to realise durable peace in Burundi given 
that the FNL are not part of the peace process. But the relevant question to pose is 
whether or not under the new mandate, peace enforcement was effected in an effort to 
promote peace in Burundi. This will be responded to in the following paragraphs. 
 
Forces encountered resistance from both the government and rebel forces. 
Government forces protested the arrival of SA troops. Very often government forces 
blocked SA troops while escorting former exile leaders to consult with their 
combatants in the bush and in camps. Initially, exile leaders had refused to return 
citing fear of their safety and this resulted in the delay of some into the country. There 
was continued random shooting by both warring parties that was aimed at threatening 
returning exile leaders and SA troops by demonstrating that war had not ended. SA 
troops suffered suspicion by both belligerent parties especially government forces, 
which resulted in an attack on SA positions by government forces alleging that they 
were allies of the former rebels. Such resistance demonstrates the need for support 
mechanisms for intervention in war-torn societies (e.g., a threat of an embargo, which 
at an earlier stage of Burundi’s civil conflict, produced positive results by forcing the 
Burundian government to negotiate). This also illustrates the importance of well 
preparedness in terms of sufficient military resources capable of repelling any attack 
and therefore enforce a peacekeeping mandate.  
 
Memorandum of understanding (status of forces agreement) limited operations of SA 
troops, for example, although shots that were very often fired, attracted the attention 
of SA troops to monitor the situation, but “documents limited our movements”. This 
was compounded by the UN peacekeeping norm of impartiality, which sometimes 
restricted operations that should have been taken to save civilians. Moreover, there 
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was insufficient number of forces to effectively carry out peacekeeping duties. 
However memorandum of understanding which limited wider operations of SA 
peacekeepers only applied under SA mission mandate and not under U.N. mission, 
whose mandate extended to include peace enforcement. However, according to the 
Burundian respondents even under the U.N., SA troops were unable to protect 
civilians facing danger. Perhaps failure to protect civilians was due to insufficient 
military resources at hand as revealed by some SA operational commanders.   
 
It was difficult to implement peace enforcement because of having been constrained 
by the National Defence Forces (Burundian government forces). Forces were 
prevented from undertaking operations during the night and yet killings and random 
shooting, in most cases, happened during night hours. This contravened the UN 
mission codes, in which UN troops are supposed to go any where at any time and into 
any place. This also reveals the importance of backing Security Council resolutions 
with the will and sufficient resources necessary to put them into implementation. 
 
Local people were uncooperative- feared to give information due to intimidation from 
government forces. In some cases they were killed by government forces on grounds 
that “they had sold them out”. This raises the question of a more coordinated 
intelligence net work within the framework of an early warning system capable of 
gathering key information necessary for effective peacekeeping operations.  
 
Troops faced logistical problems because they were self-sustained and equipments 
were only found in SA and thus, obtaining them took a long time. Insufficient and 
inappropriate transport for former exile leaders was also encountered as a big 
challenge. This was compounded by the unfriendly terrain in most parts of the 
country. Language was a big constraint since a few personnel could speak Swahili and 
one or two spoke French.  
 
In an effort to eliminate threats that were posed by the local forces, a show of force 
and high standard of discipline was demonstrated. Protection of VIPs (former exile 
leaders) was bolstered. Transparency with commanders of the Burundian army and 
liaising with them by clarifying the purpose of intended movements with former exile 
leaders helped as a confidence-building resource. In addition, communication with 
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both government and rebel forces on the specific mission of SA troops with time 
changed the perspective of the parties towards SA troops. This stresses the importance 
of a show of force as a military strategy in dealing with complex conflict situations. It 
also singles out the importance of effective communication with parties to the conflict 
in an effort to resolve a conflict. However, this is applicable to warring parties 
committed to a peaceful solution to the conflict.  
 
In order to address the logistical problem, other external parties present in Burundi, 
such as, the AU extended support. Situational reports were made and submitted to SA 
government and the UN Office in Burundi, which were later sent to New York.      
Cooperation with government was more of a compromise than cooperation per se; 
political decisions were not implemented, e.g., “the government would say this and do 
the opposite on the ground”. Support by government was more on a strategic level 
than on a tactical level, which made it very difficult to launch operations. Unlike the 
FNL, rebels were to a large extent cooperative since they thought that their concerns 
would be addressed with the help from external forces. At the extreme, one 
respondent asserted that no other support was received from government apart from 
providing operational bases. Information flow from FAB commanders to their 
subordinates was contradictory, to the extent that, subordinates would decide contrary 
to decisions issued from above and this would as a result frustrate SA troop 
operations. For instance, restrictions on troop movements by FAB resulted in delays 
in carrying out tasks. Perhaps this was an expression of the need to preserve total 
sovereignty by the government of Burundi (GoB). Thus, this poses a challenge to 
humanitarian intervention for civilian protection, a notion that has gained wider 
recognition in the contemporary era. In another sense, considering that atrocities 
against civilians were often carried out during the night, was then government through 
its forces preventing operations of external forces as a measure to conceal what was 
being done behind the scenes? In such a scenario, efforts of external intervention are 
limited by a government, which is an accomplice against its own people.  
 
SA troops liaised with other contingents from other countries on a regular basis in an 
effort to deal with incidences that were happening in different areas of deployment. 
Cooperation with external parties was facilitated in an attempt to carry out mission 
mandates. For instance, SA troops under AU, whose mandate included provision of 
                                                                      165
protection to former exile leaders, liaised with the UN troops during operations in 
order to bolster their security since the latter were responsible for ensuring peace and 
stability. Forums were also organized to discuss military issues, such as, troop 
deployment, achievements, failures and their possible solutions. However, problems 
of command and control were encountered among contingents of different countries, 
and, as such, commands were not easily respected. Meetings involved the 
participation of NGOs and relevant government institutions. Particularly, constant 
contacts with the UN forces were made such that in an event of an attack, help would 
be easily rendered. This raises the salience of cooperation with both external and local 
players in an attempt to address conflict; very often these are better placed to provide 
support systems in terms of logistics and information which is crucial to enable 
successful implementation of mandates of peacekeeping operations. For instance, the 
bolstering of the security of SA troops under AU mission361 by the U.N. troops 
ensured a successful implementation of their mandate in providing protection to 
former exile politicians and thus, prevented the escalation or eruption of conflict in 
the event that they were attacked. 
 
The presence of foreign forces eliminated great fear in the civilians; it provided some 
sort of psychological security to the extent that they trusted foreign forces to guard 
against any attempt by warring parties to destabilize the security situation. It fits 
within the broader aspiration of former President Nelson Mandela- of ensuring peace 
and stability on the African continent. Also the willingness of SA to help a fellow 
African state by undertaking such a risky mission, initially, without the support of the 
UN, is an expression of SA’s commitment to the ideals of the African renaissance and 
NEPAD. Moreover, the mission significantly limited the number of refugees that 
were fleeing into neighbouring countries and encouraged the return of thousands of 
others. The above argument demonstrates the significance of a third party force in 
restoring confidence in civilians through a show of force, which, in this case, is 
evidenced by having prevented people from fleeing Burundi and encouraged others to 
return. In a sense, this was a boost in improving the security situation, which in effect 
instilled faith in the civilians about the stability of the country. 
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For effective implementation of NEPAD, of which, SA is a key proponent, Burundi 
has to be at peace in order to promote regional stability. Burundi now enjoys relative 
peace compared to the past years- many civilians do not foresee the country 
degenerating into war again. Thus, SA’s intervention in Burundi was done within the 
framework of NEPAD and the African renaissance, programs which strive to promote 
Africa’s economic development by resolving devastating conflicts inhibiting the 
attainment of that goal. This also reveals the interconnectedness of conflicts in the 
region, by which, it should be rather argued that regional stability should precede 
peace in Burundi.    
 
5.4.2 External parties and possibility in resolving Burundi’s intractable civil     
        conflict 
 
 Logistical and financial support to provide sufficient resources and military 
equipments in order to effectively undertake missions is of paramount importance. 
This can enable the deployment of a big force that can stabilize the situation by show 
of force. A reaction force must be formed to intervene and save civilians in case of 
imminent threats against them. This could be in form of a regional reaction force that 
can be deployed at short notice. There is need for flexible mandates that can quickly 
permit intervention in the event that civilian lives are at stake. While it is important 
that sufficient resources in terms of military equipments, financial and personnel are 
necessary to increase the chances of success in any peacekeeping operation, it is 
equally important to garner the will to provide such resources, and to formulate 
flexible mandates in order to implement effective peace operations. Together with a 
reaction force, this would ensure that the international community avoids genocides 
like the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which only lasted for 100 days but led to the 
massacre of more than a million people.   
 
5.4.3 UN traditional peacekeeping norms of engagement and peacekeeping in        
         Burundi  
 
Besides the UN traditional peacekeeping norms our own mission mandate constrained 
us from protecting civilians whose lives were at stake, and from dealing with negative 
forces like the FNL, who often  were killing innocent civilians. For instance, 
“constantly there were circumstances under which civilians’ lives were threatened and 
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some killed but our mandate did not allow us to intervene”. In some instances, a 
situation may arise where immediate action is required to save civilians faced with 
danger, but due to delays in command, which has in most cases to come from New 
York, it might be too late. However, the UN traditional peacekeeping norms, in 
particular, observing impartiality was essential in building confidence among warring 
parties (government troops and the rebels, FDD) thereby, limiting possibilities of 
conflict escalation. This calls into question the relevance of strict observance of the 
U.N. traditional peacekeeping in the contemporary era, in which human rights 
(humanitarian intervention for civilian protection) have been widely recognised; it is 
impractical (for example) to observe impartiality while at the same time having to 
protect civilians whose lives are at stake. Though, impartiality might be the best 
option to take in a conflict whose warring parties are committed to a negotiated 
settlement to the conflict, but what should be an alternative option in cases (such as 
FNL in Burundi) where a party has not embraced pacific means of addressing conflict 
and whose operations are a threat to civilians or to the stability of the country? 
Responding to this requires close examination of the relevance of observing U.N. 
traditional peacekeeping norms in the face of imminent threats against civilians.  
 
5.4.4 External intervention and protection of civilians  
 
A peacekeeping force should be deployed “before things get out of hand” rather than 
wait until the conflict has escalated and civilian lives subjected to greater risk. 
Moreover, A rapid reaction brigade should be formed that “can deploy under any 
circumstances within a short period of time”. The brigade must be well trained by 
taking into consideration past experiences and modern technological advancement. 
Each region should have its own brigade but a special (centralized) rapid reaction 
brigade that is highly trained must also be formed to reinforce regional brigades 
whenever need arises. In order for rapid deployment to be possible, there is need for 
an early warning system that is capable of detecting and reporting warning signs, 
which could be initially acted upon by preventive diplomacy (e.g., negotiations) 
before resorting to a military option. 
 
External interveners should assume a more active role (without any restrictions in 
their movements/operations) in monitoring the security situation of the country so as 
                                                                      168
to establish the actual cause of a given incident. Both the FNL and government forces 
often accused each other to have launched attacks on civilians but SA troops had no 
enough evidence to establish the offender. A host country must not impose 
restrictions on external interveners that will limit them from effectively carrying out 
their mandate. This greatly constrained operations of external troops in Burundi as 
they were restricted from moving during night hours. In addition, mandates of 
external interveners must be flexible enough to provide for eventualities. While it is 
essential for external interveners to maintain flexible mandates, it is also important 
that memoranda of understanding should be made in reference to the prevailing 
situation on the ground and not just as a ‘toothless’ tool that will not produce tangible 
results. However, in case government reneges on its commitment, and in the face of 
danger to civilians, the external party should use its humanitarian obligation and 
intervene to protect such civilians. This underscores the need for sufficient resources 
to enable effective interventionist policies.     
  
External interveners (peacekeepers) should be more proactive in protecting civilians; 
should deploy where there is potential danger rather than in safety areas- urban areas. 
This, however, requires sufficient logistics in terms of weaponry. Not only does this 
require sufficient logistics but the will on the part of the host country as well as the 
intervening force (or country); while the host country may resist military operations of 
an external force by invoking its primary responsibility of protecting its population, 
the external party may be unwilling to commit its troops in fear of the dangerous risks 
involved in such a military operation.  
 
SA mandate permits the use of discretionary measures in grave situations but in 
consultation with the national army. However, in the event that the national army is 
unable to address the threat facing civilians, they are obliged to report to the UN as 
the principle custodian of maintaining peace and security, and on this basis, the UN 
engages with the government over the matter. We should argue that, given the 
bureaucratic process involved before a decision is taken, implies that the right of 
discretion is controlled and therefore does not amount to meaningful discretion, which 
is often required to respond to imminent threats on civilians. 
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 On the contrary, an informant revealed that in accordance to SA perspective, the 
mandate does not allow them to exercise their discretion in an attempt to save 
civilians. This is “unacceptable since it restricts us from protecting the lives of 
innocent civilians”. Redesigning of mandates with a view to provide clear guidelines 
to peacekeepers as to how and when one should respond when faced with a situation 
that exposes civilian lives at a risk, could go along way in ensuring that civilian lives 
are safely protected. In essence such inflexibility in mandate that does not provide for 
eventualities that could threaten the lives of civilians and therefore make provisions 
for discretionally measures aimed to protect them, fails to acknowledge the wider 
recognition in the contemporary era, which has been accorded to humanitarian 
intervention for civilian protection. Such limitation can be located in memoranda of 
understanding between the host country and the external party, and in national 
agendas of an intervening force. 
 
According to the UN peacekeeping code of conduct, a mandate allows for 
discretionary measures but such actions should be justifiable enough. For instance, in 
case of an attack on civilians in our area of control, we are allowed to exercise our 
discretion by fighting the attacking force in order to protect civilians. However, 
according to some respondents, intervention was not done even in the face of an 
attack in areas that were controlled by external forces. This puts into question the 
justifiability of an action that should permit intervention for civilian protection. 
Perhaps, such decision is based on the risk involved in a given operation, and on the 
resource sufficiency of an external force intending to launch a military operation. 
 
In conclusion, SA’s motivation in resolving Burundi’s civil conflict is informed by its 
recent history in forging a peaceful transition to democracy by use of its own conflict 
resolution approach and vision of sustainable development. Moreover, this was done 
within broader efforts designed to resolve conflict on the continent and promote its 
development through visions, such as, the African Renaissance and NEPAD. The 
deployment of SA troops enabled internal negotiations and installation of Burundi’s 
transitional government. This increased chances of success of Burundi’s peace 
process and instilled a sense of security in the civilians by acting as a neutral force. 
However, SA’s contributions to peacekeeping under the authority of the UN was not 
significant due to insufficient resources in terms of military equipment and, as such, 
                                                                      170
troops were unable to protect civilians under imminent threat. SA’s diplomatic efforts 
helped to address key contested issues; an equal number of representation in the army, 
and power sharing based on a quota system, whereby 60 per cent were to represent the 
Hutu and 40 per cent the Tutsi. SA diplomats played a crucial role in helping 
Burundian parties reach compromises. Their wider experience in negotiations, 
diplomatic craftiness and patience significantly helped the Burundi peace process. 
Although diplomatic facilitation by the former President, Nelson Mandela culminated 
in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, the agreement was 
not signed by all Burundian parties, including rebels who were key parties to the 
peace process. Thus, the Arusha peace process failed to reach consensus in addressing 
Burundi’s contentious issues. In an effort to achieve this end (resolving Burundi’s 
civil conflict), SA engaged with external players, who were also stakeholders in 
Burundi’s peace process. Thus, the next chapter will attempt to locate SA’s leading 
role within broader efforts aimed at addressing Burundi’s intractable civil conflict.   
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CHAPTER SIX: 
REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS/INITIATIVES AND AFRICA’S 
CIVIL CONFLICTS: SOUTH AFRICA’S SEARCH FOR A 
DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO BURUNDI’s CIVIL 
CONFLICT 
 
This chapter investigates South Africa’s engagement with the UN, AU and Regional 
Initiatives aimed at resolving the Burundi intractable civil conflict. The chapter also 
presents a brief discussion on the peace and security framework set up by the AU to 
respond to armed instability on the continent, in which the security regime is briefly 
tested on Burundi’s civil conflict. Thereafter, the chapter looks at the role of the 
United Nations and African Union Missions in addressing the Burundi civil conflict 
based on field work information. Finally, perspectives of field experts specializing on 
conflict in the great lakes region are presented with a view to analyse the extent of 
external intervention in addressing Burundi’s civil conflict.  
 
6.1 South Africa’s Engagement with UN, AU and Regional Initiative for   
      Peace in Burundi aimed at Resolving the Burundi Civil Conflict 
 
The regional initiative for peace in Burundi has attempted through use of its political, 
economic, and military influence, to bring the Burundi parties into negotiations. 
However, specific measures, such as, economic sanctions against the Burundian 
government and effort by the African-led mediation, have not received adequate 
Western support. Even when the West agreed with the region’s decisions, they usually 
failed to extend necessary support in form of technical assistance to implement them. 
Despite the “uneven support” from the West, regional states have made considerable 
progress in their approach by routing the Burundian parties towards democratic power 
sharing362. It should be, however, noted that efforts by the regional states were less 
substantive in that the civil conflict did not subside. It was only when the former 
South African President, Nelson Mandela became chief facilitator of the Burundi 
peace process, and based on his approach of engaging with the West particularly for 
financial resources and diplomatic/political support, and after having helped the 
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warring parties by brokering the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi, that 
Burundi’s hope for peace became more real.    
 
As part of a new effort to revive the stalled peace talks and end a conflict that has left 
hundreds of thousands of people dead and tens of thousands in catastrophic 
humanitarian conditions, Nelson Mandela has brought the Burundi civil conflict to the 
attention of the United Nations. He was meant to address an open meeting of the 
Security Council, which was expected to adopt a resolution condemning the increased 
violence that threatens to escalate. This would highlight the severity of the conflict 
and render impetus to the peace process. Burundi’s civil war, which has been ongoing 
for over six years, has not received the international attention that other conflicts 
have363. In addition, according to Reuters, Mandela’s “approach as the new mediator 
has brought Burundi’s civil war out of obscurity, and his dynamism and charm have 
given new impetus to the long-stalled negotiations”364. Because of the dire 
humanitarian catastrophe of the conflict that spread across the boundaries of the 
country into neighbouring countries, Burundi’s civil conflict qualified as a conflict 
that threatens international peace and security and therefore requiring the attention of 
the United Nations Security Council as the key organ charged with maintaining 
international peace and security. The United Nations intervention was crucial in 
providing the necessary resources required to address the conflict. In particular, 
Security Council resolution was crucial in restraining the actions of the warring 
parties by creating fear of possible imposition of sanctions against them.  
 
In a move meant to strengthen Burundi’s peace process, Nelson Mandela invited a 
number of Heads of state from the United States, the Middle East, Europe and Africa 
to participate in the Arusha peace talks for Burundi. Mandela said that, “I want 
everyone involved … otherwise there is no guarantee they will respect what we 
decide, and the process won’t have any meaning”365. Mandela also said that he had 
invited them in order to “avoid a repeat of what is happening in the Middle East, 
where the parties are competing against each other and undermining each other” 366. 
By inviting leaders from such powerful countries, which are members of the United 
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Nations, European Union and the African Union, Mandela sought to influence policy 
within those organizations so that they could support peace initiatives aimed to 
resolve Burundi’s civil conflict. This was also a diplomatic ploy to attract meaningful 
participation in the peace negotiations by the Burundian warring parties.  
 
Within the broader framework of promoting peace in Burundi, Mandela engaged in 
talks with a European leader about the possibility of organizing an international 
investment conference that would raise funds for industrial development in Burundi. 
However, he said that this would depend on the commitment to peace by the 
Burundian parties367.  While such a move was designed to provide incentives to the 
peace process and, therefore, encourage participation of the parties to the conflict, it 
was also a realization of the salience of economic influence to the Burundi civil 
conflict, which required redress as part of a broader solution to address the conflict.  
 
Almost one month after signing the Arusha peace accord for Burundi, Mandela, who 
was the chief mediator of the Burundi peace process, invited a number of regional 
heads of state and leaders of the main rebel groups to a meeting in an effort to 
negotiate a ceasefire deal368. In order to promote durable peace in Burundi, Mandela 
has called upon neighbouring countries to monitor the implementation of peace in 
Burundi369. Indeed, in absence of a ceasefire, implementation of the signed peace 
accord would have been difficult to achieve, chiefly because the accord was not 
signed by the rebel groups including the main rebel group (FDD) which had fighters 
in almost all the parts of the country. Thus, it was impossible to attain peace in the 
country without involving the FDD in negotiations to reach a ceasefire. However, this 
does not suggest that comprehensive peace is possible without the participation of the 
FNL in the peace process. 
 
 In an effort to revitalize Burundi’s shattered economy, Mandela was involved in 
organizing a conference of major donors that was due to take place in Paris on 
December 11 and 12. However, Mandela cautioned Burundi’s warring parties to make 
progress towards peace in order to attract commitment of the international community 
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in this endeavour370. The conference aimed to solicit for emergency and development 
funds in support of the Arusha peace accord for Burundi, which was signed in August 
2000 in Arusha, Tanzania to end an eight-year long civil war. The conference was 
also seen as a hope of creating, in Mandela’s words, a “showcase example of peace 
bringing its dividends”371. Although, it was important to mobilize for funding in order 
to support the implementation of the signed peace accord, this was rather meant to 
solicit emergency funds and not development funds as the climate on the ground was 
unsuitable for undertaking development initiatives since, by this time, the FDD had 
not signed a ceasefire with the Burundian government and fighting was ongoing. The 
comprehensive ceasefire was only signed in December of 2002. 
 
African leaders have been invited by Nelson Mandela, facilitator of the Burundi peace 
process to take part in a Summit aimed at addressing Burundi’s eight year civil war. 
The former South African President will brief the 11 heads of state on the problem 
encountered by the process and they will receive a progress report from the facilitator 
on a similar theme. Chief among the problem was the failure of the parties involved in 
the negotiations to agree on who would lead the transitional government provided for 
in the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi of August 2000372. By 
involving regional leaders in the search for peace in Burundi, Mandela perceived the 
importance of concerted efforts in addressing the civil conflict, which had a regional 
bearing since it had spread into neighbouring countries and thus, affected regional 
stability. It was also important to involve regional leaders as stakeholders in the 
Burundi peace process given that some were feared to support warring parties. Thus, 
Mandela’s move was crucial in ending such support and, therefore, force the parties to 
engage in meaningful negotiations to end the conflict. 
 
The South African cabinet has approved the deployment of South African troops to 
Burundi, but this was subject to United Nation’s approval. After lobbying with the 
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, Nelson Mandela is optimistic that the UN will 
approve the mission. Mandela has also had discussions with the Belgium Prime 
Minister Guy Verhofstadt and the EU Commission President Romano Prodi, who 
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have committed to finance the South African deployment provided it was not a 
military intervention373. As part of a mobilization campaign in support of Burundi’s 
peace process, Nelson Mandela the chief facilitator in the peace process managed to 
convince donors at Paris conference to support peacekeeping operations in Burundi 
and the transitional government. The European Union pledged to fund SA 
peacekeeping operations in Burundi, which aims at protecting returning Burundian 
politicians374. Mandela’s mobilization campaign in support of Burundi’s peace 
process was crucial in generating diplomatic/political support from the United 
Nations, and financial resources from rich countries, incentives that were essential in 
moving the peace process forward and, in a sense, aiding South Africa’s efforts to 
undertake the Burundi peace mission. This effort was salient in that, it brought the 
Burundi conflict to the attention of the international community and, thereby, 
increased the chances of resolving the conflict.   
 
After two months of inconclusive negotiations in Dar es Salaam aimed at reaching a 
ceasefire in Burundi’s almost a decade-long civil conflict, Southern African Heads of 
state attending a Summit in Tanzania have resolved to take punitive measures against 
Hutu rebel groups blamed for the lack of progress in the negotiations. Heads of state 
included the former South African President Nelson Mandela and the former deputy 
President Jacob Zuma, who has been responsible for mediating the ceasefire process. 
However, because of ceasefires agreed between the Burundian government and 
smaller factions of the two major rebel groups, the FDD and FNL, the Heads of state 
have softened their stance by extending another 30 days to the Hutu rebel movements 
to have entered into ceasefire negotiations before taking action. Some elements in the 
Tanzanian government and Joseph Kabila, the President of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, are under increased pressure to cut their support to Hutu rebel groups, such 
as, the FDD. As a result Nkurunziza rebel leader of the FDD has agreed to 
unconditional negotiations with the government of Burundi375. Given that pressure 
(diplomatic threats) by regional leaders produced positive results, we should then 
argue that, the delays in Burundi’s peace process were due to lack of tough stance 
against the peace spoilers, and partly due to the support that the rebels got from 
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regional sponsors. This suggests that the nature (regional bearing) of Africa’s civil 
conflicts demand concerted effort and cooperation of regional players in addressing 
the conflicts.  
 
Jacob Zuma, who was the chief mediator of the Burundi peace process, traversed the 
region in an effort to revive Burundi’s peace process. After meeting with Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni, who proposed a military solution in order to stop 
renewed fighting in Burundi, they agreed to meet with the Tanzanian President 
Benjamin Mkapa in the near future to discuss the issue376. Zuma also visited the 
Rwandan President Paul Kagame and the Burundian Vice-President Alphonse Kadege 
in an attempt to stop the fighting377. Perhaps Zuma’s approach in meeting with 
different individual regional leaders laid in the belief that each leader had an equal 
stake in the search for a peaceful settlement to Burundi’s civil conflict. This also was 
based on an understanding that factors influencing Burundi’s conflict were linked to 
the country’s neighbours. 
 
Although the FNL has been looked at as a force that cannot pose any serious threat, 
its recent week long assault on the capital, Bujumbura proved this wrong. Zuma 
intends to argue regional leaders to use their influence in persuading the FNL to join 
the peace process by arguing that what the FNL is fighting for has been addressed. 
However, this has been impossible to realize in the past since the FNL insists on 
negotiating with the Tutsis, who according to them, still have control over the 
country’s administration and military rather than negotiating with the Hutus who are 
merely used by the Tutsis378. Given that the FNL seems disinterested to join the peace 
process, it is diplomatically correct to use regional leaders to persuade them while at 
the same time putting pressure on them by way of cutting support systems, in 
particular, supplies from their allies, such as, the Mai Mai and former Rwandan 
soldiers and militias resident in the DRC, which support, in effect, provides a 
plausible explanation to the apparent strength of the FNL. 
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Success in the implementation of the Burundi ceasefire agreement that had been 
violated by parties lay in the regional players’ resolve. However, regional players 
have not done enough to control the actions of the rebels. Although, President 
Museveni had suggested a military solution to deal with the conflict, Tanzania’s 
President Benjamin Mkapa has not expressed his position in addressing the conflict. 
Unless Uganda and Tanzania’s influence is ‘checked’, Peace in Burundi is not 
possible379. Since, as mentioned earlier, regional pressure forced the main rebel group 
to negotiate unconditionally, this obliges us to reiterate the argument that durable 
peace in Burundi is based on the concerted and cooperative effort of regional leaders, 
which effort will bring the remaining rebel group, the FNL to the negotiating table. 
Conflicting strategies in dealing with the FNL issue will only exacerbate the situation.   
 
After failing to implement the December 2002 ceasefire, the government and the 
CNDD-FDD were put under pressure by SA and the Regional Initiative for Peace in 
Burundi to resume peace talks. Meanwhile, both the CNDD-FDD and the FNL 
“raised the stakes” by launching series of attacks on government positions in all parts 
of the country, which climaxed in a week-long assault on Bujumbura by the FNL in 
July 2003. The “intractability” of the rebels toughened the regional resolve in dealing 
with the conflict; Uganda and Tanzania proposed a military solution in which  a 
regional force would be deployed against the FNL to enforce peace, while convince 
the government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD to reconcile their differences. These 
differences were deepened in early 2003 as Museveni particularly endeavoured to 
convince Zuma into deployment of a regional force that would “balance and 
strengthen” AMIB. A military solution would achieve two purposes: 1) putting 
pressure on the FNL and 2) reassuring the CNDD-FDD, which had accused the SA 
military of being biased in favour of the Tutsi. In contrast, Zuma argued that such a 
move would “inflame hostilities”, efforts should rather aim at bolstering the African 
Mission (a view that was backed by Rwanda as a measure to control Uganda’s 
regional influence). “It was only with difficulty that SA contained Ugandan and 
Tanzanian urgings that if the government and rebels could not negotiate an end to the 
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conflict, peace should be imposed by force”380. Seemingly, not only, had SA got to 
strive to search for a pacific solution to address the Burundi conflict, but also they had 
to contend with the regional power politics, which very often delayed progress in the 
peace process and hence, undermined SA’s effort to reach this goal within a 
reasonable timeframe. While it was not appropriate to pursue a military option to deal 
with the peace spoilers in Burundi before exhausting all diplomatic avenues, 
according to the responsibility to protect, it was a betrayal to the innocent civilians 
who were subjected to constant attacks by rebels not to intervene to protect them.     
 
SA’s efforts in promoting peace in Burundi proved critical. SA was viewed largely as 
“an honest and neutral broker”, and one that was committed to peace by having 
deployed its troops. SA’s leadership was supported by the international community 
(notably, the UN, AU, EU and IMF/World Bank), which although largely indecisive, 
made indications throughout the successive phases of negotiations that they were 
willing to provide financial, humanitarian and development support provided that 
sustainable progress towards peace was achievable. SA’s determination to promote 
peace in Burundi was also informed by Mbeki’s vision of African renaissance, former 
deputy President Jacob Zuma’s diplomatic skills and persistence, and Pretoria’s 
central role in resolving conflict throughout the Great Lakes381. It is obvious that SA 
was committed to promote peace in Burundi considering that it offered to deploy its 
troops before the signing of the ceasefire (Burundi was still in a war situation), which 
condition prevented the United Nations and others, such as, Nigerian troops to deploy. 
Although, to a large extent, SA troops did not militarily intervene to stop the fighting, 
their presence provided a show of force that prevented Burundi’s civil conflict from 
spiralling into catastrophic experience witnessed in Rwanda in 1994, where more than 
a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were massacred in a period less than three 
months.       
 
Mandela called a regional Heads of state summit, including the UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan and OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim: the summit, which was 
to be followed by negotiations of the signatories to the peace accord signed on August 
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28, 2000, expected to focus on the issue of a ceasefire and the person to assume the 
presidency during the transition period. These were the main obstacles hindering the 
implementation of the peace accord signed in August. This happened after Mandela 
had been involved in separate and parallel talks in South Africa with the government 
of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD and FNL rebel groups, which were excluded from 
negotiations, and continue to fight the government382. Mandela’s strategy of inviting 
such important personalities to participate in the negotiations was to render credence 
(in the eyes of belligerent parties) to the discussions and, therefore, speed up the peace 
process. Diplomatically, this was a sound ploy to discourage and create fear of 
isolation by regional leaders against potential spoilers of the negotiations. However, 
the strategy could not appropriately work since some regional leaders were in support 
of belligerent parties. This was to be helped by supplementary talks that were held in 
South Africa between belligerent parties with SA negotiators.   
 
SA has been at the forefront of regional efforts designed to end the war in Burundi 
and currently leads the African Union force deployed in Burundi. The force is 
supposed to facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire agreements but it is not 
within its mandate to intervene in the fighting383. However, there should have been a 
provision to motivate intervention in case of circumstances that would seriously 
compromise civilian lives. This should be based on the responsibility to protect 
civilians in situations where the state is unable to protect them or is itself an 
accomplice against civilians, short of this, would render the presence of an external 
force of no effect.   
 
Attempts to invite FNL in a regional meeting in Dar es Salaam on July 20, 2003 
aimed to address the fighting were fruitless. The FNL spokesman Pasteur Habimana 
“regarded Zuma as biased in favour of the transitional government” and called for 
Mandela’s intervention. “If he invites us we are ready to go everywhere except SA. 
We do not believe in Zuma because he favours government”384. Although, President 
Museveni, the Chairperson of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi opted for a 
military solution in order to stop the fighting, Zuma “ruled out military intervention 
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by SA troops” and insisted that negotiations with the rebels would address the 
conflict385. As long as the FNL perceived the mediation of Zuma to be biased in 
favour of the government of Burundi, it was difficult for the talks to succeed, let 
alone, proceed. Thus, without resorting to a military solution as an option to promote 
durable peace in Burundi by defeating the FNL, there is need for a mediation process 
fair enough to attract the participation of the rebel force in the negotiations.  
 
In an attempt to mobilize support for the Burundi peace process, Zuma the facilitator 
of the Burundi peace process called upon the UN Security Council to render direct 
assistance. He argued that the help would consolidate gains made by AMIB, ensure 
successful democratic elections that were due in 11 months, and establish Burundi on 
the path to comprehensive peace and stability. Zuma submitted that “conditions are 
now conducive for the U.N. to express its support and solidarity by taking over the 
African mission in Burundi, re-hat the existing military contingent and deploy a U.N. 
peacekeeping operation”386. Visibly, SA’s mobilisation and diplomatic engagement 
with key players involved in the Burundi peace process, emerges as an important 
boost for addressing Burundi’s civil conflict. For instance, by inviting the UN to take 
over AMIB, which they were leading, meant to strengthen efforts aimed to address 
the civil conflict by expanding the mandate of the mission and providing the 
necessary resources that were required. 
 
In an attempt to search for a peaceful solution to Burundi’s civil conflict, President 
Thabo Mbeki and his former deputy Jacob Zuma, who was the chief facilitator in the 
power sharing talks, were to meet African heads of state in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
to review a deadline for the FNL to join Burundi’s peace process by September 5 or 
be subjected to UN sanctions. In case the FNL rejects calls to join the peace process, 
the AU may consider referring the matter to the UN Security Council in order to 
isolate the rebel group as a terrorist organization387. In the interest of ensuring lasting 
peace in Burundi, the FNL factor requires special attention by way of convincing the 
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rebels to join the peace process, and consciously analyze and address concerns that 
prevent them from joining efforts designed to promote peace in Burundi. This may 
require treating the rebel force as an equal party to the negotiations.  
 
In order to deal with the fighting that has escalated in Burundi, Zuma is negotiating 
with Burundian authorities to allow a wider mandate for an African Union 
peacekeeping force. Currently, the AU troops are only authorized to use force in self-
defence388. To the extent that the warring parties very often targeted civilians, it was 
paramount that terms to deploy AU troops were designed to provide a wider mandate 
to the peacekeepers in order to protect civilians under severe circumstances.  
 
The African Mission in Burundi was not meant to be a long-term operation. It was 
only deployed in Burundi to create conditions suitable for the deployment of a United 
Nations peacekeeping force. Zuma’s appeal for UN deployment after the FDD had 
started disarming were fruitless. The UN argued that it was unable to deploy its 
peacekeepers in absence of a comprehensive ceasefire, which demand was impossible 
given that the FNL had refused to join the peace process389. The UN has finally 
agreed to send its peacekeepers to Burundi, even though, the country still falls short of 
the criteria suitable for deploying a UN peacekeeping force. This has scored victory 
for Zuma, who has twice been to New York to petition the UN Security Council for 
the deployment of a UN force to Burundi390. While Zuma’s pursuit could have 
persuaded Security Council to respond to Burundi’s peacekeeping need, perhaps, the 
events that occurred in Burundi’s neighbour, Rwanda (a genocide that was largely a 
result of neglect by the international community) might have motivated the Council to 
act against traditional peacekeeping norms by authorizing the deployment of the 
peacekeeping force in order not to repeat a similar mistake.  
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6.2 AU Peace and Security Framework set up to respond to Armed Instability  
      on the Continent 
 
Although the establishment of the OAU conflict resolution mechanism was expected 
to be a driving force of the Organisation towards managing conflict in Africa, its 
performance was found lacking391. Ambassador Sam Ibok observed that:392  
Even though the OAU and its Charter came into existence as a continental 
framework for the provision of the African collective will to ensure collective 
security and collective development, we have been unable in thirty years to 
craft a comprehensive security architecture to drive the peace and security 
agenda of the continent. This is in spite of the establishment in Cairo in 1993 
of a continental mechanism for conflict management and resolution. 
As a corrective measure to the OAU’s mechanism, African Heads of state and 
government resolved in May 2001 to establish a new security regime that would 
operate within the framework of the newly formed AU393. 
 
The norms guiding the AU’s emerging peace and security regime relate closely with 
principles of the protection framework found in the responsibility to protect. Like the 
responsibility to protect, the AU’s Constitutive Act and the Protocol relating to the 
establishment of the peace and Security Council are strong proponents of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states. For example, Article 4 (f) of 
the PSC Protocol advocates “non-interference in the internal affairs of another”, while 
Article 3 (b) of the Constitutive Act states that a supreme objective of the AU is to 
“defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member 
states”394.  
 
However, the AU’s Constitutive Act, like the responsibility to protect, places 
important constraints on state sovereignty. It is based on the premise that “sovereignty 
is conditional” and is defined in terms of a “state’s willingness and capacity” to meet 
the security needs of its citizens; the Constitutive Act recognizes that the state has the 
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core responsibility of protecting its citizens. If a state fails to meet these obligations, 
the AU has a right through multilateral military force to launch humanitarian 
intervention for purposes of human protection. Article 4 (h) provides that “the Union 
has a right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in 
respect of grave circumstances: namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity”395. In practical terms, however, humanitarian intervention for purposes of 
human protection by the AU and other partners involved in peacekeeping activities 
has been constrained by memorandums of understanding between an intervening 
external force and the host country, and largely by sovereign rights and territorial 
integrity of countries; while intervening forces in Burundi were sometimes faced with 
the need to intervene militarily in order to protect civilians that were under attack by 
the rebels, they were limited by memorandum of understanding signed prior to their 
deployment. Moreover, in Darfur, Sudan, hundreds of thousands of civilians have 
been massacred in the presence of a poorly under-equipped AU peacekeeping 
mission, while Khartoum has consistently refused the intervention of a well equipped 
UN force to protect innocent civilians.  
 
The Constitutive Act of the African Union provides for the deployment of peace 
missions carried out in regard of the UN goals and principles. The AU’s central organ 
of the mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution currently the 
PSC, is charged with overseeing actions of states participating in peacekeeping 
operations under an AU mandate. However, the central organ lacks the institutional 
capacity to carry out the military aspects of AMIB’s mandate, which includes “the 
concept of operations, force generation, and command, control and communications”. 
In addition, the AU lacks sufficient financial and logistical supplies to authorize, 
monitor and sustain a peacekeeping mission396. While the central organ has been 
replaced with the PSC, which has (will have, that is, after the standby force has been 
established) structures to deal with security issues on the continent, much will not be 
done until the issue of insufficient resources is resolved, an effect which is likely to 
paralyze emergency operations faced by the institution and thus, render it ineffective.  
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After the dismal failure of the OAU in dealing with security issues, much optimism 
has been placed in its successor, the AU as an effective force for promoting peace on 
the continent. The AU protocols on an African peace and Security Council and a Pan 
African Parliament came into force in December 2003, and a few months later both 
institutions were inaugurated397. As argued above, this will largely depend on 
sufficient resources capable of undertaking effective operations and meeting 
administrative expenses. This will also depend on commitment of the African leaders 
to embrace democratic values and practices, which will be expressed by supporting 
policies of the PSC designed to address human rights abuses in affected countries. 
 
The rationale for the establishment of the PSC emerged after the Heads of state and 
government and member states of the AU had expressed mutual concern about the 
endless armed conflicts in Africa and the fact that both intra and inter- conflicts have 
been a major source of, socio-economic decline on the continent, and suffering of the 
civilian population398. Further, rationale for its establishment was a realization that the 
development of meaningful democratic institutions, and the respect for human rights 
and the rule of law, as well as, the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction 
programs, are necessary requirements for promoting collective security, durable peace 
and stability, as well as for conflict prevention399. 
 
The concept of an African Peace and Security Council (APSC) emerges as a positive 
development given that African heads of state and government have come to the 
realization that violence and conflict on the continent threatens to frustrate NEPAD 
and other vital programs designed for Africa’s renewal. In 2003, the AU called for the 
cessation of hostilities on the continent by the end of the year by exerting enormous 
pressure on countries afflicted by armed conflicts400. However, it should be 
acknowledged that whether or not the APSC is in existence, as long as, there are no 
mechanisms to ensure equitable distribution of resources, ‘conflicts of survival’ will 
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remain. Remedies to this will go beyond the need to embrace democratic values, 
respect for human rights and the rule of law. 
 
Pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, a Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) was established replacing the OAU’s mechanism for conflict 
prevention, management and resolution. The Council is a standing decision-making 
Organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The PSC is a 
collective security and early-warning system that aims to facilitate timely and 
efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. The Council shall be 
facilitated by the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early-Warning 
System, an African Standby Force and a special Fund401. The new structure also 
includes a Military Staff Committee to advise and extend assistance in all issues 
around military and security necessary for the promotion and maintenance of peace 
and security in Africa402. 
  
The Peace and Security Council has been established to pursue the objectives that 
follow403: 
1) Promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection 
and preservation of life and property… 2) Anticipate and prevent conflicts. In 
circumstances where conflicts have occurred the PSC shall have the responsibility to 
undertake peace-making and peace-building functions for the resolutions of these 
conflicts; promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction 
activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence; 3) Coordinate 
and harmonise continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international 
terrorism in all its aspects; 4) Develop a common defence policy for the Union, in 
accordance with article 4 (d) of the Constitutive Act; and 5) Promote and encourage 
democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international 
humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.  
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The PSC is guided by the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act, the Charter of 
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Among others, 
the principles include404: 
1) Peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts; 2) Early responses to contain crisis 
situations so as to prevent them from developing into full-blown conflicts; 3) 
Respect for the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, the sanctity 
of human life and international humanitarian law; 4) Respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of member states; 5) The right of the Union to intervene in a 
member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, in 
accordance with article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act; and 6) The right of member 
states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and 
security, in accordance with article 4 (j) of the Constitutive Act.  
 
Apparently, there is tension between paragraphs 4 and 5 of the principles guiding the 
PSC; for instance, what prohibits the AU from intervening in Zimbabwe to address 
the plight of civilians- considering that the PSC is guided by the UN Charter, which 
treats gross violation of human rights to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security? This is aggravated by the Darfur crisis, which has left, hundreds of 
thousands dead, and over two million civilians in a sorry state as refugees in 
neighbouring countries. Thus, given that peace enforcement by the AU with 
assistance from the UN has been blocked due to failure to secure consent from 
Khartoum, it implies that paragraph 4 remains sacred to AU members and, therefore, 
rendering paragraph 5 obsolete.     
 
While objectives and principles of the PSC (when they are achieved) promise an 
African continent that will be built on a firm foundation, which will support economic 
development and thus, ensure improved living conditions of the African people, the 
onus is on individual African leaders to cultivate the will and commitment to put in 
place institutional structures, which will function to support and strengthen ideals of 
the PSC and other development programs like NEPAD. This could work better within 
the framework of regional blocs, while maintaining strong links with continent-wide 
initiatives.  
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The PSC is considered to be the key institution of the AU. It is composed of fifteen 
member countries, which are elected based on the principle of equal rights. Ten 
members are elected for a two year term, while five members elected for a three year 
term so as to allow for continuity. There are no permanent members and no member 
has veto powers, but requirements for membership of PSC do provide for 
participation of Africa’s economic and military powers, such as, South Africa and 
Nigeria405. The PSC does not provide for regional or geographical representation on 
the Security Council, a criteria which is salient to guard against mismanagement in 
the functioning of the Council especially in peacekeeping missions or operations. This 
is likely to discredit the activities/functioning of the Council and thus, lose credibility 
in the African people. For instance, this may emerge when it fails to authorize an 
operation in a given country whose civilians are subjected to severe humanitarian 
conditions, but later authorizes another in a country whose population is not facing an 
imminent threat. This may be further affected by continual representation based on a 
member’s economic and military resources- such a member is, in a sense, a 
permanent member- more likely to dominate or even abuse its powers.   
 
The protocol establishing the PSC provides that a peace fund, which receives 
allocations from the AU budget will finance peace missions and other operations 
related to peace and security. Voluntary contributions can also be made from member 
states and other sources, such as, the private sector, civil society and individuals406. 
But most African states have financial shortages without the burden of contributing 
towards a standby force. As a result, Africa may turn to the wealthy nations to solicit 
for logistics and peace missions funding407. In effect, as Africa attempts to mobilize 
for financial and logistical resources from the wealthy nations, operations that require 
much quicker responses will be crippled. The 1994 Rwandan genocide epitomizes this 
argument. Funding from wealthy nations may have strings attached, conditions which, 
may affect the African agenda and, thereby, render ‘African solutions to African 
problems’ of no effect. 
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In order to fulfil its mandate in promoting and maintaining peace, security and 
stability in Africa, the PSC shall liaise with the United Nations Security Council, a 
body that is charged with the primary responsibility of maintaining international 
peace and security. The PSC shall also liaise with other supportive UN Agencies in 
the fulfilment of its duties. Cooperation with the UN may include provision of 
necessary financial, logistical and military support in fulfilment of the AU’s 
obligations to promote and maintain peace, security and stability in Africa within the 
context provided under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of regional 
organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security408. However, if 
African Union (PSC) is to make meaningful contributions in promoting peace and 
stability on the African continent, they should be willing and committed to shoulder 
much responsibility by meeting a bigger portion of the budget for operational 
activities. In other words, relationship with the UN should not be more inclined 
towards financial support but, rather, technical support given that the UN has broader 
experience in peace missions and operations.   
 
The predecessor of the APSC, the central organ of the mechanism for conflict 
management and resolution authorized the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) on 
April 2, 2003. The AMIB peacekeeping force was composed of troops from South 
Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique. The mission, whose key task was to provide 
protection for the cantonment areas and technical assistance to the disarmament and 
demobilization process, was mandated to:409 
1) Act as liaison between the parties; 2) Monitor and verify the 
implementation of the ceasefire agreement; 3) Facilitate the activities of the 
joint ceasefire commission (JCC) and the technical commission responsible 
for the establishment of a new national defence force and police force; 4) 
Facilitate safe passage for the parties (during planned movements to the 
designed assembly areas); 5) Secure identified assembly and disengagement 
areas; 6) Facilitate and provide technical assistance to disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes, and facilitate the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance; 7) Coordinate mission activities with the United 
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Nations’ presence in Burundi; and 8) Provide VIP protection for designated 
returning leaders. 
 
The military component was to be composed of infantry units for safeguarding the 
cantonment areas and assist in the DDR processes, and a protection and reaction force 
responsible for the protection of the VIPs and the headquarters, and rapid reaction. 
Provisions were also made for a maritime element, an aviation element and a support 
unit410. The rules of engagement (ROE) were based on international law and the 
principle of self defence. The ROE were to focus on the protection of mission 
personnel as well as the equipment. The authority to revisit the ROE was to be vested 
in the head of the mission and the force commander but only after consulting with the 
mandating authority411. Although, AMIB had a broader mandate to execute in 
normalizing the security situation in Burundi and thus, support the peace process, 
there was no provision for securing civilian protection considering that at the time of 
their deployment the security situation was still tense and the FNL was not party to 
the peace process. This was compounded by the bureaucratic procedure in revisiting 
the ROE; this limits timely operation designed to save civilians under imminent 
threat.  
 
Renewed fighting in Burundi coincided with AU Summit and clearly demonstrated 
the challenges faced by peacemaking. This provided Mbeki, the chairperson of the 
AU, with an opportunity to call for the adoption of the Peace and Security Council. 
Although, the Summit had eleven conflicts on its agenda with the most urgent being 
in Burundi and Liberia, only 17 of the 53 member states ratified the Peace and 
Security Council protocol, ten short of the required members to form the quorum. 
Mbeki hoped that the standby force will be in operation by the end of the year, an 
optimism not shared by everyone. He suggested that the force will be composed of 
“multidisciplinary civilian and military contingents in countries of origin that will be 
ready for rapid deployment whenever necessary, and an early warning system with its 
own funds”412. Perhaps the reluctance to ratify the PSC protocol exhibited by the 
African leaders, reveals the importance they attach to peace and stability on the 
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continent. It is not unreasonable to state that the leaders felt intimidated by the 
activities that the PSC was going to pursue since such activities were likely to tamper 
with their sovereign rights and territorial integrity.    
 
However funding for the standby force that will enable the PSC to carry out its 
obligations is an issue that has raised much concern. Trans-continental peacekeeping 
operations have proven financially demanding and politically challenging, in which 
some have not met the demands placed on them. While the UN has often facilitated 
some operations, in most cases this has fallen short of the necessary demands of 
certain conflict situations. For example, the decision by the UN to send an 11, 000 
strong peacekeeping force to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); 
considering that the DRC is almost a quarter the size of the United States, the size of 
the force was hardly adequate413. This raises the importance of equipping and utilizing 
existing regional blocs like ECOWAS and SADC in peace missions, while efforts to 
establish the African standby force are ongoing. The two security arrangements are 
better placed to effectively undertake peace operations on the continent if they worked 
within a more coordinated and cooperative security system.  
 
The perceived weakness of OAU was that it lacked both the will and the capacity to 
implement its decisions. Architects for the AU provided for a number of mechanisms 
to address this tradition, including the “groundbreaking” intervention clause of the 
AU Constitutive Act: Article 4 (h) and Article 23 (2) on sanctions. Theoretically, a 
Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) will be linked to “situation rooms” in 
each of Africa’s five regions in order to share information on impeding conflicts with 
the PSC. In the event that preventive diplomacy either through the Chairperson of the 
Commission or the Panel of the Wise fail, immediate deployment of peacekeepers 
should be triggered by this system to stop or reduce the killing. Much work has been 
devoted to the creation of the African standby force, which will be composed of a 
brigade on standby for peacekeeping missions in each of Africa’s five regions, and 
complemented by observers, military police and civilian personnel on standby at a 
continental level. Traditionally, the African standby force would be deployed under a 
UN mandate, but the PSC can bypass this by authorizing the deployment of 
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peacekeepers within the context of a regional organization as provided under Chapter 
VIII of the UN Charter414. However, it should be acknowledged that, what had 
paralysed the functioning of the OAU was not more to do with the lack of capacity to 
implement its decisions, but rather, the will of the African leaders; until mid-1990’s a 
substantial number of countries on the continent were still undemocratic and/or had 
not fully embraced democratic practices and, hence, they found it difficult to support 
the activities of the OAU central organ (which was charged with managing conflict on 
the continent) in defence of such practices that were very often against human rights. 
In other words, they were afraid of ‘compromising’ their sovereignty in the event that 
the central organ intervened to address the apparent conflict. 
 
The AU Heads of state have decided to build the capacity for the AU to intervene 
militarily in potential threats to peace and security in form of sub-regional building 
blocs. The aim is for each sub-region, as defined by the AU, to create a regional 
stand-by force, which will be used by the AU in case of need. Initially, the AU will 
rely on two sub-regions that have demonstrated greater military capability, that is, the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SADC. “The 
determination with which the AU security architecture is being transformed from 
blueprint to functioning institutions is primarily a sign that key African actors, such 
as, South Africa and Nigeria have a strong interest in making the AU work”415.  
 
The AU Constitutive Act had initially provided for the right of the Union to intervene 
in a member state based on the decision of the Assembly in case of serious 
circumstances, such as, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. However, 
the recent amendments of the Act introduce “a new ground of intervention by 
recognizing the rights of the AU to intervene upon the recommendation of the PSC 
when there is a serious threat to the legitimate order for the purpose of restoring peace 
and stability in a member state of the AU”416. In the event that a given state is an 
accomplice or the perpetrator of crimes against civilians, the PSC should also 
recommend intervention, short of this, the PSC may be perceived to be inclined 
towards protecting state sovereignty at the expense of individual human rights. This 
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will deter states bent on abusing human rights with impunity and, therefore, 
discourage a culture of dictatorship on the continent.  
 
The APSC’s credibility “will surely be eroded and in many instances has already been 
undermined by serious errors of judgment regarding nations” where conflict and 
violence have been left unabated. The Zimbabwean crisis demonstrates that not only 
does a country got to be at war to threaten regional peace and stability417. In addition, 
the Zimbabwean situation illustrates that, not only, do civilians deaths and or severe 
human rights abuses only occur as a result of a country being at war. This raises the 
importance of having a well balanced membership of the APSC, which will respond 
to conflict situations in affected countries without any favour for or against a state. 
Moreover, this may call for arbitration by the UN Security Council as the primary 
body charged with maintaining international peace and stability.  
 
Originally the AU Act providing for the right to intervene was informed by the desire 
to protect the individual by permitting intervention under serious conditions of human 
rights, including crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. The amendment 
of article 4 (h) “brings back the idea of protection of regimes and not individuals”. In 
a sense, this undermines the desire to protect the rights of individuals against 
“infringements by the state”418. Unless this is corrected and much caution taken, the 
AU or the PSC will, in essence, protect an unpopular regime(s) against the will of the 
people since a threat to the legitimate order may be motivated by unbearable practices 
against human rights that are perpetuated by the ‘legitimate’ order.  
 
In February 2004, African heads of state signed a groundbreaking defence and 
security agreement that authorizes the AU to intervene militarily in civil wars, 
international conflicts and coup attempts across the continent. This agreement aims to 
prevent catastrophic experiences like the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which more 
than 500, 000 people were brutally killed while the AU’s predecessor the OAU was 
unable to intervene. The OAU was dissolved in 2002 because of its persistent 
ineffectiveness. However, due to shortage of funding, with “the African Union 
already $ 40 million in debt, the joint force is unlikely to be established in the near 
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future. According to Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, the AU Chairperson, 
the agreement provided a framework through which the search for “collective answers 
to threats, whether internal or external” can be realised419. Besides the much needed 
financial and logistical resources to enable timely and effective intervention and 
thereby, avoid situations like the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the need for an early 
warning system is of paramount importance. This is based on the fact that the 
Rwandan genocide did not erupt in an overnight, but was a gradual process, 
suggesting that, had there been a system to monitor and report developments which 
led to the genocide, the international community would have been more prepared to 
prevent such killings on a large scale. 
 
Despite the impressive activities realized by the AU in the first half of 2004, it is still 
too early to project its effectiveness in dealing with the numerous security challenges 
on the continent420. Until when the AU achieves financial independence, which will 
permit prompt responses to severe conflict situations and enable extensive and 
effective peace operations as the one required in Darfur, its effectiveness in 
addressing conflict on the continent will certainly be compromised. For example, in 
spite of the apparent will by the AU to stop killings that are occurring in Darfur, the 
Union is financially and logistically crippled to implement its will and while efforts to 
cede the operation to the UN in order to secure peace have been met with serious 
opposition by the Sudan government. 
 
Through NEPAD, African leaders commit themselves to “take joint” responsibility in 
promoting and supporting mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and 
resolution both at regional and continental levels, and to ensure that these mechanisms 
are used in restoring and maintaining security on the African continent421. Unless 
NEPAD and other initiatives both at regional and continental level address key 
developmental challenges facing the African continent, efforts to restore and maintain 
security on the continent will be fruitless since undertaking such risky operations 
requires sufficient financial and logistical resources that are in short supply.   
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The AU and NEPAD must facilitate better coordination and network systems of 
peacekeeping capacities with the various regional blocs such as Ecowas, SADC, East 
African Community (EAC), the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA)422. This will “enable the UN to work with relevant regional organizations 
in reliable partnerships. The strengthened UN focus on peacekeeping allows the AU 
to seek support in expediting the establishment of the African standby force of 
peacekeepers for the continent”423. Inevitably, better coordination and network 
systems of peacekeeping with regional blocs, will ensure faster and effective 
responses to security concerns. However, such support is not dependent on the UN 
per se, but on its wealthy members and hence, realization of the African standby force 
must inevitably depend on the good will of its wealthy members.  
 
6.3 Field Work Information: African Union Mission in      
     Burundi 
 
6.3.1 Mission objectives and challenges encountered  
 
The AU mission in Burundi started operating under OAU in 1994 and became a 
bigger mission in 2003 after the signing of the ceasefire. The mandate of the AU, 
among other things, included promotion of peace in Burundi through peaceful means. 
This was mainly done by supporting Burundi’s peace process through negotiations. In 
addition, the AU mandate included monitoring and observing the implementation of 
the ceasefire agreement by the warring parties. This was done through the deployment 
of 2500 AU troops that were composed of contingents from SA, Ethiopia and 
Mozambique. In case of violation of, or any action by parties that undermined, the 
ceasefire agreement, troops reported to the AU special representative who then 
exerted pressure on the parties to the conflict with the help of the chief facilitator, 
Jacob Zuma. As a result of AU troop deployment (one month after deployment) the 
comprehensive ceasefire agreement was signed and former exile leaders were 
encouraged to return. This played the role of confidence-building. “Whatever Burundi 
has achieved has been a result of the seed that was sown by AU”. This effort has 
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enabled the institution of a democratically elected government, and democracy is 
almost flourishing in Burundi.   
 
Arguably, the deployment of AU troops, which was led by South African troops, and 
Zuma’s diplomatic pressure, exerted considerable pressure on the warring parties and 
thereby, forcing them to sign a comprehensive ceasefire. Thus, diplomatic/political 
actions supported by military action- troop deployment, moved the peace process 
forward by enabling cessation of hostilities (at least officially), a move which created 
an atmosphere (confidence-building), consequently, leading to the return of Hutu 
exile leaders, which was one of the key factors that determined stability in Burundi.    
 
To find the best approach to convince parties through confidence-building that the 
best way to deal with their differences was to enter into negotiations. This was 
compounded by the deeper distrust that existed among the parties. It was indeed 
difficult to reconcile Burundian warring parties after many decades of ethnic 
antagonism between Hutus and Tutsis. The Hutus, for instance, believed that the only 
way to accede to power that was dominated by Tutsis for over three decades, was to 
have control over the Tutsi dominated military, an institution, which backed those in 
power. Thus, according to this perspective, a military solution was the only option 
possible to bring about this change. 
    
Financial resources to support peacekeeping activities was another key challenge 
faced by the African mission in Burundi. Perhaps, had the AU got sufficient funds, 
AMIB troops would have provided all the peacekeeping requirements in Burundi 
without need of reinforcement by UN. This poses a challenge to the realisation of the 
proposed African standby force that will be charged with peacekeeping on the 
continent. Thus, it was based on this challenge that the AU decided to play a minimal 
role- that of creating conditions suitable for the subsequent deployment of UN 
peacekeeping troops.  
 
Political and diplomatic efforts were used as measures to address the challenges that 
were encountered by the AU. This was supported by a strong and deterministic 
attitude of some key members of AU to promote peace in Burundi. Resources were 
mobilized from the international community to support the AU mission. Indeed 
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diplomatic/political efforts played a key role in convincing the Burundian parties 
towards adopting a negotiated settlement to the civil conflict. The fact that at the time 
of deploying AU troops South African President, Thabo Mbeki was the chairperson of 
the AU, and together with Jacob Zuma’s role as chief mediator of the Burundi peace 
process, indicates that South Africa played a crucial role in the AU’s 
diplomatic/political endeavours to promote peace in Burundi.  
 
Like the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi (RIPB) and the UN, the AU 
participated in all processes that aimed to promote peace in Burundi. The AU played 
the role of a guarantor to all peace deals and also helped in the follow-up exercise to 
ensure the implementation of agreements. While RIPB crucially played a political 
role, the AU provided technical support and consulted regularly with RIPB. The 
decision by the Central Organ stated clearly that the AU, which had a one year 
mandate, was deploying in Burundi while waiting for the UN to take over the 
peacekeeping mission. The UN could not deploy without a ceasefire agreement in 
place and, therefore, the AU had to deploy first to ‘prepare the ground’ for the 
subsequent deployment of the. Thus, in the search for peace in Burundi, the AU 
engaged with other stakeholders through dialogues, and sharing of information around 
technical matters and peacekeeping activities.  
 
6.3.2 African Union and possibility in resolving Burundi’s intractable civil  
         conflict 
 
Promote peaceful solutions to resolve conflicts through persuasion of belligerent 
parties; for instance, up to this day FNL is still persuaded to join the peace process. 
AU cannot launch peace enforcement in order to protect civilians unless there is a 
threat of genocide. Engaged with other stakeholders like the UN, and RIPB in 
attempts to seek for a solution to the conflict. While it is important to exhaust all 
peaceful avenues to resolve conflicts, it could be in the interest of durable peace to use 
coercive diplomacy like imposition of sanctions and sometimes engage in fighting to 
impose peace. It remains to be seen whether persistent diplomatic persuasion will 
produce a positive outcome by resolving the FNL issue and, therefore, route Burundi 
on the road to comprehensive peace. In another sense, as the 1994 Rwandan 
experience demonstrated, genocide is a planned activity, which begins on a small 
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scale and escalates as a result of a catalytic event. Thus, engaging in peace 
enforcement, that is, armed confrontation to prevent such heinous activity could be 
the best option to pursue.     
 
6.3.3 UN traditional peacekeeping norms of engagement and peacekeeping in   
         Burundi  
 
AU has a responsibility of helping any African state, which is conflict stricken, 
however, observing the UN traditional peacekeeping norms sometimes hinders such 
effort, for example, while the UN refused to deploy peacekeepers without a 
comprehensive ceasefire between the GoB and the rebels, the AU had to deploy under 
the circumstances in an attempt to promote peace in Burundi. However, it should be 
acknowledged that without SA’s initial deployment of its troops, which subsequently 
enabled the deployment of troops under AMIB that were led by SA, the African 
Union’s efforts to undertake peace mission in Burundi would have faced much 
difficulty. Besides, the UN traditional peacekeeping norms cannot be observed while 
concurrently implementing the responsibility to protect, which has been occasioned 
by the post-Cold War world. Implying that, strict observance of the UN traditional 
peacekeeping norms, will inhibit efforts aimed at protecting civilians facing 
catastrophic circumstances or under imminent threat.  
 
6.3.4 AU/External intervention and protection of civilians 
 
External interveners should try and use peaceful means of resolving conflicts, such as, 
diplomatic negotiations and persuasion. Peace enforcement or fighting is not an 
appropriate approach to resolve a conflict since very often it only escalates the 
conflict. However, suitability of approaches to adopt in conflict situations should be 
determined by the nature of ongoing conflicts. For instance, you cannot decide to 
engage in diplomatic negotiations with a government that is busy cleansing a section 
of its population and not, rather, adopt a military option that aims to stop the killings.   
 
In as long as you do not put your life at stake, the exercise of discretion to save 
civilians whose lives are at stake is permitted. A mission mandate should not be used 
as a pretext not to protect civilians whose lives are in danger. AU mission mandate 
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also allows for flexibility provided that the mission head/political authority is willing 
to assume responsibility for their actions. For example, there was an incident when 
the demobilized camps, which were under the protection of the AU troops were 
attacked and the AU responded by firing back. However, this submission contradicts 
with the respondents’ views under chapter four. Implying that, either external troops 
are hesitant to intervene due to inadequate military hardware or simply because 
mission heads are unwilling to assume responsibility for their actions.   
 
6.3.5 Prospects for the AU intervention in Africa’s contemporary civil conflicts 
 
Based on Burundi’s civil conflict, the prospects for the AU intervention in Africa’s 
contemporary civil conflicts are promising. However, for this to be solid, AU must 
always have the political will and must be supported by all member states. AU should 
not raise the issue of insufficient resources, though, it is a key factor to consider but 
should cultivate the will and determination to intervene in conflicts. The AU has also 
made tremendous progress in intervention in Africa’s conflicts, e.g., Darfur, Sudan 
and DRC. This effort is based on the need to implement Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter, which encourages regional initiatives to be at the fore in promoting regional 
peace. To the extent that one month after the deployment of the AU troops in Burundi 
enabled the signing of the comprehensive ceasefire, qualifies the argument above; 
although the AU did not have sophisticated weaponry, but the will to intervene posed 
a threat to the warring parties, who responded by cooperating to move the peace 
process forward. However, while it is crucial to have the will to intervene, it is 
important that sufficient resources in terms of financial and logistical be mobilised to 
effectively implement or enforce this will. The conflict in Darfur illustrates this 
argument; although the AU demonstrated the will to intervene, yet due insufficient 
financial and logistical resources, its actions have been crippled and killings of 
innocent civilians have gone on unabated.    
 
Peacekeeping is still a new phenomenon to the AU, which is also a recently created 
body. Given sufficient resources the AU is in position to enhance peacekeeping in 
Africa. The AU has proposed setting up a standby force, though, it involves a long 
process to realize but given that there is the will to put in place a more comprehensive 
and effective framework to address conflicts on the continent, this goal will be 
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achieved. Activities of the AU have been reinforced by the peace and security 
framework. For instance, based on the framework, the AU has been able to intervene 
in a number of conflicts like Darfur, DRC and Ivory Coast. Although, the success 
registered particularly in the DRC and Ivory Coast in containing rebel activities 
cannot solely be attributed to the AU but also to the UN and the French government 
respectively, we can argue that through the new peace and security regime, the AU 
has been provided with functional structures to deal with security matters on the 
continent than its predecessor, the OAU. 
 
6.4 Field Work Information: United Nations Mission   
     in Burundi 
 
United Nations peacekeepers were deployed in Burundi on June 1, 2004 under the 
authority of Resolution 1545 (2004). The resolution was, among other considerations, 
based on the realisation that there were still challenges undermining Burundi’s 
stability and which constituted a threat to international peace and security in the 
region. The deployment which was coded United Nations Operation in Burundi 
(UNOB) had the authority to act under chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations424. 
 
6.4.1 Mission objectives and challenges encountered  
 
To render assistance to Burundian authorities in order to achieve the objectives of the 
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, and carry out major reforms 
especially political, security, judicial reforms, and socio-economic reforms: 
 
Political Reforms 
The UN has been instrumental in helping to put in place institutions that are based on 
Arusha Agreement. This has been done through political advocacy, contacts and 
working on a day-day basis. The role of the UN has been supportive; the main actors 
are Burundians, Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi and South Africa through 
Jacob Zuma as facilitator. The result of this effort was the adoption of the electoral 
law and a Constitution, which formed the basis for elections. The UN supported the 
                                                 
424 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1545 (2004), S/RES,1545 (2004), May 21, 2004 
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electoral process technically and helped in the provision and delivery of electoral 
materials. 
 
Security Organs Reforms  
The role of the UN was to help implement the formula that was designed to share 
power in security organs- the army, police and other security apparatuses. The UN 
also supported the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) exercise, 
and the security sector reform (SSR), which led to the creation of a new army and 
police. The role was mainly effected through provision of technical assistance. 
 
Judicial Reform 
The UN has and still renders assistance to the government to put in place new judicial 
institutions and rehabilitate the judiciary. In addition, the UN is rendering assistance 
aimed at putting in place a Truth and Reconciliation Program. 
 
Socio-economic reform 
Under this, the UN has helped government to put in place new economic systems and 
helped to improve financial and economic performance of government through 
rendering technical assistance. 
 
In addition, according to a military respondent the UN mission objectives included: 
1) Ensuring respect of ceasefire agreements by monitoring their 
implementation and investigating their violations; 2) Promoting the 
re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces, and 
monitoring and providing security at pre-disarmament sites, 
collecting and securing weapons and military equipments to 
dispose of them as appropriate, and contribute to the dismantling of 
militias as provided for in the ceasefire agreements; 3) Monitoring 
the quotering of the armed forces of Burundi and their heavy 
weapons; 4) Monitoring the illegal flow of arms across national 
borders and lake Tanganyika; 5) Contribute towards creating a safe 
environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance, and to 
facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and Internally displaced 
persons; 6) Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
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violence; 7) Monitor Burundi’s borders with special attention to 
refugees, as well as, to movements of combatants; and 8) To ensure 
the promotion and protection of human rights. 
  
It can be reasonably said that UN mission objectives have been achieved; for 
example, 90 per cent of DDR and SSR have been implemented. Most parts of the 
country are peaceful except Nyanza, Kibitoke and Bujumbura rural. And owing to the 
technical assistance that the United Nations Office in Burundi provided, elections 
were successfully carried out. However, according to the military respondent, a 
number of military operations are still ongoing, for example, Monitoring Burundi’s 
borders, with special attention to refugee-  related problems, as well as, to the 
movements of combatants, and Monitoring the illegal flow of arms across the national 
borders and lake Tanganyika. According to the Burundian respondents, however, the 
UN did not exercise its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat. This could 
be supported by the failure of the UN to deploy in areas like Bujumbura rural, which 
are prone to attacks by FNL, so as to protect vulnerable civilians. 
 
Dealing with some Burundian politicians has been problematic; some elements have 
misunderstood, and at times expressed ignorance of, the mandate of the UN. Troops 
have sometimes operated in a hostile environment, and the FNL which has not 
accepted the idea of peace poses a real challenge to the UN. Thus, protecting civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence has been a key challenge faced by the UN 
forces. Moreover re-establishing confidence and ensuring security in all parts of the 
country has not been an uneasy undertaking to realize. Since the argument that the 
UN ensured security in Burundi is contested by almost all Burundian respondents, we 
could argue that though effort by the UN did not meet the expectations of Burundians, 
it served (ensuring security) the purpose through show of force exhibited by the UN 
troops. Indeed, the presence of a third party force must have established confidence in 
the Burundians regarding stability in the security environment.  
 
Implementing SSR and DDR; harmonization of the different military groups into a 
single army was met with much difficulty. Political negotiations leading to a clear 
plan of an integrated army was difficult to achieve. To the extent that the military or 
the army was the foundation upon which political power was based; the military 
                                                                      202
determined who was to govern in Burundi (i.e., like in many African countries 
without military backing in Burundi, it was impossible to accede to power), it was 
inevitable that efforts to change the composition of the army were to encounter with 
difficulty.  
 
The UN had to realize that they were dealing with different partners with various 
agendas and with conflicting interests and, therefore, worked towards gaining their 
confidence and cooperating with them to establish modalities of dealing with the 
problems. For instance, in circumstances where the UN troops would not intervene, 
reliance on monitoring and reporting the incidents to authorities was implemented 
Unless such reports were quickly processed and an appropriate response effected to 
deal with the issue on the ground, then depending on the sensitivity or urgency of the 
situation, such an approach was ineffective and compromised the security of the 
civilians under such circumstances. 
 
In an effort to appeal to the different parties to implement SSR/DDR, the UN had to 
introduce educational programs and training of the security forces, and had to go 
through President Mkapa and Museveni to put pressure on President Ndayizeye to 
approve the new structure of the army. It was important to train the security forces 
especially those from the ranks of the rebels, who had less experience in military 
professionalism, in order to equip them discharge their duties commensurate to high 
ranking positions in the integrated army. 
 
The UN has interacted closely with the AU right from the beginning of its 
engagement in the Burundi peace process, and has consulted regularly with various 
stakeholders whether at the headquarters’ level or on the ground. Similarly, through 
various meetings as a supportive observer the UN has interacted and consulted with 
the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi (RIPB) and the chief facilitator of the 
Burundi peace process in an effort to promote peace in Burundi. For instance, before 
elections were held, a Constitution, Electoral law and Communal law were required 
and so whenever there was a political deadlock that threatened the due date of the 
elections, the UN asked RIPB to put pressure on government. UN briefed RIPB on 
technical challenges that were faced on the ground and through Summits RIPB made 
political decisions. The United Nations’ interactive and consultative meetings with 
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other stakeholders involved in the Burundi peace process provided them with 
expertise and experience of the United Nations’ many years in dealing with conflict.   
 
6.4.2 United Nations and possibility in resolving Burundi’s intractable civil   
         conflict 
 
There is need for flexibility; UN operations should be easily adaptable to suit each 
and every situation that presents itself since a given country is different from the 
others; closely cooperating with other international organizations/partners (Burundi 
has been a model of this cooperation); and the UN should provide more support to the 
African Union (AU) and should seek to develop common strategies in the resolution 
of conflict in Africa. It is true that flexibility is essential in dealing with various kinds 
of operations. For instance, the dynamics of the Burundian conflict are synonymous 
with the Rwandan conflict prior to the 1994 genocide and thus, based on such horrific 
experience, the UN should have intervened quickly in the Burundian case in order to 
save civilian lives.   
 
The UN should authorize regional initiatives and individual countries to deal with 
such conflicts as they are better prepared militarily than the UN peacekeepers, who 
are not an army per se. In that regard, individual countries should be encouraged to 
intervene- a decision which is normally taken based on their national interests. In such 
instances, the UN could provide technical assistance as was the case through the 
RIPB. There is need for clear mandates from the UN Security Council that are backed 
with sufficient logistics and personnel (e.g., in Sierra Leone British intervention 
helped to stop killings, and also in Ivory Coast when the French took control of the 
buffer zone killings stopped). Besides being prepared, regional blocs and individual 
countries have better knowledge about countries in the same region in terms of both 
cultural dynamics, linguistic and terrain, key factors which are essential in 
determining success of any military operation. The UN could be helpful in providing 
financial and logistical support to facilitate such operations.    
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6.4.3 UN traditional peacekeeping norms of engagement and peacekeeping in            
          Burundi 
 
Although the question about how the UN traditional peacekeeping norms have 
constrained or facilitated UN desire to keep peace in Burundi was not explicitly 
answered by the respondents, it is apparent (in reference to the previous responses) 
that the UN traditional peacekeeping norms, indeed, had a bearing on limiting the 
actions or desire of the UN peacekeeping force to enforce peace in Burundi. For 
instance, by suggesting the need to be flexible in the previous question, implies that 
the UN peacekeepers could have acted contrary by not having to observe traditional 
peacekeeping norms, which remain cardinal to UN rules of engagement in any 
peacekeeping mission. How do you, for instance, observe traditional peacekeeping 
norms in the face of a party, such as, the FNL, which was neither a signatory to the 
ceasefire and nor consented to the deployment of UN peacekeeping force, which 
criteria are inevitable for the functioning of traditional peacekeeping? 
  
6.4.4 United Nations intervention and protection of civilians  
 
In a country where there is a government whether it is democratically elected or a 
transitional government, it is very difficult for any international military presence to 
assume fully the responsibilities of that government. This is because any government 
that has got a reasonable control over its own territory will not allow a peacekeeping 
mission or military operation to assume fully the responsibility of its own security 
organs. This raises the issue of sovereignty, dignity and pride in claiming to have the 
capacity to deal with the security situation. “The UN mandate in Burundi has never 
been to do any thing on behalf of government”, civilians were to be protected but only 
with the support of government. Chapter VII only applies for purposes of self-defence 
and protection of civilians under imminent threat, but there is no right to use force 
unless such criteria are met and/or it is inevitable to do so. However, according to the 
Burundian respondents, even with chapter VII mandate, the UN was unable to 
exercise the mandate to protect civilians who were caught up in severe circumstances, 
to the extent that, some claimed that the UN forces had to flee from their positions to 
escape fighting that was launched by the FNL in Bujumbura, which left over 200 
civilians dead. This could be validated since this was the headquarters of the UN 
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forces in Burundi and the fact that serious fighting went on for a week. Could the UN 
failure to intervene had been caused by lack of adequate military hardware? If this is 
answered in the affirmative, then we can argue that the UN decision for a chapter VII 
mandate in Burundi was mere rhetoric since such a mandate required sufficient 
logistics to be implemented.   
  
UN forces could not fight the FNL rebels based on chapter VII mandate; according to 
the army the primary responsibility of fighting rebellion and the FNL belongs to the 
Burundian army. The resolution that was adopted by the Security Council took into 
consideration the will, capacity and the desire of the government to fight the rebellion, 
which the government claimed to possess. The UN has neither mandate nor capacity, 
and has never planned, to fight the FNL. Besides, this is not an objective of 
peacekeeping, the UN forces are supposed only to complement and supplement 
whatever exists and provide support to the Burundian army provided that the army 
demands such support and is willing to cooperate. In the words of another respondent, 
“both the political will from the UN Security Council and the country in question 
determine whether or not the UN exercises Chapter VII mandate to protect civilians 
whose lives are at stake”. In case of Burundi, this was lacking because government 
claimed to have total responsibility of maintaining security in the country. What the 
UN is doing is simply monitoring human rights violations by government forces and 
reporting to the Burundian government and New York for action to be taken. Thus, it 
was difficult to intervene in such a case. Intervention also depends on the political 
will/decision of individual countries participating in a given mission area- they could 
ask their troops not to fight. In addition, the quality of troops on the ground (i.e., 
whether or not they have the capacity- logistics necessary to intervene), determines 
intervention.  
 
According to the preceding argument, if implementation of the UN chapter VII 
mandate has to be partly determined by the host government, then the mandate loses 
its primary purpose of protecting civilians under imminent threat (a responsibility that 
the host government is unable to fulfil, which is, in fact, the basis of designing such a 
mandate), and also in that regard, the Security Council loses credibility since it cannot 
exercise its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and stability at 
will.   
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In response to why the UN forces cannot deploy in areas inhabited by the FNL in 
order to protect civilians, a respondent said that it was not within the mandate of the 
UN forces to engage with the FNL, the UN forces can intervene to protect civilians 
only in case of an attack happening near its positions. To the extent that chapter VII 
mandate is primarily designed to protect civilians under imminent threat, then it was 
clearly within such a mandate to deploy in potential areas where civilians lives were 
at stake, and not necessarily that they were going to engage in an offensive with the 
FNL. Eastern Congo, where the UN forces have engaged with the rebels supports this 
argument.      
 
The current resolution mandating this mission, which is a Chapter VII mandate, 
allows the exercise of discretion in an attempt to protect civilians. Therefore, in case 
of an imminent threat against civilians in areas where UN forces are deployed, effort 
is made to protect such civilians. It is, however, difficult to ensure civilian protection 
at all times and in all places given the troop number and logistical capacity of the 
current UN mission. In my view, such a mandate extends to provide for civilian 
protection regardless of their proximity to the UN peacekeepers, short of this, makes 
peacekeeping, in this sense, peace enforcement lose its rationale. This is premised on 
the argument that the peacekeeping force may (in most cases this has been the 
practice) deploy in areas whose chances of being attacked by belligerent forces are 
slim and, thereby, leave civilians exposed to attacks.   
 
6.4.5 Prospects for the UN intervention in Africa’s contemporary civil conflicts 
 
Provided that UN missions are given capacity through Security Council resolutions, it 
is possible to enforce peace. For instance, compare the UN mission in Kosovo with 
thousands of troops and sufficient equipments with the Burundi mission, it is 
impossible to enforce peace in the latter, let alone, the very late deployment of the 
peacekeepers in 2004 when in fact the peace process started in 1998. While in Congo 
they were deployed in 1999, serious peace enforcement started only a year ago (2005) 
when UN deployed troops from Pakistan, India and South Africa with the capacity to 
fight. This suggests that the UN intervention in contemporary civil conflicts rests on 
the good will of rich nations as this, not only, determines the promptness of its 
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intervention, but the level of support in terms of financial and logistical that the UN 
receives to implement the decisions of the Security Council.     
 
Asked why UN does not immediately intervene in a given conflict but rather chooses 
to come later after people have died, a respondent argued that unless there is a rapid 
reaction force or a standby force in place, it is impossible for immediate UN 
intervention because a UN resolution authorizing the intervention must first be passed 
and thereafter member countries are solicited to contribute troops to the mission, 
which takes a duration of up to 3 months. However, it should be acknowledged that 
the urgency of intervention depends on a number of factors, key among them being, 
how much attachment powerful nations especially those on the Security Council place 
on a given conflict. In reality, this is when a conflict relates closely to their national 
and strategic interests.    
 
According to a respondent, prospects for UN intervention in Africa were better during 
the Cold War than they are in the post-Cold War era; when the two superpowers 
agreed on something they shared responsibility, but now that there is a sole 
superpower, many countries are deliberately left on their own and thus, creating a 
high incidence of conflicts. Prospects could improve only when the Security Council 
members are increased to include Africa such that critical decisions are made in 
favour of Africa’s interests. On the contrary, it can be argued that there are increased 
chances of members of the Security Council reaching agreement in the post-Cold War 
period. This is based on the fact that the demise of the Cold-War ended ideological 
clashes, which very often paralysed decisions of the Security Council to intervene in 
conflicts that threatened international peace and security. The issue is that the Cold-
War has not provided strategic interests to attract stronger commitment from wealthy 
nations toward resolving conflicts on the African continent.    
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6.5 Field Work Information: Perspectives of Field Experts   
      Specializing on Conflict in the Great Lakes Region  
 
6.5.1 External intervention and strategies to resolve intractable civil conflicts  
 
There is need for a far reaching holistic approach towards peacemaking and peace 
building that involves not only the military in peacekeeping and the question of 
political negotiations but also very importantly, the question of political machinery 
especially in a deeply divided society like Burundi. For example, in an effort to 
address differences among South African parties, SA had the Bureau of rights looking 
at minority rights. Burundi could as well consider establishing an Independent 
Commission to take on complaints of one group against another by looking at 
international arbitration in that particular question. In addition, looking at 
constitutional engineering where people would not look at themselves as Tutsis, 
Hutus or Twas but as Burundians is of paramount importance. 
 
Despite the fact that there is progress on the ground, when considering a deeply 
factionalized society like that of Burundi, sustainable peace means a sustainable effort 
by the international community. For instance, when there are elections, the 
international community needs to stay engaged for as long as it is necessary. Also 
financial assistance is necessary to support developmental activities. To the extent that 
many participate in conflicts as a means of survival especially the youth, who are 
promised a better life by politicians after capturing state power, developmental 
assistance aimed at providing economic activities will go a long way by engaging 
them in productive ventures and thereby, avoid temptations aimed at destabilising 
their country.     
 
There is little international willingness to intervene in a small country like Burundi 
unless the crisis is of a bigger magnitude. Attention is placed on countries like 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran- where does Africa fit on their priority list? Citizens of a 
country must play a much bigger role. It always looks like the international 
community is imposing human rights to societies while citizens can do a better job. 
However, the Burundi conflict should not be reduced to a small conflict not to have 
attracted quicker response from the international community. For instance, hundreds 
                                                                      209
of thousand of people are considered to have been killed following the assassination 
of the first democratically elected Hutu President.  
 
The international community should not simply intervene to stop the conflict but 
address the root causes of the conflict. All parties to a conflict must be part of the 
peace process lest you will not move forward. Moreover, there is need to build 
politically inclusive solutions. For example, in the past, the problem was that 
government excluded all Hutus and now Tutsis are claiming to be excluded. This 
raises concern in the internationally backed Arusha agreement, which provided for 
power sharing between the ethnic groups to a five term office of the newly elected 
officials; considering that political power has been at the core of the Burundi civil 
conflict, a government of national unity (involving all ethnic groups) would have been 
the most appropriate strategy to adopt, at least, for a reasonable period of time until 
the question of national unity is addressed.   
 
The region where the conflict is situated must take the lead in addressing the conflict 
and then the African Union must also take ownership since it is an “African thing”, 
and the UN could come in later if necessary. While it is important that regions should 
take the lead in addressing conflict, it is appropriate that such commitment should be 
determined by the nature of an ongoing conflict. Some conflicts require strong 
mandate with adequate resources in terms of finances, personnel and military logistics 
to be addressed more effectively, which resources can readily be met by an 
organisation like the UN. The Darfur crisis presents a clear case in point; the AU 
troops have failed to address the conflict due to inadequate sources.  
    
In conflicts like the one in Burundi, there is always need for a UN Security Council 
resolution to authorize intervention, though, this is not easy because one or more 
members of the Security Council might veto the decision. Alternatively, it is 
appropriate to send an African mission like one in Darfur with a strong mandate, 
which is supported by adequate military resources to give the peace process a chance. 
In an event that the decision is not vetoed based on the need to protect civilians facing 
catastrophic circumstances, what should constitute such an intervention in case the 
government is unable to ensure the protection of civilians or is itself an accomplice to 
the atrocities? The case of Darfur, where the Khartoum government is giving support 
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to Janjaweed militias to decimate black Sudanese is illustrative in that case. Since, 
according to the UN Security Council gross human rights abuses constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, this should provide firm ground on which the 
Council (a body charged with the responsibility to maintain international peace and 
security) should take action with a view to enforce peace by pursuing negative forces 
regardless of whether or not the country in question consents to such an action.  
 
6.5.2 Third party intervention and resolving the Burundi civil conflict    
 
A lot of interest in Burundi was a direct result of the guilt the international community 
felt for not having prevented the genocide in Rwanda. The international community 
took a simplistic picture that if Rwanda could have genocide then Burundi was next, 
not realizing that this was quite a different situation because to commit genocide you 
have to control state apparatus, which in Rwanda the Hutus had. Therefore, if you do 
not have control over the state apparatus you cannot carry out a proper genocide, you 
could only carry out ethnic massacres. Although, the extensive killings that occurred 
in Burundi at various periods did not match one in Rwanda, they by definition 
amounted to genocides, which as it was in Rwanda, did not attract the attention of the 
international community to prevent them. It should be acknowledged that the 
international community only intervened in Burundi from the year 2000 after major 
killings had stopped.   
 
The international community was unwilling to intervene before signing of the 
ceasefire. South Africa had to come in and pave the way for AU and thereafter 
exerted pressure on the international community to intervene. Because there was no 
genocide or massive killings occurring, the international community “waited to see 
how the process moved”, however, before the UN assumed the mission, the 
international community supported SA and AU in the attempt to address the conflict. 
Considering that the international community intervened later without a 
comprehensive ceasefire and when there was no mass killings occurring, implies that 
their earlier refusal to intervene was not based on the absence of genocide occurring. 
Perhaps this had to do more with bureaucratic procedures governing peacekeeping 
missions and lack of will by Security Council permanent members.     
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Burundians played a minimal role in the peace process, the process was dominated by 
foreigners. Both Nyerere and Mandela were too powerful as facilitators; Burundian 
parties were not negotiating with one another they were only trying to “befriend” the 
facilitator to the extent that if Nyerere/Mandela sided with a given party then the other 
side was wrong. The peace process should have been controlled by the Burundian 
parties themselves but the problem was that parties never developed a feeling that the 
process belonged to them. They only came because they had been invited by 
facilitators, they were reluctant and they could not expect that something positive 
could emerge. Thus, the weakness was that there was too much international 
involvement and too little Burundian involvement and no population involvement at 
all. In a way, Burundians were forced to negotiate before they were ready to do so and 
that cannot necessarily produce good results. Sometimes deadlines set for completion 
of certain tasks by the international community were unrealistic, it is important that 
the right moment be determined. It was unhealthy for the international community to 
hijack the Burundi peace process without creating an atmosphere for Burundian 
parties to own the peace process, and involving the Burundian population through 
civil society. Perhaps this was responsible for the refusal of some parties not to sign 
the Arusha peace agreement and others keeping away from the process. Such practice 
as a result blocks popular efforts that are crucial in the implementation of the peace 
agreement.   
 
After signing the Arusha peace agreement, Mandela with the help of the international 
community created an environment where exile Hutu leaders came back home to 
participate in the Interim government. 300 SA troops had to provide their security as 
they had no trust in the Burundian army. Although, this effort did not lead to a 
complete end of the conflict, it was a positive step towards resolving the conflict since 
it was a confidence-building gesture to the Burundian population considering that the 
Burundian government was willing to negotiate with the former exile politicians and 
permit their participation in the transitional government.   
 
The Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi played a consistent role from the 
beginning but they eventually became more important than the parties to the conflict; 
whenever people wanted to know the right thing to do, they would consult the 
Initiative and not the parties. Every time the parties could not agree over something, 
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the Initiative imposed their opinion on them- the Initiative became like a judge. 
Whenever the Burundians could not succeed in negotiating a compromise, the 
Initiative decided. For example, while discussing the new Constitution, the parties 
negotiated without success then the Regional Initiative, SA (Thabo Mbeki and Zuma), 
Museveni and Kagame “asked parties to accept the Constitution whether they liked it 
or not”. Now you have a Constitution rejected by every Tutsi party who have lost the 
election. While it is important sometimes to propose (through use of carrots and 
sticks) to warring parties specific courses of action to take in order to save 
negotiations from collapsing, it is crucial that extra caution be made not to impose 
your will on the parties especially if such course of action has important implications 
on the future of the parties and their constituencies. For instance, imposition of a 
Constitution on parties after failure to reach consensus does not promise stability in 
the future since that may create a ground for future conflict.  
 
There was no coordinated effort among international players. What was problematic 
was that it was a reactive international response- it occurred after conflict had erupted 
whereas if you want to be effective you have to be pre-emptive. Moreover, 
international players had different agendas as should we or not back this plan, are 
there prospects of peace or not. International community only came on board when it 
looked like the peace process was going to be successful, until then they were 
speaking with different voices. Although, OAU was ineffective, AU has not done 
much either; unlike where they are in Darfur, which is the size of France, Burundi is a 
tiny country- it is an area where you can have a very quick impact because it is a 
small country but AU does not feature very much. AU needs to use smaller countries 
like Burundi and build a recipe for success.   
 
6.5.3 UN traditional peacekeeping norms of engagement and peacekeeping in   
         Burundi   
 
 There is no standard approach to apply in a given conflict situation: look at the 
situation and ask what it requires to resolve it in a way which is durable and not have 
a quick-fix solution. In the international community the emphasis is increasingly 
becoming end the violence and not the conflict. While UN traditional peacekeeping 
norms should be applied generally, they should be amended depending on the 
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prevailing situation on the ground. In case there is an imminent threat against civilian 
lives, UN traditional peacekeeping norms should be flexible enough to allow 
intervention of foreign forces. For instance, the emphasis of a ceasefire and not 
resolving the root cause of the conflict led to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In another 
sense, UN traditional peacekeeping norms should give way to the responsibility to 
protect by allowing the international community to intervene in order to protect 
civilians faced with catastrophic circumstances. 
 
Observing traditional peacekeeping was problematic considering that the FNL were 
playing the role of a spoiler by fighting while other players were negotiating. Who 
takes a decision of Chapter 6 role becoming chapter 7 role?: there is need of some 
expedited mechanisms to allow either a very quick UN Security Council process or 
the commander on the ground to make a call- there is a problem of dealing with the 
military and the political. While other aspects of a mission/operation could fall under 
Chapter 6 and others under Chapter 7 but the UN peacekeeping says it is either 
Chapter 6 or Chapter 7. To the extent that the FNL was not party to the ceasefire and 
nor did the rebel group consent to the deployment of external forces, it was 
impossible to observe UN traditional peacekeeping under such conditions. By 
implication, therefore, UN deployment in Burundi meant an operation designed to 
enforcement peace and not one to keep peace.    
 
There is need to be more proactive in terms of peacekeeping because once the conflict 
has erupted, it is very difficult to resolve. There is need of a functional early warning 
system as it points to tension developing then preventive diplomacy can be employed. 
Peacekeeping is not about preventing renewed hostilities that are hindering peace. In 
the case of Burundi, what needed to happen just quickly as forces were being 
deployed is that the political mechanisms whether from New York, Pretoria, Addis 
Ababa or from other regional capitals were supposed to be working in concert but this 
was not happening. Peacekeepers alone cannot maintain peace unless there is progress 
occurring politically. This means that to have a better chance of promoting peace, 
there must be coordinative effort among the parties involved in the peace process to 
ensure that military/peacekeeping operations and diplomatic/political mechanisms 
complement each other. This subjects warring parties to considerable pressure, which 
pushes them to adopt a negotiated settlement to the conflict.   
                                                                      214
To sum it up, in an effort to promote a pacific solution to address Burundi’s civil 
conflict, which was contrary to a military solution that was proposed by the Regional 
Initiative for peace in Burundi, SA had to mobilize for support in member states of the 
Initiative. In order to strengthen and expand SA’s peacekeeping role, SA had to merge 
into AMIB. The mission, whose mandate was initially restricted to providing 
protection for the former exile Hutu leaders, was expanded under AMIB to include, 
inter alia, monitoring and verifying the implementation of the ceasefire agreement; 
facilitating safe passage for the parties (during planned movements to the designed 
assembly areas); securing identified assembly and disengagement areas; and 
facilitating and providing technical assistance to disarmament. Moreover, SA engaged 
with the UN in an attempt to render impetus to the peace process by providing 
necessary financial resources and political support for the Burundi peace mission, and 
assuming the mission by taking over from the African mission. Thus, SA’s role as the 
lead nation in both AMIB and UNOB peacekeeping missions plus provision of 
guidance to the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, were crucial in significantly 
moving the peace process forward. The next chapter will provide the general 
conclusion of important findings of the research.   
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CHAPTER 7: 
 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter presents a concise form of salient findings of the research, which are 
based on the objectives and justification of the study. The chapter also revisits the 
theoretical perspectives used to frame the research, makes a suggestion of 
recommendations, and areas of possible further investigation.  
 
7.1 Findings of the Study  
 
The Burundi conflict is not directly caused by ethnic diversity, but it is because of 
political purposes that ethnic differences were exploited, thereby, making ethnic 
diversity an ingredient in generating conflict. In an attempt to control power by 
excluding other ethnic groups, the Tutsi-Hima from the south used ethnic identity as a 
tool of exploitation. On the other hand, the excluded political groups (from state 
resources) mobilised ethnic solidarities to challenge the regime in power. Therefore, 
ethnic diversity emerged as a tool for political struggles in pursuit of economic 
advantages. Thus, in an attempt to capture and/or defend/maintain political power, 
ethnically motivated killings and the past exclusionary policies and a history of 
massacres were manipulated. What can be drawn from the above arguments is that, 
not only, did exclusion based on ethnic background create strong ethnic 
consciousness, a resource that highly motivated conflict, but also the strong link 
between political power and economic benefits significantly influenced the civil 
conflict; conflict was waged in order to end political alienation and therefore ensure 
economic survival.      
  
Like ethnicity, regionalism is a tool that has been manipulated for seeking rent. 
Ethnicity and regionalism complement each other to shape rent collection and sharing, 
none of the factors can explain violence exclusively. Thus, both ethnicity and 
regionalism are linked to conflicts insofar as they are dimensions on which power and 
resources have been premised and monopolized. 
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The Hutu-Tutsi animosity came as a result of such factors as colonialism, 
modernisation, the traumatic experience in the Rwandan Hutu rebellion and 
repressive and discriminatory post-colonial policies. Belgian policies had an 
overwhelming impact on both the social and political system and were responsible for 
igniting the Hutu-Tutsi conflict. Attempts by the Belgians to structure the traditional 
administrative system served to entrench the Tutsi dominance. Colonial policies 
elevated the social status of both Ganwas and Tutsis, and coupled with the seeds of 
domination that were sown by colonialists, animosity was created among Hutus and 
hence, acted as resources in the post-colonial conflict. Once ethnic differences in 
Burundi had been manipulated as symbols of superiority versus inferiority, they were 
used as weapons in later conflicts.   
 
Among other effects of colonialism is the creation of ethnocide (mass killings 
engineered by ethnicity), which has occurred at every stage of political transition. 
From 1960s, the period in which the country got its independence, the Hutu and Tutsi 
ethnic groups have been afflicted by massive violence. These killings have occurred 
within the context of power struggles, but are in fact fuelled by ethnic prejudice. 
Thus, in conformity to this argument, the Burundi conflict is sustained by the 
struggles between rival politicians for state power by manipulating ethnicity in order 
to mobilize their followers. 
 
Colonialism was responsible for divisive policies and unfair class stratification, key 
factors that created ethnic antagonism among Burundian groups and, as a result, 
significantly influenced violent conflict in post-colonial Burundi. However, this does 
not rule out, the fact that, post-colonial leaders have had a role to play in creating 
conflict among Burundians. This has been expressed through greed for power- have 
manipulated colonial legacy in pursuit of their personal ends.        
 
Thus, the root of Burundi’s civil conflict lies in the struggle for power by which rival 
politicians manipulate ethnicity and the past injustices, which are rooted in colonial 
policies of divide and rule, as tools in an attempt to gain economic advantage. 
Exclusionary policies based on regionalism are key ingredients in this struggle.    
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In light of SA’s national interests and foreign policy on Africa, SA’s motivation in 
addressing Burundi’s civil conflict is informed by its recent history in negotiating a 
peaceful transition to democracy based on its own approach of resolving conflict and 
vision of sustainable development. Moreover, this was done within broader efforts 
designed to resolve conflict on the continent and promote its development through 
visions, such as, the African Renaissance and NEPAD. This was also to ensure 
regional peace and stability in order to create an environment within which trade and 
development will thrive, and prevent devastating effects of conflicts in the 
neighbourhood. In addition, SA was motivated by humanitarian grounds and the need 
to pursue the moral and material interests of its people by engaging in the search for 
peace throughout the entire continent. Further, the understanding that the future of 
South Africa is inextricably bound up with what happens in the rest of Africa 
informed SA’s motivation in intervening to resolve the Burundi civil conflict.  
 
In an effort to reconcile and manage differences in approach to deal with Burundi’s 
civil conflict, which had called for an armed solution (raised by member countries of 
the Regional Initiative for peace in Burundi) by deploying a regional force to 
strengthen AMIB, SA insisted on a diplomatic solution by warning of the 
repercussions of using a military solution, and mobilized for support in the other 
regional countries so as to back a peaceful solution to address the conflict. 
 
In order to bolster its troops and therefore expand operations designed to promote 
peace in Burundi, SA had to merge into AMIB. The mission, whose mandate was 
initially restricted to provide protection to the former exile Hutu leaders, was 
expanded under the AMIB to include, inter alia, monitor and verify the 
implementation of the ceasefire agreement; facilitate the activities of the joint 
ceasefire commission (JCC) and the technical commission responsible for the 
establishment of a new national defence force and police force; facilitate safe passage 
for the parties (during planned movements to the designed assembly areas); secure 
identified assembly and disengagement areas; and facilitate and provide technical 
assistance to disarmament. Further, SA’s involvement with the UN in the search for 
peace in Burundi was meant to render impetus to the peace process by, providing 
necessary resources and political support for the Burundi peace mission, and 
assuming the mission by taking over from the African mission.   
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SA’s troop deployment meant to provide protection for the former Hutu exile 
politicians encouraged them to participate in negotiations and the transitional 
government, which increased chances of success of the peace process. The presence 
of SA troops also instilled a sense of security in the civilians by acting as a neutral 
force. This brought an end to Hutu mobilization for conflict, which was motivated by 
intimidation and threats by the Burundian army. However, SA did not do much in 
peacekeeping under the UN due to insufficient military equipments. Civilians 
continued to be killed in the presence of SA troops; they did not intervene to protect 
them, even though, under the UN their role extended to include civilian protection, 
and protection of ex-combatants in areas of reassembling and demobilization. 
 
SA’s diplomatic efforts helped to achieve 50/50 per cent split in the army between 
Hutus and Tutsis, and a transitional government based on a power sharing quota 
system (60 per cent Hutus and 40 per cent Tutsis) in both cabinet and parliament, 
issues which had been strongly contested by warring parties. South Africa’s approach 
in engaging with the international community in an attempt to seek for support for the 
Burundi peace process, and with Burundi’s neighbouring countries that were involved 
in the search for peace in Burundi, notwithstanding, several supportive meetings (to 
the efforts of the regional initiative for peace in Burundi) held in SA with the warring 
parties, combined to move the peace process forward. South African diplomats, 
however, misread the Burundi conflict to be almost similar to apartheid South Africa, 
where they thought Hutus lived in separate areas from Tutsis, which was not true. In 
addition, SA’s technical teams were not so helpful; they lacked a clear understanding 
of the issues under negotiation. 
 
Although, intensive diplomatic efforts under the facilitation of former President 
Nelson Mandela culminated in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for 
Burundi, the agreement was only signed by some political parties and others refused 
to sign while others refused to attend on the occasion of the signing of the Agreement, 
and the rebel movements were excluded. Thus, the Arusha peace process failed to 
attain consensus in addressing Burundi’s contentious issues. The Agreement also 
provided for a Constitution that was unilaterally imposed on Burundians by the 
Regional Initiative for peace in Burundi and SA, and yet it had been rejected by all 
Tutsi parties. Limitations in the Constitution around power sharing emerged after the 
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2005 elections as parties questioned the basis for cabinet appointments- power 
sharing. This is not conducive for comprehensive peace as it is a mere shift from 
violent to non-violent conflict.  
   
Involvement of the public in the negotiations through civil society organizations was 
expected from third parties (South Africa), which they did not do. By failing to 
involve the public in the peace process, denied popular ownership of the peace 
process (the Arusha Agreement in particular), a condition which is essential to ensure 
popular participation in the implementation of the Agreement, and consequently, 
produce durable peace.    
 
Whenever there was a deadlock in the ceasefire negotiations, the intervention of SA 
diplomats was important in striking a compromise between Burundian warring 
parties. Moreover, with the help of SA diplomats, the government of Burundi and the 
main rebel movement, CNDD-FDD were able to reach agreement on the 
implementation of the ceasefire agreement they had signed in Arusha, Tanzania on 
December 2, 2002. In addition, through the mediation efforts of SA diplomats, on 
entry into government Burundi’s main rebel leader, Pierre Nkurunziza signed a new 
peace accord with President Domitien Ndayizeye in an effort to end a decade of civil 
war that had killed 300,000 people. However, since the second main rebel group, the 
FNL has refused to stop fighting comprehensive peace may prove elusive. 
 
While SA ‘s diplomatic/political intervention (by former President Nelson Mandela) 
in Burundi produced positive results, e.g., the Arusha peace and reconciliation 
agreement, a formula from which, political and military power sharing were effected, 
its peace mission was unable to launch military intervention for civilian protection in 
spite of the fact that under the UN mission, SA had a Chapter seven mandate to 
protect civilians under imminent threat. According to the military informants, this was 
constrained by the Memorandum of Understanding between the government of 
Burundi and SA/SANDF and insufficient military hardware. However, SA had to rely 
on the cooperative effort, i.e., diplomatic/political intervention and financial resources 
by the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, AU/AMIB, UN plus other influential 
nations/Organisations of the world e.g., United States of America and the European 
Union in an effort to route Burundi on the road to enduring peace.   
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 Despite the fact that the ceasefire agreement between the GoB and the FDD rebels 
was concluded before Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU (which calls for 
intervention in grave circumstances, e.g., genocide) went into force in July 2002, it 
did not disempower the AU from dispensing its duties to promote peace and maintain 
peace within the context provided Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of 
regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security425, and 
in line with the guidelines enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
 
If third parties had not intervened, lots of people would have continued to die, and 
others displaced as long as issues of concern between parties were not addressed. Had 
third parties not intervened things would have gone out of hand and we would have 
had another Rwanda because both warring parties were determined to fight on. 
However, third party intervention was only enormous on the diplomatic and political 
front and not on the military front; were helpful in facilitating negotiations, which 
addressed key issues, e.g., power sharing, which were a major source of conflict. As 
far as, military intervention is concerned, third parties contribution was insignificant; 
even though, they intervened after mass killings had been carried out, they failed to 
prevent civilian killings that were still being perpetrated by warring parties.  
  
UN traditional peacekeeping norms cannot be observed while concurrently 
implementing the responsibility to protect, which has been occasioned by the post-
Cold War world, in which human rights have gained wider recognition, and 
international norms of sovereignty and non-intervention redefined. Thus, strict 
observance of the UN traditional peacekeeping norms inhibit efforts aimed at 
protecting civilians facing catastrophic circumstances or under imminent threats. 
 
Political will from the UN Security Council and the country in question determine 
whether or not the UN exercises Chapter VII mandate to protect civilians whose lives 
are at stake. In case of Burundi, this was lacking because government claimed to have 
total responsibility of maintaining security in the country and thus, it was difficult to 
intervene. Intervention also depends on the political will/decision of individual 
countries participating in a given mission area- they could ask their troops not to fight. 
                                                 
425 Peace and Security Council Protocol, op.cit,  p.25 
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In addition, the quality of troops on the ground, i.e., whether or not they have the 
capacity- logistics necessary to intervene, determines intervention. 
 
7.2 Perspectives on Conflict Resolution Revisited  
 
This sub-section attempts to revisit key aspects of the theories used to frame the 
current research with a view to establish the applicability of the theories in the efforts 
to resolve Burundi’s civil conflict. 
 
The perspective that conflict resolution is more effective when done in concert, and 
that greater chances of success depend on a number of conciliators available to the 
belligerent parties and a number of friends capable of coordinating their good offices 
and pressure, is demonstrated in the efforts of member countries of the Regional 
Initiative for Peace in Burundi, whereby, in spite of the fact that, regional countries 
acted through the ‘umbrella’ of the Initiative, they at times, individually pursued 
individual initiatives aimed to resolve the Burundi conflict. This strategy was further 
elaborated by Mandela’s quest to mobilise key influential members of the 
international community including the United Nations. However, for this perspective 
to hold, the need for wealthy conciliators is of paramount importance. This is 
premised on the fact that these possess the resources capable of exercising carrots and 
sticks that are often more likely to determine positive outcomes in negotiation.    
 
The rational-actor model in terms of cost-benefit calculations enables the 
understanding of motives in the desire to promote peace. According to this 
perspective, mediators in a given conflict are driven by an interest in its outcome, 
otherwise, they would not find it attractive to mediate. Testing this perspective on 
South Africa’s motive in addressing Burundi’s civil conflict rationalizes the 
perspective: South Africa has a major stake in helping to resolve the Burundi conflict. 
Though, this is “not simply humanitarian”, it is “most certainly that too”426. However, 
this is informed by the need for South Africa to pursue the moral and material 
interests of its people by engaging in the search for peace throughout the entire 
continent.427 The perspective, however, limits analysis of mediators’ motives in 
                                                 
426 Kristina A. Bentley & Roger Southall, op.cit, p.2 
427 Ibid., pp.2-3 
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pursuit of conflict resolution by suggesting that the desire to promote peace should be 
seen within the realm of power politics. For instance, South Africa’s motive in its 
attempts to address Burundi’s civil conflict points to social and economic realms.  
 
Mediators use three modes to appeal to interests of all conflicting parties in an attempt 
to reach a mutually acceptable outcome of the conflict. They include communication, 
formulation, and manipulation respectively. The second mode of mediation requires 
the mediator to be a party to the substance of the negotiations. A conflict may not 
only break down communication between the parties, but may totally prevent them 
from reaching a negotiated settlement to the conflict, in this case, the parties need a 
mediator as formulator. Formulas provide the key to an acceptable outcome of a 
conflict; they facilitate common understanding of the problem and its remedy or a 
shared belief system of justice to determine an outcome. Therefore, the mediator as a 
formulator often needs to persuade the parties, as well as, to suggest remedies to their 
differences. Since persuasion involves power, it therefore requires greater 
commitment than merely communication. In case of Burundi, however, practice 
departed from theory; although, the formula that was designed by Mandela to share 
political and military power largely seemed fair, a number of Burundian parties 
rejected it whereas others approved it reluctantly. Thus, the formula failed to facilitate 
common understanding of the Burundi conflict and a shared belief system of justice to 
determine power sharing. 
 
While theoretically, in mediation the third party possesses control over the process 
and not the outcome of the discussion, and that the mediator only helps belligerents in 
resolving the conflict but does not possess the power to impose a settlement, in 
practice, however, as the Arusha peace process demonstrated, mediators, the Regional 
Initiative for Peace in Burundi and Mandela possessed control over the process and 
the outcome of the talks. For instance, the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement 
for Burundi was reluctantly signed by the Burundian parties while others refused to 
sign the Agreement and others boycotted the exercise. Moreover, the mediators 
unilaterally imposed a Constitution (which was produced by the Arusha Agreement) 
on Burundians and yet it had been rejected by all Tutsi parties. Thus, the belligerent 
parties had no control over both the process and the outcome of the negotiations.    
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Some of the most important work takes place during the pre-negotiation phase of 
resolving a conflict. It is during this phase that when key parties to the conflict are 
identified and invited to participate, that critical issues are raised and prioritized to 
constitute an agenda, and that a formula which is to form the basis of the general 
agreement is designed. In line with this perspective, South African diplomatic 
approach of arranging separate talks with different belligerent parties prior to 
negotiation of key elements in the peace process, or talks after stalled negotiations 
like the Heads of state Summit in Dar es Salaam428 that sought to address power 
sharing, produced positive results by addressing irreconcilable interests held by the 
parties.         
 
The views of potential spoilers of an agreement must be accommodated in order to 
render a successful negotiated agreement. Reaching an agreement is determined by 
the number of parties to a negotiation. Only if the relevant parties and interests are 
included in a negotiation is the agreement reached likely to hold. Perhaps the 
realization by SA mediators, Mandela and Zuma, that without involving the key 
warring parties, FDD and FNL, in the post-Arusha peace agreement negotiations it 
would be difficult to implement the Arusha agreement, affirms this perspective. It was 
imperative to bring on board the armed movements that had not participated in the 
Arusha process, without whom, it was difficult if not impossible to resolve the 
Burundi civil conflict. However, the perspective is contradicted regarding the 
importance attached to the number and relevance of parties to a negotiation as key 
resources/conditions determining the success of negotiation. By failing to involve 
some of the key stakeholders, FDD and FNL in the Arusha peace process for Burundi, 
the facilitators of the Burundi peace process omitted relevant parties whose interests 
were paramount in determining the success of the agreement and thus, comprehensive 
peace in Burundi.    
 
Parties are fully in control when they are responsible for decision making rather than 
surrender decision making wholly to an adjudicator. This applies in cases where they 
negotiate without assistance or are helped by a neutral third party in the form of a 
facilitator, a mediator or an arbitrator in non-binding arbitration. In each of these 
                                                 
428 Henri Boshoff and Jean Marie Gasana, op.cit., 24 Nov. 2003 
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cases, the responsibility to make the final decision lies with the conflicting parties. 
Facilitation is where the third party suggests the procedures to be followed in 
negotiation, while mediations is where the third party takes a  more active role in 
brokering the negotiations, and non-binding arbitration is where the third party 
suggests a solution for their consideration. However, in practical terms the difference 
between these roles is not clear-cut, notably, between facilitation and mediation. 
Often a facilitator looks for consensus … But a facilitated process should not aim at 
consensus … The goal of facilitation should not be to reach agreement but to improve 
communication and increase understanding. In the case of Burundi peace process, all 
the roles were interchangeably used to the extent that, not only, did third parties 
suggest the adoption of a Constitution that was produced by the Arusha Agreement, 
but imposed it on them. Moreover, given the reluctance and refusal by many of the 
Burundian parties to sign the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi, 
suggests that the goal of facilitation in the Arusha peace process for Burundi was to 
reach agreement, rather than improve communication and increase understanding to 
enable the belligerent parties to reach agreement without pressure.   
 
In order to resolve conflicts in society, much emphasis should be put on satisfying 
human needs. In other words, achieving a harmonious society is conditioned by 
needs-satisfaction. Problem-solving at any social level extending to interactions 
between states- can be fruitful only, when individual needs are taken as the basis of 
analysis and planning. Meeting individual human needs facilitates an individual to 
function as an efficient unit within a social system, without which no social 
organization can exist harmoniously. Thus, the link between needs satisfaction and 
social harmony suggests three things, first, that if basic human needs are met, then 
conflicts are inevitably rooted out. Conflicts emerge due to systematic frustration and 
prevention of certain individual needs. Second, once analysis and planning are based 
on needs, it will be much easier to identify and deal with conflict. Thirdly, though, a 
variant of the second interpretation, it is argued that every conflict carries within itself 
an aspect of need satisfaction. Conflict breaks out as a failure to recognize certain 
needs of a particular group or though recognized, have been frustrated or 
unsatisfactorily fulfilled. Once the needs at hand are identified and legitimately 
recognized to require fulfilment, the course for conflict resolution is mapped out. The 
link between social harmony and needs satisfaction makes much sense to the Burundi 
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civil conflict, which is “largely considered a fight for good jobs, … and economic 
advantage”429. Since access to these needs is associated with those in power or those 
with political connections430, majority of whom were Tutsis, thus it is fair to say that 
the civil conflict in Burundi that was launched by the Hutus was linked to the desire to 
correct this imbalance and thereby satisfy basic needs. Moreover, systematic 
frustration reflected in the “tradition of ethnic exclusion in politics contributed to 
ethnic polarization” and thus, confirms the link between social harmony and needs 
satisfaction in the case of Burundi. 
 
Africa’s conflicts cannot be attributed exclusively to ethnicity or external forces as 
this limits the understanding of the complexity of the conflicts. According to this 
perspective, the use of a combination of factors ought to be used in order to 
understand Africa’s intractable conflicts. The Burundi civil conflict epitomizes this 
thinking. As the current research reveals, a number of factors combine together to 
explain the conflict in Burundi. For instance, one cannot argue that the conflict was 
exclusively caused by ethnic animosity between Hutus and Tutsis, but it was rather 
rooted in the desire to capture and/or preserve political power by manipulating 
ethnicity, regionalism, colonial legacy, and the history of the origin of Burundi as a 
nation.  
    
The rationale for intervention for human protection is based on the need to protect 
civilians facing major catastrophes when the state in question is either unable or 
unwilling to bring the situation to an end, or is itself involved in perpetuating the 
situation. It is also based on the need to contain an internal situation that constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security. Also intervention is informed by a broad 
spectrum of international legal instruments and principles such as fundamental natural 
law principles; the human rights provisions of the UN Charter; the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Additional Protocols on international humanitarian 
law, and many others. Although, atrocities that were committed during the civil 
conflict in Burundi clearly fulfilled conditions necessary to launch humanitarian 
intervention for civilian protection, this was not done and as a result the conflict 
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claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. Even when the AU and later the UN 
intervened, civilians continued to die in the face of the ‘peacekeepers’ due to lack of a 
clearly mandated peace enforcement mission.   
 
7.3 Recommendations 
 
In order to allow for successful implementation of the Arusha Agreement there is 
need for the participation of all Burundians in the peace process. Thus, there is need 
to unpack and rediscuss key parts of the agreement, e.g., the question of 
justice/impunity, by involving all Burundians. This will ensure that all Burundians 
own the peace process and, therefore, enable smooth and popular implementation of 
the agreement, which will establish the country on a solid foundation of peace.  
 
Moreover, there is need to revisit the Arusha agreement in order to create a culture 
that will promote peaceful change of government. This will include, addressing the 
issue of political power whereby parties will not develop a feeling of alienation, as it 
is the case now; Tutsi parties have questioned the basis for their exclusion from the 
cabinet, which was formed after the October 2005 elections. Given that the key 
driving force behind Burundi’s civil conflict centres around power, there is need to 
ensure that effective and fair mechanisms (in the eyes of all the parties) of power 
sharing are put in place in order to build permanent peace in Burundi. Power sharing 
should, however, be a long-term initiative until Burundians have embraced, a national 
identity i.e., see themselves as Burundians and not in terms of Hutu-Tutsi ethnic 
groups, and a democratic culture. For instance, the recent coup plot demonstrates the 
salience of inclusiveness in power sharing by all parties across ethnic and ideological 
lines; former President Ndayizeye has been arrested together with others thought to 
have plotted a coup against President Nkurunziza’s government in August 2006431. 
According to BBC News, arrests included Aleen Mugaravabona, leader of FNL-
Chanzo, a faction that split from the main FNL rebel movement, and the former vice-
President Alphose-Marie Kadege, who is a Tutsi432.  
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Although, the current Constitution was passed through a referendum, it was not 
generally accepted by Tutsis and was influenced by the Arusha peace process. A new 
Constitution that will encourage the participation of all Burundians should be made in 
order to provide a solid ground for peace-building in Burundi. The question of justice 
should be dealt with decisively in order to bring to an end the culture of impunity, and 
a Commission of Truth and Reconciliation should be set up in order for people to 
know what happened and forgive. This will ensure that mass killings based on 
revenge, which have occurred periodically in Burundi, are prevented from ever 
reoccurring. 
 
In an effort to address the FNL issue, there is need for cooperation among 
neighbouring countries, and support from the international community, which support 
should ensure that alliances of the FNL with negative forces in Congo, such as, the 
Mai Mai and former Rwandan militias and soldiers come to an end by cutting off their 
supplies and support base, and also support initiatives aimed at convincing the FNL to 
start serious negotiations with government. Countries of the region should cooperate 
to promote regional peace because peace in Burundi depends on the prevailing 
regional environment.  
 
If Burundi is to have long-lasting peace and reconciliation, the country should revisit 
its violent history and bring to justice those responsible for committing atrocities 
against Burundians. Thus for peace and justice to be a reality in Burundi, the question 
of impunity must be given greater consideration433. However, in order for retribution 
to bear positive results, it should be pursued within the context of truth and 
reconciliatory justice system so as to prevent an administrative crisis, which could 
degenerate into violent conflict. This argument is premised on the fact that many 
members of the current government of Burundi, including the FNL, who have 
recently signed a comprehensive peace agreement with the government of Burundi, 
and many others in the previous governments are either directly responsible or 
accomplices to the atrocities which have occurred in Burundi.  
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The post-election government with the assistance of the international community 
should revisit the implementation of Protocol IV of the Arusha peace accords, which 
provides for the key and immediate priorities for the reconstruction and development 
of the new Burundian state, and which priorities will determine the sustenance of the 
current peace. For example, attention and resources must focus on human 
development to avoid slipping back into a “conflict trap”. Thus, the needs of the most 
vulnerable and those with potential to spoil the peace should be addressed. Since 
access to land is the key issue facing post-conflict Burundi with more than 90 percent 
of the population dependent on land for their livelihood, challenges to land access 
must be addressed to avoid land related conflict. Moreover, lasting peace is 
impossible as long as, the problem of refugees and ‘senistrés’ is not definitively 
resolved, and the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Further, the Burundian 
society that has been plagued by decades of conflict demands political reconstruction 
in form of reform of the judiciary, advancement of women, democratization of 
institutions, and support for the legislature, civil society and the media434.  
 
In addition, the international community should support Burundi’s economic recovery 
and reconstruction in order to provide opportunities for the youth to engage in 
productive activities and, hence, avoid the temptation of joining rebel activities as a 
means of survival. Because of the devastation to the economy that was left by over a 
decade long civil war, unemployment especially in the youth is alarming and thus, 
there is urgent international support to rebuild the economy as a measure to prevent 
the vulnerable youth from engaging in destructive activities. 
 
There is need to introduce education for peace programs with a view to sensitize 
people to get rid of ethnicism, and promote national identity- people should be seen as 
Burundians and not in terms of Tutsis or Hutus. This initiative would include 
extensive and nation-wide public information system designed to correct the past 
distortions in Burundi’s history of its people, which partly share blame for ethnic 
antagonism in Burundi. It is through this conscious effort that the key concern (the 
ethnic question) of the FNL can be addressed.   
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In order for peacemaking efforts to bear positive results, there must be comprehensive 
efforts to identify and strengthen structures which will consolidate peace and promote 
confidence and a better life for the people. These, among others, include repatriation 
of refugees, providing training for security personnel, supporting efforts to protect 
human rights, reforming state institutions and encouraging political participation 
through formal and informal processes435. These efforts could be implemented along 
with identifying the root causes of conflict among Burundian groups by engaging the 
Burundian public in the process. It is based upon this information that realistic and 
effective conflict resolution instruments can be established to address the root causes 
of the conflict.  
 
Although, the joining of the FNL in the peace process by signing a comprehensive 
peace agreement with the government of President Nkurunziza on September 7, 2006 
in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, falls outside the timeframe of this research, it is 
nonetheless worth noting, as this gesture has increased chances of success in reaching 
long-lasting peace in Burundi. However, by granting provisional immunity for 
members of the FNL436, is a loophole in the agreement that may undermine the peace 
process and thus inhibit durable peace in Burundi. This is because by waiving 
immunity from the FNL will be practicing ‘one-sided justice’ over a section of 
Burundians and yet many politically and military affiliated Burundians have 
committed heinous crimes against the Burundian people. Thus, under the present 
climate, it is politically and socially appropriate to tread on the path of truth and 
reconciliation.   
 
As long as it is evident that the host country is unable to provide security to all its 
citizens, the UN Security Council should go ahead and discharge Chapter VII 
mandate whether or not the host country is willing to consent to such an action. This 
should be based on the responsibility to protect civilians under imminent threat, and 
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such action should fall within the Council’s responsibility to maintain international 
peace and security.  However, this requires a strong mandate, which is sufficiently 
backed by logistics and stipulates clearly the will of the Council in order to enable 
effective implementation of the Council’s decision. This will also demand that 
countries contributing troops to the UN, surrender their will to the UN in determining 
whether or not their troops should enforce peace. This will ensure that the UN is not 
paralyzed in the course of executing its decisions.     
 
The Burundi civil conflict demonstrates an urgent need for an early warning system, 
which can identify potentially precarious situations/indicators that demand urgent 
action in terms of diplomatic/political and military intervention in order to address 
them timeously and thereby, prevent mass killings of civilians. This is premised on 
the fact that hundreds of thousands of Burundians were massacred under mysterious 
circumstances that were unable to attract immediate intervention by the international 
community.   
 
7.4 Areas of Possible Further Investigation  
 
There is need to explore the extensive role that was played by Burundi’s neighbouring 
countries under the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi. To the extent that their 
role started far back in 1998, will help in unveiling the impact of diplomatic/political 
actions by the Initiative in shaping and influencing the Burundi peace process;    
Investigating the applicability of South Africa’s model of conflict resolution, which is 
based on its experience in addressing the pre-1994 conflict in resolving Burundi’s 
intractable civil conflict, will go a long way in drawing important lessons of relevance 
that will inform Africa’s international relations; 
 
An investigation into the coordinative efforts of the various parties that were involved 
in the search for peace in Burundi will unveil important information crucial in 
harmonizing and strengthening efforts designed to promote peace in intractable 
conflicts. Such information could be helpful in cutting down costs in terms of 
resources and the timeframe for peace negotiations, and could also check on 
unnecessary clashes/differences between stakeholders involved in helping to promote 
peace; and 
                                                                      231
 
Inquiring into efforts of internal third parties, such as, civil society organizations and 
the elite could reveal important information that such groups can play in concert with 
the support of external third parties in addressing civil conflicts. This is based on the 
fact that these groups have a better knowledge of the issues confronting warring 
parties.   
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APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
SA Officials 
Name: ………………………………………………………. 
Position/Profession: ……………………………………….. 
Organization/Department: ………………………………..  
 
1. Why is Burundi considered of any importance to you given that it is 
geographically distant from SA? 
2. Where does Burundi fit in your national interests and foreign policy on 
Africa? 
3. What motivated you in strongly joining the Burundi peace process given that 
there were already other key players involved in the process? 
4. How did you go about reconciling differences between you and other key 
parties (e.g., the Regional Initiative for Burundi) in an attempt to resolve the 
Burundi civil conflict? 
5. Considering SA’s economic and military potential, why did you opt to involve 
the AU and later the UN in peacekeeping in Burundi? 
6. How did SA diplomats/negotiators manage the Burundi peace process in 
partnership with the Regional Initiative for Burundi, AU and the UN? 
7. In what ways is SA’s polarized society during the transition to democracy 
relate to the Burundian warring parties or society? 
8. How does SA’s past experience in negotiating a successful transition to 
democracy help in bringing the Burundian warring parties towards a 
negotiated settlement? 
9. SA’s ‘conflict resolution approach’ is considered to have played a significant 
role in helping the Burundi belligerent parties reach agreement on a number of 
contentious issues. What is the premise of this approach and how was it 
applied in Burundi’s conflict situation? 
10. What do you consider to be the key lessons learned by SA officials in the 
attempt to resolve Burundi’s intractable conflict? 
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      Burundian Officials 
 
1. What role does ethnicity play in fueling the civil conflict in Burundi? 
2. Is regionalism a component of the civil conflict in Burundi? Explain 
Briefly 
3. How has economic and political exclusion perpetuated conflict in the 
Burundian communities? 
4. Colonial legacy is thought to be a factor explaining conflict among the 
Burundian people, do you agree with the statement? Explain briefly 
5. In your view what do you consider to be the root cause of the Burundi 
civil conflict? 
6. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi is seen 
to be a vehicle for addressing Burundi’s civil conflict, do you agree 
with this? Explain briefly 
7. Do you think if third parties (external actors) had not intervened in 
Burundi, the civil conflict would have escalated and thereby causing 
massive population displacements and alarming deaths? Explain 
briefly 
8. In what ways has SA’s diplomatic mediation specially benefited the 
Burundi peace process? 
9. How has SA’s peacekeepers helped to keep peace in Burundi? 
                 10.  What were your expectations of the role of third party Interveners                                
                         (South Africa’s peace mission) in particular? 
                 11.    In your opinion, what needs to be done to ensure comprehensive   
                           peace in Burundi?   
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Burundi Peacekeeping Mission/SA Operational Commanders 
 
1. What are your mission objectives and to what extent have you achieved them? 
2. What are the key challenges that you have encountered in pursuing your 
mission objectives? 
3.  How have you addressed such challenges? 
4. How much support or cooperation have you received from the Government of 
Burundi and other belligerent parties in the course of pursuing your mission 
objectives? 
5. In what ways have you engaged with other external parties, involved in the 
search for peace in Burundi, in an attempt to achieve your mission objectives? 
6. In your opinion, do you think that this mission is worthwhile undertaking? 
Explain briefly 
7. In your view, what do you think efforts of external parties should involve in 
order to successfully respond to the Burundi conflict or a similar conflict 
situation? 
8. How has UN traditional peacekeeping norms of engagement constrained or 
facilitated your actions or desire to keep peace in Burundi? 
9. In your opinion, what do you think should be done by external interveners in 
order to protect civilians facing catastrophic circumstances in an intractable 
conflict like the one in Burundi? 
10. Does your mandate allow you to exercise your discretion in order to save 
civilians whose lives are at stake? Explain briefly 
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United Nations Officials in Burundi 
 
1. What are your mission objectives and to what extent have you achieved them? 
2. What are the key challenges that you have encountered in pursuing your 
mission objectives? 
3. How have you addressed such challenges? 
4. In what ways have you engaged with other external parties (AU mission in 
Burundi and the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi), involved in 
addressing Burundi’s civil conflict, in an attempt to achieve your mission 
objectives? 
5.  In your view, what do you think efforts of the UN should involve in order to 
successfully respond to Burundi’s civil conflict or a similar conflict situation? 
6. How has UN traditional peacekeeping norms of engagement constrained or 
facilitated your actions or desire to keep peace in Burundi? 
7. In your opinion, what do you think should be done by the UN in order to 
protect civilians facing catastrophic circumstances in an intractable conflict 
like the one in Burundi? 
8. Does your mandate allow you to exercise your discretion in order to save 
civilians whose lives are at stake? Explain briefly 
9. According to your own assessment, what do you consider to be the prospects 
for the UN intervention in Africa’s contemporary civil conflicts? 
10. Given the current international dispensation (post-cold war era), what are the 
prospects for the UN intervention in Africa’s contemporary civil conflicts?  
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African Union Officials in Burundi 
 
1. What are your mission objectives and to what extent have you 
achieved them? 
2. What are the key challenges that you have encountered in pursuing 
your mission objectives? 
3. How have you addressed such challenges? 
4. In what ways have you engaged with other external parties (UN 
mission in Burundi and the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi), 
involved in addressing Burundi’s civil conflict, in an attempt to 
achieve your mission objectives? 
5. In your view, what do you think efforts of the AU should involve in 
order to successfully respond to Burundi’s civil conflict or a similar 
conflict situation? 
6. How has UN traditional peacekeeping norms of engagement 
constrained or facilitated your actions or desire to keep peace in 
Burundi? 
7. In your opinion, what do you think should be done by the AU in order 
to protect civilians facing catastrophic circumstances in an intractable 
conflict like the one in Burundi? 
8. Does your mandate allow you to exercise your discretion in order to 
save civilians whose lives are at stake? Explain briefly 
9. According to your own assessment, what do you consider to be the 
prospects for the AU intervention in Africa’s contemporary civil 
conflicts? 
10. Based on the experience of the African Mission in Burundi, how do 
you assess the AU’s peace and security framework set up to respond to 
armed instability on the continent?  
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Field Experts specializing on Conflict in the Great Lakes Region 
 
1. How is the Burundi conflict related to the broader conflicts in the Great 
Lakes Region? 
2. What do you consider to be the international/regional implications of 
Burundi’s civil conflict? 
3. How is ethnic extremism/solidarity, as a dimension of the Burundi 
civil conflict, a potential threat to regional/international peace and 
security? 
4. Based on your experience, what do you think lies at the root of 
Burundi’s intractable civil conflict? 
5. Do you think that strict observance of the UN traditional peacekeeping 
norms in a conflict as that of Burundi is feasible? Explain 
6. Do you think that Burundi is at the dawn of enduring peace, given the 
Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi and other key 
agreements (e.g., Protocol on Political, Defense and Security Power 
sharing in Burundi) reached in Pretoria by the Burundian Government 
and the key former rebel group (FDD)? 
7. In light of contemporary intractable African civil conflicts like the one 
in Burundi, what do you consider to be the appropriate 
actions/strategies that the international community should adopt in 
order to address them? 
8. In your opinion, what do you think are the likely repercussions of the 
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi that was not 
signed by the two main rebel groups (FDD and FNL) and was also not 
approved by a number of smaller parties? 
9. What do you consider to be the underlying challenges of Burundi’s 
civil conflict that need to be addressed in order for the country to be 
routed on the road to peace? 
10. Given the devastating nature of Burundi’s civil conflict on the civilian 
population and neighboring countries, how do you assess the 
international response that has attempted to contain the situation? 
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APPENDIX II: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS INTERVIEWED  
 
Burundian Officials: 
 
Interview with: 
 
Philippe Nzobonariba, Secretary General of Government, January 4, 2006; 
 
Etienne Kana, former rebel leader (PARAMEHUTU), January 5, 2006; 
 
Ambassador Celestin Niyongabo, Director General Ministry of External Relations and 
Cooperation, January 5, 2006; 
 
Sinunguruza Trerence, former Foreign Affairs Minister, January 9, 2006; 
 
Colonel Léonidas Nijimbere, Commission of Demobilisation and Reintegration, 
January 10, 2006; 
 
Prof. Julien Nimubona, University of Burundi, January 10, 2006; 
 
Appolinaire Ngahungu, Journalist and former Presidential interpreter, January 11, 
2006; 
 
Dr Christopher Sebudandi, President, Observatory of governmental actions, January 
12, 2006; 
 
Gérard Hakizimana, Assistant Mayor, Bujumbura city, January 12, 2006; 
 
Lambert Ntahimpera, Vice-President, FNL-Incanzo, January 17, 2006; 
 
Pierre Buyoya, former President of the Republic of Burundi, January 19, 2006; 
 
General Silas Ntigurirwa, former FDD Commander, January 23, 2006 
 
 
SA Operational Commanders 
 
Interview with: 
 
Colonel Clinton Sandmann, December 16, 2005; 
 
Captain H. Van Rynerld, December 20, 2005; 
 
Captain Xapa Charles, December 21, 2005; 
 
Lt. Colonel Mafheda Robson, January 6, 2006 
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UN Officials in Burundi 
 
Interview with: 
Ambassador Nureldin Satti, UN Deputy Special Representative of the 
Secretary General, December 20, 2006; 
Pierre Bardoux, Political officer, January 17, 2006; 
Brigadier General Boucheba Boucheba, Deputy Force commander, UN 
peacekeepers, January 19, 2006. 
 
AU Officials in Burundi 
 
Interview with: 
     Ambassador Mamadou Bah Thierno Gobihi, Special Representative of the    
     Commission of the African Union, December 21, 2006;       
      Falmata Liman, Political Officer, January 4, 2006  
 
 
Field Experts specializing on Conflict in the Great Lakes Region 
 
Interview with: 
           Prof. Solomon Hussein, Director, Unit for African Studies, Center for   
           International Political Studies, Pretoria University, March 23, 2006 
           Jan Van Eck, Expert, ISS, Pretoria, March 29, 2006 
           Henri Boshoff, Expert, Military Analyst, ISS, May 02, 2006 
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APPENDIX III: Map of Burundi 
  
 
 
Source: Lonely Planet  
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